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2Abstract
The burst of the mortgage meltdown in the U.S since 2007 is the gravest financial crisis that
we have witnessed until now. This dissertation concentrate on the mortgage securitization and
its credit risk, which are criticized as the main causes of the crisis. From the point of the veiw
of mortgage's evolution, the nature, structure and function of mortgage has been radically
changed, yet the mortgage law did not give appropriate response to this market change.
Meanwhile, the U.S legilslations facilitating the mortgage securitization also have rotten the
legal foundations for mortgage market self-regulation and sustained development. These
constitute the institutional causes of the financial crisis. In contrast, the EU covered bond
system has kept financial stability for 200 years' time, and their statutory approach has been
proved to be able to control the credit risk and incentive problems very well, in combination
of market self-regulation and public regulation. So the future reform should be directed to
strengthen the market's capacity of self-regulation and improve the public regulation through
reducing the improper intervention, such as the homeownership policy of the U.S. For the
development of mortgage securitization in China, it is suggested to introduce the EU covered
bond system for the reason of the equilibrium between funding efficiency and financial
stability.
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6I Introduction
Awealth story: How an individual becomes a millionaire within 10 years in China?
In 2000, two Chinese guys were graduated from the same university in Beijing, and one was
employed by a private company (hereinafter referred to as Guy A) and the other went to work
for a national state-owned company (hereinafter referred to as Guy B). They were very
intelligent, got the similar marks in the university courses and enjoyed the same scholarship.
In one word, their achievements in the university are nearly the same. However, something
different occurred after their employment. Guy B purchased an apartment of 120 square
meters in 2002 with the financial assistance from his parents at the price of RMB 3,000 per
square meter, and was distributed an apartment of 100 square meters by the state-owned
company with a lower price than the first one in 2003. In 2005, he bought a third apartment
of 150 square meters with the mortgage loan from a leading commercial bank, in a good zone
with the price of 6000 RMB per square meter. Now, these three apartments are estimated with
a value of more than 12 million RMB, equal to $1.86 million. In contrast, Guy A just
purchased a small apartment of 80 square meters in 2004, which is evaluated with a value of
2 million RMB, equal to $310,000. Because of the high housing price and the current
tightening monetary policy on the purchase of the second apartment, it becomes very difficult
for Guy B to purchase another apartment for his big family, including his retired parents and
his boy.
This is what has happened and is still occurring every day in the bigger cities of china, a true
wealth story. Because of various reasons, two university graduates, owning nearly the same
characteristics, shared different life experiences and owned different amount of wealth since
their graduation. And this is precisely what I will study in this dissertation: In a society where
the housing constitutes the main component of the citizens’ wealth, what should we do to help
the citizens realize their homeownership dream, an urgent need for the new city immigrants in
china, especially the Chinese young generations. Is mortgage securitization a possible
7alternative to finance the housing purchase of the low-and media- income families, as has
done in the U.S. and EU? However, the burst of the sub-prime crisis in the American
secondary mortgage market told us that the mortgage securitization could be a potential risky
business for the reason of financial stability. Recently the China government has decided to
re-start its securitization practices. At the same time, the advocates of securitization also
admitted frankly that the legal regime governing securitization transactions is still not very
well developed1. How to develop mortgage securitization in an emerging country is a great
challenge for both the decision-makers and the market participants: in the first place, it should
make the housing more affordable than before, and at the same time, the financial stability
should also be considered in priority. This story is the starting point and the end of the current
research.
1 See the statement of the vice-president, Shiyu Liu, from the People's Bank of China, available at:
http://finance.ifeng.com/roll/20110429/3955538.shtml, visiting date: 2011.05.10; Information about the recent
development of securitization in China can also be accessible at:
http://finance.jrj.com.cn/2012/02/27001712343192.shtml, visiting date: 2012.02.28.
8Securitization is one of the most significant and popular legal and financial innovations in the
past four decades. It has been the fastest growing form of capital formation because it gives
originators of the receivables an additional way to raise capital to finance their operations or
to extend credit to consumers2. For example, the private label securitization of mortgage loans
at the end of 2007 reached up to 2918.2 billions of dollars3, while there were only 11 billions
of dollars of mortgage loans securitized as the end of 19844. However, in the past 5 years we
have witnessed the greatest economic meltdown as a result of the sub-prime crisis since the
Great Depression. Many financial institutions have suffered great losses because of the
plummeting house price and increasing mortgage defaults , and some leading financial
institutions have disappeared, been nationalized or been merged by their competitors in the
marketplace. The most exploding event may be that the Federal Housing Finance Agency
(FHFA) placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs)
that play a critical role in the U.S. home mortgage market, in conservatorship on September 7,
2008. With the decrease of credit supply, the housing prices have plummeted and
homeowners lost an estimated $ 3.3 trillion in equity in 20085. Because of the serious
delinquency and foreclosure of mortgages, the U.S federal government had to initiate some
federal programs to help those families. For example, the "Making Home Affordable"
program announced by the Treasury in early 2009 is aimed at using federal subsidies of up to
75 billion dollars to modify millions of home loans6. However, these efforts are criticized for
imposing burdens to the taxpayers to satisfy the irresponsible banks and families. In the
following parts of this dissertation, we will try to reveal why this financial crisis has occurred,
how to control the financial risk arising from the mortgage securitization and how to develop
a efficient and healthy secondary mortgage market in China.
2 Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 Cardozo L.Rev. 1655, 2004,
P1656.
3 See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual
Flows and Outstandings 2005-2007, at 71, tbl.L.126 ll. 5, 9 & 10 (Sept. 18, 2008) , available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a2005-2007.pdf, visiting date 2010.10.09.
4 See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States: Annual
Flows and Outstandings 1975-1984, at 71, tbl.L.126 ll. 5 & 10 (Sept. 18, 2008) , available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/annuals/a1975-1984.pdf, visiting date 2010.10.09.
5 Kurt Egger, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1257,
May, 2009.
6 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable: Updated Detailed Program Description (Mar. 4,
2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/housing_fact_sheet.pdf.
visiting date: 2010.05.08.
91.1. Background: Residential mortgage securitization and
the financial crisis
1.1.1 Mortgage, housing finance and the economy
Using real estate to secure the financing transaction is a durable human institution of long
history because of its stable value and permanent physical existence. Real estate is a
fundamental form of property since the beginning of civilization and various financing
instruments have been developed so as to fund the economic activities utilizing the great
value of real estate, for example the mortgage popular in the common law countries, the
hypothec in the continent Europe, the land obligation in Germany and the other similar
institutions7. In mortgage law, these institutions are generally titled by “lien over immobile
properties” and they were structured differently in various periods in the history. Here I do not
want to take much time to discuss the theoretical differences of mortgage and hypothec8,
while I prefer to study their common essential economic substances from the perspective of
law and economics, particularly from the perspective of law and finance. And this essential
economic substance of both the civil law hypothec and common law mortgage is to secure the
performance of obligation using the value of real estate, and in case of default, the creditor
can enforce its security rights over the encumbered lands or buildings through force auction.
For this reason, the term “mortgage” will be generally used to indicate the above mentioned
mortgage and hypothec in the two legal systems which are utilized as instruments to fund the
economic activities through the real estates’ security function. For the reason of comparative
study, mortgage (both the common law mortgage and civil law hypothec), together with land
obligation and the other similar institutions, will be covered in this research.
Practically mortgage over real estate is a primary mechanism for extending credit in the
7 For example, the deed of trust is widely used in the common law countries, which is a tripartite transaction. In
the civil law system, the reservation of ownership is similarly used to secure the performance of obligation.
8 In common law systems, there are three main schools regarding to the nature of mortgage: title theory, security
theory and the intermediate theory. And the title theory has dominated the academy over centuries and still has a
great influence in the academy. With respect to the title theory of mortgage, the lender was completely granted the
legal title of the debtor’s real property, subject to a subsequent condition under which the debtor could re-enter and
re-vest himself with the legal title upon the due performance of his obligation to repay the borrowed money.
While in the civil law system, the hypothec is typically considered as a limited real property right in theory.
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modern society, and it has always been employed as the principal instrument to finance real
estate acquisitions, provide liquidity and raise capital over centuries. And it has been proved
to be successful in satisfying the financial needs of people with different types of real
property in different history period and economic patterns, agrarian economy, industrial
economy and the current financial economy.
As an important security interest over immobile properties, mortgage owns the following
two advantages from the point of view of law and economics: (1) The comparative stability of
value. The economic value of the lands and its fixtures (mainly residential or commercial
buildings) are comparatively stable relative to the other assets, even though there always
occurs the housing bubble in the modern history. And the investments in real estate are
generally considered as a good choice for the preservation of family wealth. (2) The strong
protection from law. This advantage derives from its recording in the public registry, which is
used to determine the existence and priority of the creditors' lien over the real property. The
lenders or other parties can look to the information in the registry, check whether there exist
any encumbrances over the lands or buildings, and thus decide whether to do the transaction
with the borrower or no. It is also notable that this reasonable reliance on the information
from registry is protected by the law9, even if the actual legal status of mortgaged immobile is
not the same as shown in the registry.
At the same time, mortgage has always been a successful instrument for stimulating
economic development. The modern housing sector is critically important to stead economic
development and stability. As we will discuss in the second part, even early in the 1770’s,
mortgage had been utilized as a financing instrument for saving the bankrupt Prussian
economy. And this model was further developed in the form of Pfandbrief in Germany, which
was employed to provide fund for house building, buying and at the same time stimulating the
economic development. In U.S, the proliferation of mortgage-based securities has greatly
changed the economic structure and modernized its financial sector. More important is that
the major economy bodies are involved in the secondary market of U.S, such as the European
countries, China, Japan, India and so on. Currently, the housing sector is greatly integrated
into the whole economy, especially closely connected to the credit market and capital market,
9 German civil code (BHB), article 892 and 893. China real property law, article
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and consequently the financial stability is determined, to a great extent, by the changes in the
housing market.
As an important real estate financing instrument in the modern society, mortgage provides
transaction participants the opportunity to convert the illiquid assets into cash and it excludes
the risk of a (second) lawsuit against the surety (who may be unwilling to pay), or of being
faced with his financial collapse too10. And the mortgage has evolved to adapt to the changing
legal and economic environment in order to retain its utility in commercial life throughout
centuries, from the agriculture era to the industrial economic era and finally to the current
financial economic era. In different periods, however, the relationship between land and the
mortgage transaction participants was structured distinctly.
In the current financial economic era, financial innovations parallel with industrial
production as the engine of economic growth11. Particular attention should be paid to the
interplay between the financial markets and the real estate markets. In 2005, global financial
assets (including banking assets, stock market capitalization, and bond market value) were
calculated at US $ 165 trillion, a sum nearly four times the global GDP12, and mortgage debts
has comprised one of the largest single categories of in the American national-debt structure.
For example, as illustrated by table 1, the market value of the total mortgage loans has been
equal to that of GDP in U.S during the period between 2007 and 2009. The current liquidity
crunch in the American economy is partly the result of the stock market being impacted by
the collapse of the mortgage market. So in the 21 century, the economists must look not just
to the stock market but to the mortgage market to determine the financial health of the
economy.13
10 As is evident both from the standard of jurisprudential analysis and the amount of legislative activity, personal
security was much more important in Roman law than it is today. Today creditors usually prefer real security. See
Reinhar Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990), P115.
11 At the same time, the over-development of financial sectors has also brought about the concern that the real
industries would be hollowed, as a result of the flow of capital from real industries into the capital markets.
12 Aaron Unterman, Innovative destruction—Structured Finance and credit market reform in the bubble era, 5
Hastings Bus. L.J. 53, Winter, 2009.
13 See Peter M. Carrozzo, A new deal for the American mortgage: the home owners’ loan corporation, the national
housing act and the birth of the national mortgage market. 17 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev.1, Winter 2008.
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Table 1 U.S Mortgage Debt Outstanding (Millions of dollars)
Amount
Year
Total One- to four- family
residences
Multifamily
residences
2004 10,663,749 8,269,026 617,866
2005 12,101,261 9,380,898 688,344
2006 13,487,850 10,433,398 706,619
2007 14,568,485 11,167,193 786,838
2008 14,605,718 11,070,492 837,333
2009 14,320,323 10,861,535 848,855
2010 13,819,764(Q4) 10,531,174(Q4) 840,057(Q4)
2011(Q1) 13,724,679(Q1) 10,457,601(Q1) 840,152(Q1)
Source: Federal Reserve14
Consequently, we can observe that the mortgage industry, including the mortgage-based
financial innovations, has made a great contribution for economic transition from the
industrial economy to the financial economy, and it plays an increasing important role in the
economy of both the developed countries and the developing countries. Among these
financial innovations, the Mortgage Securitization, as a well-established technique financing
the non-tradable and therefore non-liquid mortgage assets, is of special importance to the
residential housing finance and capital market. With roots dating back more than two
centuries, securitization has boomed over the last four decades since the late 1970’s. With the
establishment of the secondary mortgage market and the proliferation of mortgage
securitization, the mortgage has been transformed from a stagnant lien into marketable
commodities. As one of the most significant financial innovations in the global capital market,
mortgage securitization continues to evolve and expand until the burst of the sub-prime crisis
14 See http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm
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in 2007. The current financial crisis provides us a good opportunity to make a specific
examination of mortgage law, mortgage loans, mortgage-backed securities and mortgage
markets, both primary and secondary15.
On the other side, the mortgage securitization practices in U.S and the other economy
bodies has brought about great changes to the relating laws, such as mortgage law, bankruptcy
law, regulation law and etc. The development of the mortgage industry, especially the
residential mortgage securitization, has led to an increasing social importance of the mortgage
law, and more families and national wealth are becoming affected by it. Although the segment
of real property law had been peculiarly resistant to innovation over centuries, the mortgage
law has initiated its modernization process because of the combined pressure of government
intervention and market needs. Usually the law follows the steps of the market’s needs,
although the speed with which the law follows varies greatly. At the same time, legal
evolutions bring about great changes to the market too. So it is convenient to observe the
interplay between law and financial innovations in the secondary mortgage market as we will
demonstrate in the following chapters. We will find that while mortgage securitization has
become more attractive today, it has remained a double-edged sword, beset with both new and
old flaws and dangers.
Since its inception, the mortgage law has involved to pursue the equilibrium between the
individual debtors and creditors for centuries so as to maintain a stable borrower-lender
relationship which are useful to keep the economic stability of the community. In a society
where the participants of transaction were acquainted with each other, the mortgage, in
combination with the integrity and reputation of the borrower, secured the performance of the
underlying obligation16. Now with the proliferation of securitization, mortgages have become
a mean whereby income can be obtained without the risks of ownership for the most part, and
there has been a shift in emphasis from a personal relationship predicted on acquaintance and
15 As a commentator has said ironically, “with so many fundamental changes, opportunities for moral hazard,
agency cost problems, consumer abuses, and impending lawsuits, perhaps the only group with plethora of
opportunities are law professors looking for salient article topics”. See Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure,
subprime mortgage lending and the mortgage electronic registration system, University of Cincinnati Law Review,
Vol. 78, No. 4, 2010, it is also accessible at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1469749.
16 According to Powell on Real Property, the author holds that the integrity and reputation of the borrower were
the primary security of lender; and the pledged land served only as an emergency safeguard.
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the solvency of the borrower to an investment approach17. With the establishment of the
secondary mortgage market, the residential mortgages become tradable commodities in the
capital market. The individual peculiar mortgages have been standardized so as to facilitate
the commoditization of them. However, the mortgage law did not give timely and right
response to these market changes, and the new market and the governance of obsolete legal
regime will contradict with each other, as what have happened in the financial turmoil such as
the Great Depression since 1929 and the current sub-prime crisis. So how to establish a
efficient and scientific legal regime governing the dynamic and changing market is still a
great challenge for us.
1.1.2 Housing policy’s effect on the Mortgage lending: Homeownership
and government intervention
Homeownership18 is of great importance to the social stability and the culmination of family
wealth. It is also an important indicator which is used to measure the housing conditions of
one country. While houses most commonly serve as shelter, they also serve as a forced
savings device19. For these reasons, the governments of most countries have intervened20 in
the housing market by adopting various measures to improve the housing conditions for
citizens and raise the homeownership rate of families, especially for those
low-and-medium-income ones. Thus the housing finance systems are greatly influenced by its
administration’s housing policy purporting to promote the homeownership, while the housing
policies adopted and implemented by the governments has great effect on the housing
purchase and housing finance system. However, this effect will be positive or negative
17 See Powell on Real Property, §37.04.
18 How do the government and scholars calculate the homeownership rate? Is it true that once the buyer bought the
house with mortgage loan, the house buyer will be treated as a true owner and thus is calculated into the
homeownership rate? Ownership is “the bundle of rights allowing one to use, manage, and enjoy property,
including the right to convey it to others.” Yet because of the existence of the mortgage, the buyers’ ownership is
not absolute and exclusive ownership, and subject to strict limitations; and the right is contingent upon the
repayment of the loan supported by the mortgage and their “equity” in the house gradually grows.
19
20 As we will discuss in the following parts, governments intervene in housing markets to ensure people’s
equitable access to housing, including fiscal measures, such as taxes and subsidies; the direct provision of social
housing or rent allowances; financial assistance programs to improve families’ purchase ability; and various
regulations influencing the quantity, quality and price of housing. This research will focus on the financial
assistances provided to families, especially the mortgage-based financial innovations.
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depending upon whether they are badly-designed or well-designed, because housing policies
played a disgraceful role in triggering the recent financial crisis.
1.1.2.1 Homeownership: The American dream
The strength of the American economy has deep roots in its history of widespread property
ownership. In 1862, President Lincoln signed the Homestead Act with purpose of promoting
property ownership. This act provided protections for the family homestead from the claims
of creditors and launched a scheme of massive land distribution at extremely low cost to those
who were willing to move west21. According to this act, the would-be homesteaders had the
chance to claim 160 acres of public land if they farmed it for five years and built a home on
the land22. So this act distributed the public lands to the private individuals, and conferred
them a valuable asset. The impact of this act has been massive: it gave millions of people the
potential for economic independence, and constituted the foundation for the much of today’s
current homeownership23.
The former U.S president Hoover has stated that “homeownership is our national idea and
we expect renters to strive for homeownership”. It is deeply believed that homeownership
carries with it important advantages both for individuals and society. For the individuals and
families, they can gain independence from the renters or a landlord, get freedom from
eviction and increased rent. At the same time, the homeownership has been associated with
increasing life satisfaction, psychological health and self-esteem, better and safer
neighborhoods, and better schools for the children. It is also a source of societal status and a
significant means of defining identity24. In addition to these psychological and societal
benefits, homeownership also owns financial benefits, for example home equity is a
significant component of household wealth, which could be used by the families to confront
misfortunes through the re-financing against their home equity; the home equity could also be
refinanced to fund the economic activities of the families. These are the obvious benefit that
21 Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental Disposition of Assets: Fashioning Regulatory
Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1705, 1720,1999.
22 See, 12 Stat. at 392.
23 Jonathan Miner, The mortgage crisis in historic perspective: is there hope? 36 J. Legis. 173, 2010.
24 Kristen David Adams, Subprime Mortgage and Discriminatory Lending: Homeownership: American Dream or
Illusion of Empowerment? 60 S.C. L. Rev. 573, 2009.
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homeownership has given to the individuals and families. From the economic perspective of
the society, the widespread homeownership is a significant source of economic might. As
economist Hernando de sotto has studied, the clear system of property rights is the core
reason that American capitalism got success while the other former colonies have failed
economically25. Another reason of the economic development of the American economy is the
creation of the land title records which made it very easy for property to transfer between
market participants with little legal risks. It provided security and flexibility for the
prospective buyers of real estate. Consequently, a thriving banking sector developed, in which
people were able to use their real property securing the loans.
At the same time, the American congressional allocation of funding shows a strong
preference for homeownership over rental housing. The federal government has been funding
homeowner subsidies at ever-higher levels that exceed the HUD’s entire operating budget.
However the homeowners, especially the high-income homeowners, receive most of the
country’s housing subsidies. In 2003, the federal government spent almost twice as much in
housing-related tax expenditures and direct housing assistance for households in the top
income quintile than on housing subsidies for the lowest-income households. Clearly, the
homeownership preference has encouraged the construction of single-family homes in place
of affordable rental housing, despite of the greater need for the latter26.
As shown in the following graphic, we can examine the change of U.S homeownership rate
since 1960 at which point the United States Census Bureau began to track the aggregate
homeownership statistics. Homeownership has been growing at a very slow pace since the
1960s.
Graphic 1 The change of homeownership in the U.S.
25 Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else,
2000. De Soto is one of the leading economic scholars studying the importance of widespread property rights as a
precursor to economic development.
26 Kristen David Adams, Subprime Mortgage and Discriminatory Lending: Homeownership: American Dream or
Illusion of Empowerment? 60 S.C. L. Rev. 573, 2009.
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Source: Homeownership Rates of U.S: 1960 to 2010, U.S Census Bureau, Annual Statistic
201027.
The homeownership rate has risen about 7% in the past 50 years, from 62% to the highest
point of 69% in 2004. And for the reason of the financial crisis, it has declined sharply as a
result of increasing foreclosures. Until the second quarter of 2011, the homeownership rate
has greatly declined to 65.9%28.
Now, the policies aimed to promote homeownership are no longer distributing vacant lands
to eligible families, rather helping families buy their own houses with the financial assistances
from the government and the banks. Mortgage is an important instrument to realize this
purpose. In this research, we will investigate how the U.S. mortgage markets, especially the
secondary mortgage market, has helped the American families to realize their“American
dream”. There are two main aspects to be studied: the programs assisting the low- and
medium-income families to buy houses; and the programs assisting the low- and
medium-income families to avoid foreclosure during the financial crisis. Precisely speaking,
the modern housing system originated since the great depression in the 1930’s. Since then the
American federal government began to establish series of institutions and programs assisting
the American families, especially the low- and medium-income families, to own their houses.
27 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual10/ann10ind.html
28 See Table 14. Homeownership Rates for the US and Regions: 1965 to Present, Housing vacancies and
homeownership, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/historic/, Visiting date: 2011-10-14
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1.1.2.2 Democratization of homeownership and the current crisis
Affordable housing is a commodity that is perpetually in short supply in the United States29.
The federal government has addressed the need for affordable housing through various
subsidization programs, however, the improvement of housing situation in the neighborhood
is limited as result of the shortage of fund and mismanagement of the housing Authority. Later,
the federal government has turned to a market-driven, private development approach, with
less government involvement in the financing, development, and management of affordable
housing30. The secondary mortgage market is usually utilized to implement the federal
housing policy.
In 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed the Housing and Community Development
Act. The Act amended the charter of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to reflect Congress' view
that the GSEs "have an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable housing
for low-income and moderate-income families." For the first time, the GSEs were required to
meet "affordable housing goals" set annually by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and approved by Congress. The initial annual goal for low-income and
moderate-income mortgage purchases for each GSE was 30% of the total number of dwelling
units financed by mortgage purchases and increased to 55% by 2007. The mission of the
GSEs to serve the policy goal of universal homeownership was confirmed by the American
Home Ownership and Economic Opportunity Act of October 2000. These legislations
promoted the homeownership at the expense of GSEs increasing exposure to residential
mortgage loans not satisfying their own underwriting standards for conventional, conforming
loans31.
On June 17, 2002, President George W. Bush declared that “there is a home ownership gap
in America. The difference between Anglo American and African American and Hispanic
home ownership is too big (White House, 2002). The goal was to increase minority
homeowners by at least 5.5 million by 2010. In 2003, president Gorge Bush signed the
29 Allison D. Christians, Breaking the Subsidy Cycle: A Proposal for Affordable Housing, 32 Colum. J.L. & Soc.
Probs. 131, Winter, 1999, P132.
30 Henry G. Cisneros, The State of American Cities, 16 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. No. 2, 251, 259-60, 1997.
31 Jay Surti, Can Covered Bonds Resuscitate Residential Mortgage Finance in the United States? IMF Working
Paper, December 2010, P3.
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American Dream Development Act through which provided financing for low-income
first-time buyers. The program aimed to assist these buyers by providing funds for down
payments, closing costs and other expenses32. The democratizing home ownership can be
realized through amortization, sound mortgages, government guarantees, secure investments
to lenders and enhanced liquidity33. In August 2004, the White House produced a document
surveying President Bush’s achievements. The document stated that “the US homeownership
rate reached a record-high 69.2 percent in the second quarter of 2004.
Unfortunately, the short-lived increase in homeownership was followed by a record high
foreclosure avalanche that has pushed the U.S. economy into one of its worst financial crises
since the Great Depression.34 The reason is that the democratization of homeownership or the
promotion of homeownership has become an unmoral technique which was used to exploit
the low-and-medium-income families through financial innovations. The rising inequality
since the 1980s formed the breeding ground for the current financial markets meltdown. One
notable phenomenon to democratize the homeownership is the expansion of mortgage loans
eligible for securitization since the 1970’s as we will show in the second chapter, from the
agency loans to conventional loans, and finally the Alt-A and subprime loans, so as to supply
enough mortgage loans for the increasing securitization transactions35. The robust demand by
investors for the high yields offered by subprime loans stimulated the growth of a market for
securities backed by those loans36.
This expansion has impacts on the housing finance system in two separate aspects. In a
positive view, an abundance of available mortgage money would democratize homeownership
for the middle class. And it could also bring prosperity to Americans and stimulate the
economy. In a negative point of view, it offers more money-making opportunities for the
32 http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/programs/home/addi/ (last visited 2011-8-11)
33 Peter M. Carrozzo, A new deal for the American mortgage: The home owners’ loan corporation, the national
housing act and the birth of the national mortgage market, 17 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev.1, Winter 2008.
34 Fadhel Kaboub, Zdravka Todorova, and Luisa Fernandez, Inequality-Led Financial Instability: AMinskian
Structural Analysis of the Subprime Crisis, International Journal of Political Economy, vol. 39, no. 1, Spring 2010,
P3–27.
35 Homeownership, to a great extent, now is only the desirable target for the interest groups including the banking
industry, the politicians, the other sectors closely associated with the real estate, not for the lower income families.
For the banking industry, the housing market for higher income buyers was virtually saturated. So the banking
industry changed its operation strategy to some extent, deviating from the higher income buyers to the lower
income borrowers due to the banks’ need to explore new market, rather than the borrowers’ ability to repay the
loan.
36 Financial crisis inquiry commission, The financial crisis inquiry report: Dissenting statement, P455.
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mortgage industry participants, including mortgage bankers, credit rating agencies, insurance
companies and the investment banks. For them, more securitized mortgage loans mean a
steady excess profit. The breed of the financial institutions, especially the investment banks,
provokes them securitize more mortgage loans so as to make more profits. For this reason,
what we observe today is only the manifestation of the ingenuity of the market in taking
advantage of moneymaking opportunities, regardless of the consequences. The impulse of
profit-maximization led to an increase in the incidence of abusive predatory lending37 in the
mortgage market, especially in the sub-prime lending market. The financial exploitation was
implemented in the name of “democratization of homeownership” for the low- and
medium-income families. And the sudden turn in market expectations led investors and banks
to reevaluate their portfolios, which brought about a credit crunch and widespread economic
instability38. The so-called “democratization of homeownership” rapidly turned into
record-high delinquencies and foreclosures. A major reason for this financial winter we are
witnessing is that the market for housing purchase has been systemically violating core
principles of justice39. It is the unjust financial transactions cause the current financial turmoil.
So we could conclude that the U.S housing policy has played an important role in the
financial crisis, or "the sine qua non of the financial crisis was U.S. Government housing
policy", which led to the creation of 27 million sub-prime and other risky loans---half of all
mortgages in the United States40. The rise of homeownership is at the expense of the
reduction of the mortgage underwriting standards, the loosening documentation requirement,
the lower LTV ratio, less down payment o even zero down payment. The result is that the
quality of the loan deteriorates, and thus the American Dream has turned into the American
37 Predatory lending generally describes fraudulent practices involving loan originations and also loans with terms
and practices that use inappropriate risk-based pricing. Fraudulent or illegal predatory practices (all of which are
illegal under existing laws) include forging loan documents, misrepresenting the borrower's income, backdating
documents, failing to disclose information required by federal or state laws, and inducing borrowers to apply for
loans to pay for home improvements which either are never done or are improperly done. With particular reference
to the terms of loans, the interest rates are significantly higher than needed to ensure against the risk of borrower
default. Amandatory prepayment penalties, which charge borrowers who pay off (or refinance) loans early, also
appears in the predatory lending practices. See A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and mortgage lending: The
homeowner dilemma, Fall, 38 J. Marshall L. Rev. 19, 2004, P31.
38 Luisa Fernandez, Fadhel Kaboub, Zdravka Todorova, On Democratizing Financial Turmoil: AMinskian
Analysis of the Subprime Crisis, Working Paper No. 548, The Levy Economics Institute of Bar College.
39 Brian M. McCall , Historic perspective on the subprime crisis: Learning from our history: Evaluating the
modern housing finance market in light of ancient principles of justice, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 707.
40 Financial crisis inquiry commission, The financial crisis inquiry report: Dissenting statement, P454.
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Nightmare because of predatory practices involving some subprime lenders41.
1.1.3 Mortgage securitization and mortgage market
Typically, the mortgage securitization could be divided into statutory mortgage securitization
and structure mortgage securitization. The statutory mortgage securitization is more popular
in EU, namely the covered bond in most of the EU state members, such as the Pfandbriefe in
Germany. While the later could be redivided into agency and GSEs-backed securitization, and
private-label securitization. In the following analysis, we mainly concentrate on the U.S
mortgage securitization theory and practices since the Great Depression, make a comparison
between EU covered bond and U.S MBS, and try to find some policy suggestions for cure the
financial crisis and keep financial stability from the comparison.
1.1.3.1 The definition of securitization
Although securitization is widely discussed in the legal and financial literature, no uniform
definition has described it satisfactorily. In short, securitization is a financial process by which
converts pools of cash-flow-producing financial assets, such as mortgage loans, auto loans or
credit card debt obligations, into securities hold by public investors in the capital market.
With particular reference to the mortgage securitization, it allows the mortgage originators to
sell the illiquid mortgage loans in return for liquid cash, and thus improve its capital adequacy.
This financing technique was developed to address the problem of insufficient mortgage
capital, then was adapted and expanded by participation in the private markets to facilitate
many types of consumer and commercial borrowing42. Securities backed by mortgage loans
are called mortgage-backed securities (MBS) which are further divided into residential
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) and commercial-backed securities (CMBS) according to
41 A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and mortgage lending: The homeowner dilemma, Fall, 38 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 19, 2004, P20.
42 Faten Sabry & Chudozie Okongwu, Study of the Impact of Securitization on Consumers, Investors, Financial
Institutions and the Capital Markets, NERA Econ. Consulting, P16, Available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_NERA_Report.pdf.
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whether the nature of mortgage is residential or commercial43. The RMBS is usually
structured as a different type of security from that of CMBS. Meanwhile those backed by
other types of receivables are asset-backed securities (ABS).
The key to understand the feature of “asset-backed” or "mortgage-backed"is as following:
the investors of these securities are only exposed to the risks of the asset pool not the risks of
the originator company’s business44. The public investors have only claims on the underlying
assets of securitization, not on the assets of the originator company’s asset. The credit rating
of these securities is based solely on the quality of the asset pool. In this respect, there exists a
“mutually exclusive” relationship between the originator and public investors with respect to
each other’s estate, that is to say: the originator would not have any direct claim on the
receivables, nor would the investors in the securities issued by the SPE or the SPE itself have
any claim against the general assets of the originator, except to the extent of credit support
described later45. And the cash flows deriving from the asset pool are used exclusively to
repay the investors. So the investors are not concerned with the generic risks of the originator
company, because even the bankruptcy of the originator exposes no legal risk to the public
investors.
The reason for the difficulty in constructing a uniform definition of securitization is that the
term is used to describe various financial transactions, from the basic mortgage-backed
securities to a complex offering of multiple layers of debt and equity interests in a single asset
or pool of assets46. Because we just study the basic mortgage-backed securities and its
relationship with the mortgage law in this thesis, it is not necessary to spend much time to
make a perfect definition of securitization, important is that we understand very well the
mechanism through which the mortgage securitization operates in the capital market.
The surge of securitization can be attributed to a various legal and economic stimuli, such
as deregulation of regulation, favorable tax law and bankruptcy law, technological
43 Usually a residential mortgage-backed security (RMBS) is secured by single-family or two to four family real
estates, while a commercial mortgage-backed security (CMBS) is secured by commercial and multifamily
properties, such as apartment buildings, retail or office properties, hotels, schools, industrial properties and other
commercial sites.
44 Frank J. Fabozzi, Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation, Yale ICF Working Paper
No. 0707, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997079.
45 Frank J. Fabozzi, Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation, Yale ICF Working Paper
No. 0707, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997079.
46 Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers,
69 Tex. L. Rev. 1369, May, 1991.
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improvements, increased efficiencies in collecting and processing information, and increased
interest rate volatility47. In its legal aspect, securitization presents myriad legal issues
pertaining to securities, bankruptcy, secured transaction, tax, banking and other areas. In this
research, we will just study the interrelationship between the evolution of related private rules
and the market development of mortgage securitization.
With respect to the nature of securitization in private law, it is usually considered as a “true
sale” of loan receivables from the originator to the SPV and finally to the investors in the
capital market. The credit risk of these receivables is also transferred with the assignment of
the underlying receivables. In its face, it is a transfer of obligation from the point of view of
civil law, specifically the contract law. However, it is notable that these underlying loans are
secured by mortgage which is a strong security for the due performance of the underlying
loans according to its terms and conditions. Through mortgage, the creditors could realize its
credit by forcible sale of the mortgaged property48. Thus the credit risk of the loans is
mitigated greatly. So the mortgage securitization should be treated as a transfer of mortgage in
its economic sense. Without the mortgage, the loans can not be transferred at par. An evidence
of the this assertion is the small market scale of the securitization of the consumer and trade
credit, and most of the issuance of the securities in the secondary mortgage market are backed
by various mortgages. And these are specifically what I will study in the second chapter of the
thesis: mortgage has been transformed from a stagnant lien into a tradable commodity in the
secondary market with the proliferation of mortgage securitization.
1.1.3.2 The process and structure of securitization
In a prototypical transaction, mortgage securitization transactions generally involve the
following participants: (1) the initial owner of the mortgage loan (originator); (2) an
subsidiary company of the originator who owns the special purpose vehicle (Sponsor); (3) the
issuer of the debt or equity instruments, usually a special purpose vehicle (SPV); (4) the
47 Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers,
69 Tex. L. Rev. 1369, May, 1991.
48 To support this argument, it is notable that the securitization of mortgage is currently the largest asset class
within the ABS market, in which the trade receivables, credit card receivables, auto receivables are also
securitized.
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investment bankers who assist in structuring the transaction and who underwrite or place the
securities; (5) the rating agencies, who assess the credit quality of the instruments and assign
a credit rating; (6) a credit enhancer, possibly a GSE, a bank, surety company, or insurer, who
provides credit support through a letter of credit, guarantee, or other assurance that there will
be a source of funds available for payments as they become due on the securities; (7) a
servicer, usually the originator or an affiliate, who collects payments due on the underlying
assets and, after retaining a servicing fee, pays them over to the security holders or their
trustee; (8) a trustee, who deals with the credit enhancer, servicer, and issuer on behalf of the
security holders. These entities participate in securitization in different stages.
The process of securitization is very complex. It can be illustrated by the following steps:
(a) Mortgage loans are purchased from banks, mortgage companies, and other originators by
sponsor which is usually a subsidiary of the originator; (b) Mortgage loans are assigned to a
special purpose vehicle (SPV) by the sponsor; (c) The SPV assembles these loans into
collections, or "pools"; (d) the SPV issues securities backed by the pools (e) An underwriter
purchases all the“securities”—here meaning derivative income streams drawn from payments
on the underlying mortgages—issued by the pool; (f) the underwriter, with the help of agents
on commission, sells securities to MBS investors. Through these steps, the receivables –
mortgage loans (residential or commercial), automobile loans, credit card loans and etc –are
converted into securities that are issued and exchanged in the capital markets.
Mortgage securitization integrated four functions in lending generally handled by four
different types of specialized financial institutions: origination, which is the initial step of
making loans to individual borrowers; servicing, which is used to manage the ongoing
relationship with individual borrowers and collecting payments; securitization, which means
buying or pooling together large numbers of loans from originators and packaging them into
tranches of securities that can be sold to investors; and funding, through which the securitizers
sell mortgage backed securities (“MBS”) to public investors which hold them in portfolio as
an investment, and consequently they are funded by the investors.
Once the loans are originated, the originator identifies a pool of receivables that satisfy
certain features, pools them together and transfers them to the SPV. The pool of receivables or
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loans is referred to as “asset pool”, and is transferred at par value. At the same time, the
originator usually bears the servicing function49, and manages the collections on the
receivables, although these assets have been transferred to the SPV. This is because the
originator generally has the proximity with the borrowers and has an infrastructure and
systems for the collection and service. So the originator is the best party to manage the
collections and render other borrower services. The SPV is actually a non-substantive shell
entity. Although it holds the asset pool, pays for it by issuing securities as its liability in the
law, it does not have the necessary wherewithal to collect the receivables and therefore can
not perform the collecting and servicing function itself50. As illustrated above, the originator
or an independent third-party entity will bear the servicing function with a compensation of
servicing fee.
In general, the securities issued by the SPV are structured into three different classes,
namely the senior tranche, the mezzanine tranche and the junior tranche, according to their
priority in receiving distributions from the SPV. In this structure, tranches of higher priority
bear lower risk and consequently receive lower interest rate, vice versa. The senior securities
are paid prior to any of the classes below and were typically rated AAA which typically made
up the majority of bonds issued by the SPV. The mezzanine tranches bear higher risks and
thus are paid a correspondingly higher interest rate. The most junior tranche in the structure is
called the equity or residual tranche and was set up to receive whatever cash flow was left
over after all other tranches had been paid. This junior tranche will absorb any losses or
shortfalls on any defaults of mortgages in the pool in the first resort. This subordination
structure is one of the ways of credit-enhancement of securitization51. Let us suppose that a
pool of mortgage loans with a par value of 100 million is transferred to SPV, and the
percentages of three classes of securities are as following: class A – 95% (senior bond), class
B – 2%(mezzanine bond), class C – 3% (junior bond). See table 1.
49 The services to borrowers, collection of cash flows, and remittance of cash flows to investors, and basic investor
services, are collectively known as the servicing function.
50 Frank J. Fabozzi, Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The Tool of Financial Transformation, Yale ICF Working Paper
No. 0707, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997079.
51 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Preliminary Staff Report: Securitization and the mortgage crisis, P6,
available at: www.fcic.gov.
26
Table 2
Balance sheet of an MBS
Assets Liabilities
Mortgage loans
AAA senior bonds 95%
Mezzanine BBB bonds 2%
Residual tranche 3%
For the promotion of the securitization, the credit-enhancement is very important, adding
value by inter-creditor arrangement whereby the public investors are provided two advantages
– legal and structural preference. With respect to the structural preference, it refers to the
stacking order of mutual rights among the different classes of investors. Legal preference
refers to the bankruptcy isolation which could be realized through the mechanism of true sale,
and thus an asset-backed investor enjoys over a traditional investor as a claimant on the assets
of the operator. And these will be illustrated in part 3. The traditional investors are subject to
bankruptcy, if the borrower runs into delinquency, which is time-consuming and expensive,
and a very low percentage of the debt is to be paid off. For these reasons the legal preference
offered by securitization is the central concern of securitization.
1.1.3.3 The benefits of mortgage securitization
The benefits of mortgage securitization can be summarized in the following four aspects:
lowering the costs of credit; making credit more available to the borrowers; risk
diversification; and enhanced market liquidity.
Firstly, mortgage securitization is viewed as an innovative tool through which lowers the
cost of funding for the financial institutions. Different from the secured lending, the mortgage
loans are transferred to the SPV at par with full repayment of the value of the loans. Different
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from the traditional corporate bonds or securities the popularity of which is decided by the
corporate credit, the mortgage securitization is basically an "asset credit", by which the MBS
is exclusively based on the expected performance of the asset pool and the priority of a
security in the Structure. More specifically, the "credit enhancement" is required in the
structure order to achieve a specific credit rating for each bond class. And this is why the
credit rating usually assign a higher rating to the MBS than that of the originator.
Secondly, the sources of fund of the banks are diversified and thus more credit with lower
cost are available to homebuyers. In one aspect, the securitization could help the financial
institutions get funds from the capital market and reduce the reliance on the family deposits.
In the second place, securitization changes the local characteristic of mortgage lending and
thus aids in the geographic dispersion of capital to areas that may otherwise be deprived of
credit options. By securitizing loans, however, the lender generates capital for new loans that
may come from a different location. This linkage to the capital markets broadens the range of
regions where depository institutions obtain capital to provide credit. Moreover, the funds out
of the U.S also invest in the MBS market and thus the financial institutions could also get
foreign funds to support the origination of new mortgage loans. The existence of a liquid
secondary market for home mortgages increases the availability of capital to make new home
loans. Financial institutions that realize the full value of their loans immediately can turn
around and re-deploy that capital in the form of a new loan.
Thirdly, securitization helps shift various risks, including the interest rate risk, prepayment
risk and the credit risk, from the originator to the investors who are willing and able to bear it.
Before the development of the mortgage securitization, the greatest challenge for the
mortgage lenders was their exposure to interest risk deriving from the mismatch between
long-term assets and short-liabilities. That is because the mortgage lenders shall use the
short-term family deposits to fund the long-term mortgage loans. If the interest rates rises, the
lenders have to bear this interest rate risk. The mortgage securitization is funding mechanism
through the long-term assets will be funded by the long-term liabilities, and the interest rate
will be adjusted according to the economic environment.
Fourthly, the liquidity of the capital market has been enhanced. By distinguishing the
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jumbo and non-jumbo52 mortgages, Elena Loutskina and Philip Strahan developed a
theoretical model to explain the impact of the securitization on the loan supply. They found
that mortgage liquidity has increased rapidly over the past 30 years, in part through the GSEs
subsidies53. The expansion of the secondary mortgage market has dampened the effects of the
monetary policy on real economic activity. Without the securitization, the central bank can
slow the real activity by raising bank’s funding costs (e.g., the cost of deposits) and thereby
constraining the supply of credit. Nevertheless, the secondary mortgage market can help the
banks to get funds even though the central bank has tightened the monetary policy. At the
same time, the higher rating assigned by rating agency to the MBS plays a vital role in the
liquidity creation. The higher rating to the MBS assures the high liquidity of them.
1.1.3.4 Mortgage securitization market and the financial crisis since 2007 in
U.S
Mortgage securitization was first started in U.S in 1970, when Freddie Mac issued its first
mortgage-backed securities. Since then, securitization was applied to the automobile loans,
trade receivables, credit card loans and etc, and it was titled by a broader term “asset
securitization”. In fact, nearly all the financial assets which own a stable cash flow can be
securitized. However, the residential mortgage securitization is still the most important
component of the securitization business both because of its long history and its importance to
the residential families54.
Initially, the government's efforts to increase the supply of funds for housing finance could
be traced back to the establishment of a secondary mortgage market as early as the 1930’s.
Later the development of modern mortgage-backed securities was greatly attributed to the
federal government intervention in the real estate market to increase the funds for housing
52 Jumbo loan is a mortgage with a loan amount exceeding the conforming loan limits set by the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), and therefore, not eligible to be purchased, guaranteed or securitized by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. OFHEO sets the conforming loan limit size on an annual basis. Jumbo loans are often
securitized by institutions other than Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Non-jumbo loan is loan which does not exceed
the conforming loan limits set by the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) and eligible to be
purchased, guaranteed or securitized by the GSEs.
53 Elena Loutskina and Philip E. Strahan, Securitization and the declining impact of bank finance on loan supply:
evidence from mortgage originations, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LⅥⅤ, No. 2, April 2009, P 862
54 For example, the issuance of MBS in 2007 was 2936.7 billion dollars, while the issuance of ABS backed by
consumer credit and trade credit reached up to 795.4 billion dollars.
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finance by facilitating the flow of capital in different regions and by shifting funds from the
capital market to the housing finance system55. As we will see in the second chapter, the
secondary mortgage market was first established through the intervention of federal
government, namely the establishment of Federal National Mortgage Association in 1938.
Since the 1970’s, the mortgage securitization began to securitize the agency loans which are
guaranteed by the GSEs because of its feature of implicit government guaranty. Later, the
private-label securitization began to surge and develop dramatically from 2001 to 2007, and
then ended abruptly in 2008 when real estate markets began to collapse.
The largest segment of the secondary mortgage market remains the sale of whole loans to
institutional investors and the government sponsored agencies for eventual conversion into
mortgage securities56. In the first place, The largest government agency program is sponsored
by the Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA"), an agency within the
Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") that guarantees securities
representing interests in pools of mortgages comprised solely of Federal Housing
Administration ("FHA"), Farm Housing Administration ("FmHA") and Veterans
Administration ("VA") loans that are less than one year old. Ginnie Mae, backed by the full
faith and credit of the U.S. government, guarantees that investors receive timely payments.
Regarding to the GSEs, the Federal National Mortgage Association ("FNMA") and the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC") purchase mortgage loans from the
primary mortgage market, issue mortgage-backed securities or hold the loans in their portfolio.
The guarantees of these two entities do not bear the "full faith and credit" of the United States
government, yet they have special authority to borrow from the U.S. Treasury. Because of
their close association with the government and their history of successful operation, they
have excellent standing in the credit markets and are considered to provide protection to
investors virtually equivalent to that provided by GNMA.
Besides, the private sector also plays an increasing important role although GSEs are still
55 This flow of fund from the capital market to the housing market has special significance for the development of
China housing fiance system, because once the secondary mortgage will be established, the speculative funds in
the housing market will be encouraged to invest in the MBS and thus will converted into new loans to the
homebuyers. And this will greatly increase the supply of low-cost credit.
56 Edward L. Pittman, Economic and regulatory developments affecting mortgage related securities, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 497.
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dominating the secondary market. Some private institutions, such as Investment Banks, Real
Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) and the Real Estate Investment Trusts
(REITs), also securitize mortgages, known as "private-label" mortgage securities. With
particular reference to the issuance of MBS, the private-label securitization has surpassed the
agency and GSEs-backed securitization, as shown in Graphic 2.
Graphic 2 The issuance of MBS in the U.S.
Source: The Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Annual Flows and Outstandings,
available at: http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm.
At the same time, it is notable that the current mortgage financing system in the U.S was
initially established by the reforming legislations in the midst of the Great Depression nearly
80 years ago. In the 1930’s, the federal government created the Federal Housing
Administration (“FHA”), Fannie Mae, and the Federal Home Loan Banks which together
aimed to resolve the mortgage market turmoil, increasing foreclosures and decreasing
homeownership rates. These legislations and agencies established the framework and outline
of the U.S mortgage financing system. And most of them still play important role in the
current mortgage market. The subsequent developments in this field are mainly based on the
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structure and idea formed during the Great Depression. When we discuss the reasons for the
current financial crisis, it is inevitable to trace back to the Great Depression legislation and
practices.
In the past decade before the sub-prime crisis since 2007, the housing price was kept
increasing as a result of multiple factors, such as the loosening monetary policy after 2001,
and thus there existed a housing bubble. The financial history can show us the cyclical nature
of the housing bubble: because of either exuberant expectations about economic prospects or
structural changes in financial markets, a credit boom begins, increasing the demand for
housing and thereby raising their prices. The rise in housing value, in turn, encourages further
lending against them, increasing demand, and hence their prices, even more. This feedback
loop can generate a bubble, and the bubble can cause credit standards to ease as lenders
become less concerned about the ability of the borrowers to repay loans and instead rely on
further appreciation of the asset to shield themselves from losses57. After the 9.11 terrorist
attack of 2001, the U.S administration created a long-term environment of low interest rate.
This credit boom entered into real estate and the housing price was driven up rapidly. And the
impact of this housing price bubble was magnified because of the financial innovations which
are mainly based on residential mortgages. Because of the increasing appreciation of housing
price, homebuyers applied mortgage loans from banks to purchase houses which are out of
their affordability. Also during this period, the MBS backed by sub-prime mortgage and Alt-A
mortgage proliferated in the marketplace and the high liquidity of secondary market further
raised the housing price. However, the housing price began to decline because the Federal
Reserve had raised the interest rate since 2007 and this caused a great scale of default of the
homebuyers.
From the first quarter of 2007, the number of U.S. homes in foreclosure began to soar. By
June 2007 more than one million mortgages were in default or foreclosure. This represented a
50% increase from defaults and foreclosures in 200558. Defaults and foreclosures have
continued to grow since 2007. By January 2009 the total number of foreclosures may have
57 Governor Frederic S. Mishkin , How Should We Respond to Asset Price Bubbles? May 15, 2008 ,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20080515a.htm#f4
58 See AYear of Turmoil: Fed. Chairman Ben Bernanke Reflects on the Stabilization of the Financial System
Since the Events of Last September, available at http://www.brookings.edu/events/2009/0915_financial_crisis.aspx,
visiting date:2011-3-8
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been close to three million homes59. The most recent data available shows that for the month
of July 2009 "[new] foreclosure filings - default notices, scheduled auctions and bank
repossessions - were reported on 360,149 U.S. properties.60" Clearly, the housing crisis is far
from over.
The recent foreclosures represent a significant threat to the gains in homeownership made
in the last fifty years. It receded to 67.9% by the third quarter of 2008. This is a decline of
1.3%. While this is not a large number on its face, the fact that homeownership had only
increased by 6.3% since 1965 means that a decline of 1.3% is in reality a significant loss of
about 20%. There is obvious political importance in helping the people hit by this crisis.
However, beyond the politics of today, the analysis above suggests that finding a solution to
reduce foreclosures is not only good for the people in foreclosure but for the long term
economy as well. That is, it is good for all of us.
1.2 Research questions and the structure of dissertation
Although this dissertation will concentrate greatly on the mortgage securitization financing, it
cannot provide a comprehensive discussion of the overall problems and its ramifications, in
contrast, it just focus on the legal regime governing mortgage securitization and the interplay
between this legal regime and the mortgage market. The center of this dissertation is to
explore the institutional causes of the current financial crisis and how to improve the legal
regime so as to avoid the future crisis and keep financial stability. The end of this research is
to explore an appropriate approach to develop mortgage securitization in China so as to
perfect its housing finance system and mitigate the difficulties for housing purchase for
low-and medium income families.
The sub-prime crisis in the U.S since 2007 has encouraged us to thinking about some very
interesting and also challenging questions. Traditionally, real estate is always considered as
the best security for the performance of the underlying obligation because of its stable value
59 See JimWasserman, Citigroup Shift on Senate Bankruptcy Bill May Aid Homeowners, Sacramento Bee, Jan.
10, 2009, at 7B.
60 Press Release, RealtyTrac, U.S. Foreclosure Activity Increases 7% in July (Aug. 13, 2009),
http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/PressRelease.aspx?I temID=7192. RealtyTrac is a private
company that provides foreclosure statistics across the country. They offer their services commercially for
potential buyers. Their statistics are collected by compiling public default and foreclosure notices.
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as we have analyzed before, but why the the market value of the houses could not cover the
losses of the lenders in the sub-prime crisis? Is mortgage still the best instrument to secure the
repayment of obligations? Why the securitization of mortgage loans needs agency or GSEs
guarantee or further "credit enhancement"? Why the capital market in U.S, which has been
claimed to provide the strongest investor protection, collapsed? Could the powerful regulation
avoid the future mortgage meltdown and help keep the financial stability? Taking into
consideration of these ideas, this dissertation will be organized as following.
Firstly, in chapter 2 we will focus on the evolution of mortgage from its ancient inception
until the modern mortgage securitization from the point of view of institution change. In fact,
the mortgage itself is always on the way of evolution with the changing economic and legal
environment, from a contractual relationship, to a stagnant lien and ultimately to a tradable
commodity in the capital market.We first review the transformation a mortgage from a
contractual relationship to a security interest, both in the civil law system and common law
system. This was the normal situation before the 18th century. The mortgage only worked as a
security to secure the performance of the underlying obligation. Later, the mortgage-based
financial innovations were developed, initiated at the 1765 at Prussia and further developed
since the Great Depression in the U.S. The proliferation of mortgage securitization ultimately
transformed in general the mortgages into tradable commodity in the capital market. This is a
radical revolution which has re-structured the U.S and Eu housing finance system. In this
chapter, we mainly concentrate on the Great Depression legislation which has constructed the
primary legal regime governing the creation and development of the secondary mortgage
market. Then the proliferation of mortgage securitization and the changes of the economic
and legal environment are studied in detail. Through the combination of legal and economic
research, we will find the very process of institution change and financial innovation, and the
dialectical interplay between economic development and the institution changes of law. The
research of this part will show us that the mortgage securitization is indeed a general trend in
the mortgage financing.
In chapter 3, we will scrutinize the legal foundation of mortgage securitization mainly in
the U.S context, since many scholars have always criticized its shaky foundation. In this part
we will see that the current legislative regime governing mortgage securitization has rotten
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the foundation for the healthy development of mortgage securitization, so as to meet the
sector interest of the mortgage industry. We will examine some fundamental rules in mortgage
law, secured transaction and bankruptcy law, such as "Accessoriness of mortgage", "True
sale" and "Bankruptcy isolation" which have been circumvented or misused for the purpose of
financial innovation. The U.S legislation governing mortgage securitization has destructed the
mortgage market's capacity of self-regulation and self-correcting, in the name of financing
efficiency and reduction of systemic risk in the capital market. Financing efficiency is the
unique goal of the legislation and the financial stability has been neglected, either deliberately
or unintentionally. The problems in these legislations constitute the institutional causes of the
current financial crisis. And this finding also rebuts the assertion of LLSV that the capital
market in civil law system is less efficient than that of common law countries.
In chapter 4, an economic analysis of the secured lending and mortgage securitization will
be undertaken. The role of mortgage in credit risk control will be examined carefully, and the
incentive problems arising from the originate-to-diversify model of securitization are the
important reason for the financial crisis since 2007. A new analysis approach will be adopted
to examine the impact of securitization on mortgage's role in credit risk control, and this
analysis will show us why the real estate is no longer the most qualified collateral to secure
the performance of mortgage loans. Later, we will discuss how to create a efficient legislative
regime that could help restore the mortgage industry's self-regulation capacity so as to realize
the continuous and healthy development. From the point of view of risk control, the EU
statutory securitization works better than the U.S structured securitization. At the same time,
we should also re-consider the function of securitization: its main function should be to
eliminate the mismatch between long-term assets and short-term liabilities, and thus enhance
the financial institutions' liquidity, while its risk-diversification function should not be
excessively emphasized and utilized for the reason of the financial stability. Particularly, the
credit risk shall not be transferred for the reason of incentive problems. In this aspect, the EU
statutory securitization realized a balance between financing efficiency and financial stability.
In chapter 5, we will discuss the possibility of developing mortgage securitization in China.
The rising home price and the tightening monetary policy have contracted the credit supply
for housing purchase, especially of these low-and medium-income families. Developing
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mortgage securitization will help resolve the structure problems in China economy and
encourage the domestic consumption. However, there is not a specifical legislation governing
the development of mortgage securitization, and the existing regulations have many
drawbacks and still need improvements, because the decision-makers have not studied the
securitization theory and practices in EU and U.S very well, and have not analyzed the legal
and economic environment of China in detail. The risk diversification was emphasized while
the financial stability was neglected. It is possible that another mortgage meltdown would
occur once the mortgage securitization proliferates in China in the future years. The China
securitization legislation shall learn the experiences of U.S mortgage securitization industry's
rise and fall, and the EU covered bond legal framework is more appropriate to transplant into
China for the institution-building for the mortgage securitization.
In fact, mortgage securitization, as an important business innovation, has not received
much attention from the legal scholars since its inception and thus there is little discussion
about it from the point of view of law, especially the private laws governing the specific
operation of mortgage securitization. Since the burst of the sub-prime mortgage crisis, many
law scholars have criticized the greed of the Wall Street, the government deregulation, the
rating agencies and so on. No research has been undergone to scrutinize the basic principles
of securitization, especially from the point of view of mortgage law. No scholar has paid
attention to the role of mortgage in the past financial crisis and thus it is impossible to get a
comprehensive insight into the burst and evolution of the crisis, and the measures taken to
prevent the future financial crisis.
After each grave financial crisis, the market and its legal regime would experience great
institutional change so as to meet the new market conditions, it is the same for the evolution
of mortgage market and mortgage law. The sub-prime crisis since 2007 offered us a precious
opportunity to observe the process of institutional changes in mortgage markets and mortgage
law, and to evaluate whether the changes are appropriate and have positive impacts in the
future. Specifically speaking, what the emerging countries, which are eager to develop
mortgage securitization, such as China, can learn from these institutional changes in U.S?
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1.3 Methodology
Mortgage securitization is complex structured financing technology, involving both specific
laws governing the transaction process which has always been criticized by some scholars for
its shaky legal foundations, and the economic viability and desirability which determine its
proliferation in the marketplace. For this reason, a pure legal or economical study is not
sufficient to understand comprehensively this complex financing method and its systemic
influence on the financial markets. With respect to the relationship between law and finance,
LLSV has done an innovative research in this aspect61, and have made some interesting and
enlightening assertions. Although I do not agree with his opinion, their research has indeed
given me precious inspiration to study the relationship between law and financial innovations,
especially the mortgage securitization. This dissertation will combine the research both on the
economic and legal aspects of mortgage securitization, so as to study comprehensively how to
control the credit risk relating to the mortgage loans and mortgage-backed securities. Here
three main research methods will be employed.
First, a historical study of institution change of legal rules will be undertaken. History can
tell us something more than the research object itself can. As professor Douglass North has
stated, a theory of institutional change is essential for further progress in the social sciences in
general and economics in particular62. In this paper, this research method will be used to
explore the evolution of mortgage law both in the civil law system and common law system
which separately own a history of more than 2000 years and 800 years. During this long
history of evolution of mortgage, it has been transformed from a personal rights, into a real
rights and finally into a tradable commodity in the secondary mortgage market. And this is the
great insight that the history has told us. The evolution of mortgage financing, accompanied
by specific economic environment analysis at the time when the legal rules were changed,
will give us a more direct and dynamic demonstration of the process of institution change.
61 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes,and Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, Journal
of Political Economy, 1998, vol. 106, no. 6. In this paper, they examines legal rules purported for protection of
corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries.
they concluded that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French civil-law countries the
weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle.
62 Douglass North, working paper: Institutional change: A framework of analysis, available at:
http://129.3.20.41/eps/eh/papers/9412/9412001.pdf, visiting date: 2010.09.03.
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And thus the interplay between economic development and law change will be better
understood.
Secondly, a comparative law research on the specific rules of law will also be undertaken.
It is necessary to scrutinize the specific rules of mortgage law, secured transaction law and the
bankruptcy law, which together constructed the legal framework for mortgage securitization.
The institutional causes of the financial crisis in US. Since 2007 derived from the drawbacks
of these legislations. Here we will find that the legal framework governing mortgage
securitization in common law system becomes more rigid and inefficient as a result of the
"race-to-the-bottom" competition in relating legislation which has rotten the legal foundation
for mortgage market self-regulation. At the same time, a comparative research of the legal
framework governing the EU covered bond and U.S mortgage securitization will be made so
as to search for a possible remedy for the incentive problems arising from the
originate-to-diversify mortgage securitization. Moreover, the results of this comparative
research will be used to construct the legal framework for China mortgage securitization with
analyzing the specific legal and economic environment of China.
Thirdly, the methodology of law and finance. With respect to the relationship between law
and economic development, the scholars have probed into this interesting question for a long
time. In the late 19th century, Max Weber has employed law to explain the rise of capitalism,
asserting that “rational” law supports economic activity by lending predictability and
legitimacy to the rules of market exchange. Friedrich A. Hayek asserted that the “spontaneous
order”63 in the common law system is better suited to the market economy than the civil law.
Since the 1990’s, LLSV has done enlightening research in this field, explaining the
correlation between the development of capital market and legal origins, concluding that the
common law countries own a more developed capital markets than those of civil law
countries, through the establishment of a database scrutinizing the law protecting shareholders
and creditors and their enforcement in 49 countries. Their conclusion is based on the
following observations: (1) Common law countries protect shareholders better than do civil
law countries and especially better than French civil law countries.64 (2) as John Coffee has
63 Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, legislation and Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973.
64 Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The New
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asserted, civil law overregulates securities markets, while the common law systems imposed
less regulations, and prefer market solutions and private contracting to centralized, statist
regulation65.
These researches revealed that the legal system well defining and protecting the property is
the premise for the success of economic development; once the law gets into position, it will
become a stable, politic-neutral institution arrangement, a framework in which the economic
activities. From the point of view of these scholars, law is considered as fixed assets, like
highway and dam, for the economic development, while the law itself will be kept invariable.
The quality of law divides the countries into rich ones and poor ones. These views could be
summerized as the "legal origin" theory, and the differences between the two legal systems
are particularly emphasized.
A legal system or a legal framework, established for a specific sector, such as the mortgage
industry, is not a bundle of abstract rules governing the market participants in a technical
sense and thus is not a pure legal technology for social control. Otherwise, the legal changes
will be simplified as technological efforts, rather a comprehensive social-economical change
process. In this sense, it is important and necessary to understand the context in which these
rules are applied, so as to reveal the correlation between legal change and economic
development. LLSV, John Coffee and some other scholars attributed this difference of capital
market in differnt states to the legal origins, with a conclusion that the common law countries
granted more protection to the creditors and shareholders with a powerful enforcement of law,
and thus the common law system is usually more efficient than the civil law system.
However, the burst of the financial crisis from U.S. teaches us a different lesson. Why the
financial crisis occured in the most efficient and developed capital market in the world? Why
the crisis did not occur in the EU which shares a similar secondary mortgage market with
their U.S cousin? The reason is that the sucess and the higher efficiency of the US. capital
market is at the expense of the violation of some fundamental rules which are necessary for
the continuous development as illustrated in the 3rd and 4th part of this dissertation. More
important is that the violation of these fundamental rules of common law has destroyed the
Comparative Economics, 31 J. Comp. Econ. 595, 610, 2003.
65 Mark J. Roe, Legal origins, politics and modern stock markets, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460, December, 2006, P466.
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basis of market self-regulation. So this dissertation will concentrate on the micro market
self-regulation, rather on the macro public regulation. At the same time, the analysis of LLSV
in “law and finance” is a stable, rather than a dynamic one, which limits its persuasiveness of
legal change in a specific sector of interested county, such as the mortgage securitization in
U.S.
With respect to mortgage and mortgage securitization, it is important to study how the law
operates in the market and what the mortgage securitization practices have influenced the
mortgage law. In this research, we will observe that the mortgage securitization has radically
changed the way that mortgage law functions and provided no longer the necessary incentives
to the participants for credit risk control. Thus the mortgage law has experienced an important
institutional change in the functional sense.
40
II The evolution of mortgage: From contractual relationship to
marketable commodity
2.1 The evolution of the mortgage from a personal right to
a real right
As an important institution to secure the performance of obligation, mortgage has always
been and is still on the way of evolution so as to suit the changing economic environment.
From the ancient agriculture era, to the industrial era and finally to the current financial era,
the nature and structure of mortgage has been radically changed. For example, at the begining,
the mortgage was structured just as a contractual relationshi between the transaction parties;
later it was transformed into a real security interest over the immobile property; since the 18th
century, the mortgage began to be used as a instrument to secure the performance of bond and
securities in the capital market. The legislators and transaction participants always explore the
way to expropriate the value of mortgage and maximize its utility to the market in different
historical eras. In the following part, we will see how the mortgage has been reconstructed so
as to adapt to different market envrionments in history.
2.1.1 The mortgage in the Roman law
2.1.1.1 The pre-mortgage era
The term hypotheca, derived from the Greece, was introduced into the Roman law very lately.
In the Greece law, the mortgage or hypothec is defined as a real right on property without the
transfer of possession. However, this occurred only if the debtor became insolvency at the
moment when the obligation was due. The true real guaranty was introduced into Greece very
lately, because the inalienability of land until the 5th century D.C prevented its perception.
According to Paoli, the author of “Study on Athens Law”, the simple agreement of hypothec
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just created a personal obligation not against to the third party, and only in combination with
possession, it could be considered as a true real guaranty which is opposable to the third
party66(in the sense that a situation qualified as a real right emerged from the agreement, and
the transfer of possession just occurred as a consequence of non-performance, and the
principle of prior in tempore potior in nure will be applicable to the potential conflicts among
different creditors). The research of Paoli showed that, in 10th century the guaranty in the
mortgage became into a true right only with the possession and with the character of
continuity, the creditor in practice entered into possession of neither the property nor its
monetary equivalent.
In the roman era, the personal guaranty was mostly employed to strengthen the credit,
while the real guaranty was not original67. As is evident both from the standard of
jurisprudential analysis and the amount of legislative activity, personal security was much
more important in Roman law than it is today68. However, there was not lack of institutions
aiming to provide real guaranty for the underlying debt.
The first real guaranty utilized by the Romanian, in chronological order, was no doubt the
trust of creditor – fiducia cum creditore69, which was in substance a relationship of trust,
subordinated to the principle obligation. The debtor transferred (implemented by the regular
form of mancipatio70) a property to the creditor which held it as collateral. Until the credit
was satisfied, the creditor re-transferred the property to the debtor. And the price of the above
sale, from the point of view of economic, constitutes in practice the money given for a loan
and the object of a debt. The essential character of this trust is the complete transfer of
property from the debtor to the creditor, in the form of mancipatio and later in iure cessio71.
The creditor became the proprietary over the property, and the debtor became the creditor
66 Pietro Boero, Le ipoteche, seconda edizione, NTET, P9.
67 Danilo Dall and Renzo Lambertini, Istituzioni di Diritto Romano, Terza edizione, G.Giappichelli Editore,Torino,
P290.
68 Reinhar Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990), P115. Here
Prof. Zimmerman specifically discussed the reason for the prevailing of personal security. The first reason is that
friendship played a far greater social role than it does today. Secondly, personal security had a much more potent
effect than security by pledge; the harshness of personal execution made whoever was personally liable try to
discharge his obligation almost at all cost.
69 Alfredo Ascoli, Le origini dell’ipoteca e l’interdetto salviano, Livorno, 1887.
70 The act of transferring things called res mancipi. This is effected in the presence of not less than five witnesses,
who must be Roman citizens and of the age of puberty, and also in the presence of another person of the same
condition, who holds a pair of brazen scales, and hence is called Libripens. http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mancipatio
71 It means transfer in the court, see Danilo Dalla and Renzo Lambertini, Istituzione di diritto romano, P264.
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relative to the same property which would be subject to the future act of mancipatio.
Under this trust, the sole obligation of creditor was to re-transfer the property to the debtor
(another mancipatio in the reverse sense), when the price of the sold property was paid to the
creditor. The trust constitutes the sole cause of the property transfer. And we can conclude that
the trust transfer is for the sole purpose of entrusting one’s property to another one because it
will be restituted.
For the reason of the conservative spirit of the Romanians, the ancient Roman law did not
accept the complete freedom of forms and modes for the transfer and constitution of rights.
Although the Romanians had been emancipated from certain institutions of the barbarian
people, they were very slow freeing them from the influence of certain forms when they
constructed its own private law. The essential requisite for the constitution of rights is for a
long time in Roma the publicity72.
The second form of real guaranty was the pledge, denominated as datio pignoris o pignus.
The real right of pledge could be constituted by a simple agreement by the participants. The
debtor just transferred the possession of the property to the creditor, not the property itself.
The property on which the pledge was based can be delivered by the pledgor (the debtor or a
third party) to the pledgee (the creditor).
The pledge or pigus datum is the older one. With the act of “datio” 73 accompanied by
specific agreement “conventio”, the property entered into the possession of pledge. Under the
pigus, only the possession is transferred, not including the title. The pledgee is obligated to
restitute the property when the underlying obligation extinguished. Because the possession of
the property is precisely utilized as a guaranty, the pledgee can neither use nor get the
proceeds of the property. In the event of the non-performance of the debtor, the creditor is
entitled to hold the property as owner or sell it using the proceeds for the satisfying of its
credit. The agreement whereby the creditor could get the property of the thing for pledge is
called lex commissioria, and it could be characterized as a traditio74 under the condition of
non-performance. Of the alternatives of lex commissioria and sale, the second got forbidden
72 Alfredo Ascoli, Le origini dell’ipoteca e l’interdetto salviano, Livorno, 1887, P2.
73 'Datio' is a latin term which refers to the transfer of property (meaning literally 'to give').
74 It means transfer (consegna). La traditio era la forma più semplice di trasferimento del possesso, in quanto
consisteva nella materiale consegna del bene; la stessa traditio tuttavia, se accompagnata da iusta causa ed animus
dominii trasferendi, trasferiva, per le res nec mancipi, addirittura la piena proprietà. 交付。
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by the post-classical emperors, while the faculty of sale later became the natural element,
inherent in the nature of the institution.
The further and decisive step for the evolution of hypothec is commenced by establishment
of pignus by a simple agreement (pignus conventio), under which the possession of the things
for mortgage were transferred to the creditor just until the moment of non-performance of
obligation. This conventional pledge (piguns conventum) later was titled by the Greece term
“hypothec” (hypotheca or ipoteca) which is in contrast with the real contract encompassed in
the pldge (pignus datum), and this constitutes the original core of the modern concept of
hypothec75.
The first form of hypothec, however, was on personal property, precisely on the working
instruments and animals on the rural land by the tenant. Under the hypothec, the landlord was
protected against the possible arrears in paying the land rent by the tenant. Through the
interdictum Salvianum, the landlord could take possession of these hypothecated things in the
event of tenant’s arrears in paying the rents; later, the landlord was entitled an action in rem
(action Serviana) against any third party76, and later it was extended to the guaranty of any
kind of credit in the form of actio utilis, no longer limited to the credit deriving from rent.
Hereto a real guaranty- conventional pledge with a general application - without the transfer
of things as collateral, independent from the rent claims on rural land, was constituted against
anyone. Later it was possible that there existed several hypothec on unique thing in favor of
different creditors, the priority was determined under the principle of chronological anteriority,
namely prior tempore potior iure.
It is controversial with respect to the effective scope of creditor’s power in case of the
non-performance in different historical periods. According to Tamburrino77, the conventio
pignoris, even after the Serviana, was circumscribed in the jus honorarium78 and just granted
protection for the possession, while Gentile and Gorla and Zanelli connected it with the
conception of mortgage as a limitation on the alienability which might derive from the Greece
75 Pietro Boero, Le ipoteche, seconda edizione,NTET, P6.
76 See http://www.sapere.it/enciclopedia/ipot%C3%A8ca.html visiting date 2011-6-21.
77 Giuseppe Tamburrino, Della tutela dei diritti : delle ipoteche : Artt. 2808-2899, 2. ed, 1976, P5.
78 Jus honorarium is a Latin term which means magisterial law. It means the body of law laid down by the decrees
of the supreme magistrates, including the jurists and aediles or jus aedilium.
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law79.
The possible line of the development of hypothec in the Romanian law can be shown as
following: a) originally, the creditor could take over or possess the thing under the conventio
pignoris, and thus gave the debtor a psychological pressure; it was possible and became
popular that the creditor could utilize the lex commisssoria to stipulate a supplementary
agreement whereby the property of the collateral will be transferred to the creditor in case of
non-performance.; b) successively, it informed another agreement whereby the creditor could
sell the collateral and get repaid with the proceeds; c) the pactum de distrahendo pignore80
became more popular, and it became the natural element of the pignus relationship in the
classical era; d) in 320 DC, the emperor Constantine forbid the use of lex commissorio, and
the ius ditrahendi became the essential element of pledge ( however the sale could not be
proceeded if a special notification was not given to the debtor); at the same time, the
institution of impetratio dominii emerged for the situation in which a buyer could not be
found, and the creditor could make an application to the emperor to get the property of the
collateral( the debtor also had the possibility to re-take the property in two years time); e) in
530 DC, Justinian established the obligation to restitute the eventual excess of value relative
to the guarantied credit to the debtor, both for the creditors who have sold the collateral
exercising the ius distrahendi and those who have get the property by means of impetratio,
It is, however, evident that the protection for the potential acquirer, in case of the
hypothecated property, is problematic. Because there was no mechanism for the publication
of the hypothec, the limitations on the property was not cognizable for the third party and
consequently it was inevitable to create a secret hypothec. Usefulness and reliability of real
security were seriously impaired by the lack of publicity81. The question of secret security is
confronted in different states and eras. With respect to the publication of the hypothec
contract, the emperor Lenone, in 472 D.C established a system of publicity, based on
79
80 Il pactum de distrahendo pignore era, in periodo preclassico, il patto con cui si attribuiva al creditore il iùs
distrahèndi [vedi], e cioè il diritto di alienare, in caso di inadempimento, l’oggetto ottenuto in possesso al fine di
soddisfare il credito con il ricavato della vendita, restituendo al debitore l’eventuale eccedenza [vedi hyperocha].
In età classica, data la notevole diffusione, esso fu considerato automaticamente inserito nel pignus [vedi], tanto
che per escludere il ius distrahendi si ritenne necessario ricorrere ad un espresso pactum de non distrahendo
pignore. See http://www.simone.it/newdiz/newdiz.php?id=2198&action=view&dizionario=3 visiting date
2011-6-22.
81 Reinhar Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990), P116.
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priviliges to pignus publicum through the transcription in the registry of magistrate.
Successively the emperor Justinian introduced the pignus quasi publicum (private act
undersigned by three testimonies). In 1673, the famous Colbert decree was promulgated and it
established a system of publishing the mortgage whereby the registered creditors enjoyed
priority over the non-registered one. However this decree was revoked a year later. Some
other systems also pursued to assure the consciousness or knowability of the existing
limitations on the collateral, which was brought about by the documentation in the public
registry (for example the notary institution in Venice in 1288 assumed this function) or by the
form of oral publication (the statutes of Sassari of 1316 provided that the act of creating a
mortgage should be published in the public every year). The publicity assumes substantial
effect of diminishing the secret security. Sine the 14th century, in some German-language
areas the constitutive effect of the “intavolazione” in special public registry of all the acts
about immobile negotiation was confirmed, including those relative to the real guaranty.
There are two contrasting categories of conceptions of mortgage in the Romanian law. One
defines mortgage as a limitation on alienability of collateral; the opposite one, however,
permits the transfer the property of the collateral so as to dispose it for the repayment to the
creditor. Generally speaking, the second definition has gradually dominated over the first one,
as a result of the requirement of the circulation of collaterals, no matter how much oscillations
have occurred in different periods. It is undoubted that the current provisions as a whole
accept the doctrine of the expropriability of collateral through the third party who becomes
the proprietary finally.
2.1.1.2 The evolution of mortgage in the later periods
In the medial era, the hypothec was often a subterfuge because of the anti-usury law and took
the name of obligation bonorum. In the 16th century, the institution of hypothec re-took its
ordinary name, but its level of publicity remained the same with that of the Romanian period.
Before the 13th century, the security interest over the immobile property in Germany
introduced the Romanian hypothec, usually provided the possession of the collateral and had
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in disposal of the use of and the proceeds from the collateral 82. Since the 13th century, the
non-possessory mortgage became popular in some areas of Germany, such as Cologne,
because of the creation of "city book" ( stadtbuch), and thus the exchange value of the real
property was employed to secure the performance of the loan. The borrower, usually the
businee man involved in navigation, kept the possession, use and exploitation of the real
property. This could be seen as the srpout of the modern mortgage.
In fact, the mortgage in the medial era was not very well publicized, and various
non-uniform methods were used to publicize the mortgage. Consequently, this confusing
publicizing system did not satisfy the security requirement of the commercial economy
development since the 18th century. For this purpose, Prussia enacted a national "Mortgage
and bankruptcy act" establishing the "land and mortgage recording book" managed by the
court system in 1722. It is notable that the recording under this act is not necessary for the
constitution and validation of the mortgage, while the unrecorded mortgage is still valid, but
repaid after the recorded creditors.
Later, the prussia government enacted anther two acts which improved or modernized its
real estate financing system, namely the "Bankruptcy act" of 1748 and the "Mortgage act" of
1750. Under the "Bankruptcy act" of 1748, in case of the debtors' insolvency, the creditors
would be repaid according to their recording time, whereby the creditors recorded prior were
repaid in priority. Under the "Mortgage act" of 1750, all the mortgages, including the legal
mortgage, should be recorded, otherwise the creditor would loss its priority in the repayment.
The priority of competing mortgages in the repayment is determined by their recording time.
The recording became the unique way to determine the existence and priority of the mortgage.
Since then, the mortgage became a uniform lien over the real property in the national
jurisdiction and this facilitated the further exploitation of the exchange value of the real estate
to fund the commercial activities in the expansion of capitalism. A refined and consolidated
land register provided the basis for what was called "mobilization of land value". However,
the consequence was that landed property soon became overcharged with debts83.
82 Chen Huabin, Working paper:The evolution of the security interest over immobile property in Germany,
availalbe at: http://china.findlaw.cn/info/minshang/danbao/lunwen/319089.html．
83 Reinhar Zimmerman, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990), P116.
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In the pre-revolution France, the famous law of Brumaire 11 introduced the distinction
between the transcription, a condition for the effect against third party concerning the
property and real right of enjoyment, and registration, evidencing the existence of mortgage
and affirming the principle of publicity and specialty84. And this constituted the fundamental
development for the immobile publicity system of latin. The Napoleon civil code went back
to the consensual transfer of property, introducing the secret security which waived the
mortgage publicity.
The mortgage as a lien to secure the performance of obligation became very popular since
the 18th century, and this system was also transplanted to the other areas of the world, such as
Japan in the 19th century and China at the begining of the 20th century. The commercial
activities, assisted by the modern mortgage system, got developed very fast. The recent
example is China. Since the enactment of its "Guarantee Law" governing mortgage in 1996,
the mortgage law has been widely used to finance the economic activities, especially the
housing finance, and many urban families have bought their new home throug the financial
assistance from the banks' mortgage loans.
2.1.2 The mortgage in the common law system
Mortgage has a long story of development in the English law since the medieval era. It has
experienced three fundamental transitions since its inception. The first occurred at the end of
the 15th century, where the mortgage was transformed from the possessory interest of the
creditor into a security interest of modern law. The second occurred in the early 17th century
with the recognition of the equity of redemption by which the mortgage was transformed
from a personal right into a real right. And that is why it is generally considered that the
mortgage law in the common law system originated in the 17th century. The third occurred
since the 1930’s, when the mortgage was transformed from a stagnant lien into a tradable
commodity in the secondary mortgage market. The mortgage securitization since the late
1970’s fastened this process and broadened its impacts on the mortgage law. Combining with
84 Pietro Boero, Le ipoteche, seconda edizione,NTET, P13.
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the mortgage-based financial innovations, such as the MBS. In this part, we will discuss the
first two transformations and the third is left for discussion in the next part.
The mortgage law of today, being of ancient derivation, is of many complexities which are
the result of the law's oscillations in trying to maintain the equilibrium among the parties in
this field: on the one hand, mortgage law has always been seeking to offer safe security for
the creditor who advanced money; on the other hand, it also try to restrain greedy creditors
from exploiting needy borrowers. Through the following analysis of the mortgage's evolution
in common law, we will see the effots of judges and legislator made to achieve this
equilibrium.
2.1.2.1 The mortgage during the 12th and 15th century
The mortgage in this period was greatly influenced by the prohibition on charging interest85
imposed by the Church, which characterized the agreement to pay interest as usury. And this
prohibition aimed to prevent economic exploitation of poor people and continued to exist
until the 15th century. Due to the interest prohibition, the key feature of the two mortgages
above discussed was the lenders’ physical possession of the mortgaged land with different
contractual arrangements. Moreover, the lenders structured these transactions to disguise the
true nature of the lender-borrower relationship so as to circumvent the prohibition on interest
for lending, such as lease, conditional sale and etc. And during this period, the mortgage
arrangements have evolved through three forms --- the Glanvillian gage, the Bractonian
mortgage and the Littletonian gage.
Although no detailed evidence is available, the earliest instance in English law of an owner
using land as collateral for a loan is the gage of Glanville’s (a justice in eyre) time in the late
12th century86. Glanville87 described two kinds of gages of land: the live pledge (vif gage) and
85 At that time, the England economy was undeveloped and international trade was not very active and the lenders
were lack of investing opportunities. Consequently, they had to lend money to the necessitous people charging
interest as the primary source of income. And that is why the state and church issued their prohibitions on charging
interest.
86 Andrew R. Berman , "Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage" - The Use (and Misuse of) Mezzanine Loans and
Preferred Equity Investments, 11 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 76, Autumn, 2005. Also see Powell on Real Property,§
37.02.
87 In 1190, Raulph de Glanville wrote his “Treatise on the Laws and Customs of England”.
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the dead pledge (mort gage88). For the live pledge, the creditor took physical possession of the
pledged land and applied the rents and profits to satisfy its claims. The most popular gage was
the “mort gage” or “mortuum vadium” (dead pledge) through which the creditors took
physical possession of the pledged land, but not applied rents and profits of the land to reduce
the underlying obligation. So the lenders’ physical possession of the land is the essential
element of these two forms of mortgages89. However, the physical possession of the lender
did not get protection from the law90, although it was essential for the creation of a valid
Glanvillian gage. Upon the borrowers’ default, the title to the land was forfeited to the lender
regardless of the fact that the land’s value exceeded the outstanding debt and the rents and
profits had been collected by the lender as interest in substance.
In the 13th century, the Glanvill’s gage was replaced by Bractonian gage, under which the
borrower was required to transfer an estate for years and legal possession to the lender.
Different from the Glanvillian gage, the possession of Bractonian gage was legal protected.
The borrower had the right to recover the property upon repayment of the debt, and he or she
would automatically loss the absolute fee simple to the lender once he or she failed to repay
the debt. Bractonian mortgage required the lenders to prove both the existence of the
underlying debt and the validity of their title.
Here we describe the ancient and primary form of mortgage. But it is not the mortgage in
the common law. Although the term “mortgage” is still used today, it is no longer the
mortgage in an arrangement under which the mortgagee took physical possession of the
property and retained the proceeds from the property. Under the modern and equitable
mortgage, the fundamental principle is the anti-clogging rule which prohibited the clogging
of the debtor’s equity of redemption and thus prohibited the mortgagee from retaining any
interest in the mortgagor’s property once the underlying debt had been repaid91. So the
88 At that time, French was the official language after the Norman Conquest, and at that time, the term “mortgage”
was introduced from French and was incorporated into English.
89 There are two possible reasons for the lenders’ physical possession of the land. First, the possession was the best
way of publicity in a era absent of recording system, and thus prevented the potential competing lenders; second,
the lenders’ possession facilitated the lenders’ remedy upon the borrowers’ default.
90 There are two possible explanations for this result. One is from Glanvill who justified this result on the ground
that the lenders’ real interest was in the debt and not in the land. See Ranulf de Glanvill, A Treatise on the Laws
and Customs of the Realm of England bk. x, ch. 12 (G.D.G. Hall trans.,1965). Some other commentators thought
that the lack of protection could be attributable to the early state of development of the possessory actions. See
Frederick Pollock & Frederick Maitland, The History of English Law 119 (2d ed. 1898).
91 Morris G.Shanker, Will mortgage law survive? : A commentary and critique on mortgage law’s birth, long life
and current proposals for its demise. 54 Case W. Res. 69.
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original Dead Pledge transactions have disappeared and been substituted by a totally different
equitable mortgage since the 17th century. Later we will detailed discuss the revolutionary
development of mortgage law in the 17th century.
Approximately by the end of 15
th
century, the mortgage was transformed from the
possessory interest of the creditor into a security interest of modern law. Littleton92’s gage ---
the direct forerunner of what we now refer to as the common law mortgage --- soon began to
displace the Bractonian mortgage93. Under Littleton’s gage, the mortgagor conveyed the land
to the mortgagee in fee simple, subject to a condition that the mortgagor might re-enter and
determine the mortgagee’s estate if the money lent was repaid on a determined date. Upon the
borrower's repayment of the debt, the lender's estate automatically ended and the borrower
could exercise its right of reentry and recover the land from the lender. Through the Littleton’s
gage, the mortgagor just conveyed the fee simple to the mortgagee, while he retained the
actual possession of the mortgaged land by the middle of the 17th century. So the mortgage
was no longer a possessory one rather a true security instrument94, by which the mortgagee
was granted the legal title to the property as collateral.
From the era of Glanville’s gage to the Littleton’s gage, the lender gradually strengthened
its rights in the mortgaged land. The culmination of this trend was Littleton's gage where the
lender actually obtained fee title to the mortgaged land with almost all the rights incident to
absolute ownership, including the right to possession and collection of rents and profits95.
There was no separate body of mortgage law at that time and the relationship between the
lender and borrower was governed by the general principles of conveyance law and contract
law. Usually the lender, with superior bargaining power, dictated the terms of the mortgage
contract and imposed their will over the borrower. At the same time, the situation for the
92 See Littleton on Tenures, (Wambaugh ed. 1903).
93 There is no clear consensus on exactly when Littleton's gage became the dominant form of mortgage, but the
dates range from the thirteenth century to the early sixteenth century. Osborne on Mortgages, supra note 19, 5 at 8
(arguing that in the fourteenth century the conveyance of the fee upon condition subsequent emerged as the
dominant form of mortgage); Powell, 37.02 (noting that in 1475, Littleton "described a mortgage as a conveyance
upon condition that if the debtor paid upon the due date ... he might re-enter"); See Andrew R. Berman , "Once a
Mortgage, Always a Mortgage" - The Use (and Misuse of) Mezzanine Loans and Preferred Equity Investments, 11
Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 76, Autumn, 2005.
94 Here, we find that mortgage in the civil law system and the common law system has followed a similar evoution
from possessory to non-possessory security interests, as happened in England and Germany nearly at the same
historic moment.
95 Andrew R. Berman , "Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage" - The Use (and Misuse of) Mezzanine Loans and
Preferred Equity Investments, 11 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 76, Autumn, 2005.
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borrower was worse because of the common law court’s rigid literal interpretation and
enforcement of the contractual arrangement. In the litigation, they did not taking into
consideration of the intent and the true nature of the transaction. According to the common
law court, the freedom of contract was paramount and thus they protected the lenders’
interests in the name of freedom of contract. The mortgagor had to perform the underlying
debt on the due date (which was usually referred to as law day), otherwise he would lose its
fee simple over the property, even if the default could be due to circumstances out of the
debtor’s control, such as illness, force majeure and etc. This was titled by the common law
“freedom of contract” regime.
2.1.2.2 The equitable mortgage in the 17th century: The equity redemption and
the conversion of mortgage from personal rights into real rights
In the early 17th century, the mortgage experienced a great change in the form and substance
because of the intervention of the equity court through developing the borrower’s equity of
redemption. And it is commonly considered that the true mortgage originated at that time.
Because of the harsh consequence of the common law mortgage described above, the
chancellors in the early 17th century began to grant appropriate relief to the mortgagors, and
the result of these practices was that they developed a unique and separate body of mortgage
law.
The chancery intervention primarily aimed to protect the debtors from the harsh and
technical treatment of the common law mortgage. And this helped realize the radical
transition of mortgage from a personal right into a real right. There is a good explanation for
the equity of redemption from the point of view of the creditor-debtor relationship. The
mortgagee advanced a loan to the mortgagor and expected to be repaid the amount due to him
with the corresponding interest. The mortgagee’s right was only to the payment of his debt
and the property was merely security for that purpose. Once the mortgagee-creditor got paid,
the relationship between the parties was terminated like the general creditor-debtor
relationship; and the mortgagee no longer had any rights over the property offered by the
mortgagor for securing the payment of the underlying debt. Any attempts trying to retain
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rights over the property are illegal and unenforceable, and they are unlawful clogs on the
debtor’s equity of redemption which is considered as inviolable. According to this basic
anti-clogging rule, the provisions in the mortgage contract allowing the mortgagee retaining
any interest are ineffective.
Initially, the Chancery just compelled the creditor to make the agreed re-conveyance where
the debtor had strictly performed its obligations. Later this intervention was applied to the
situations where the debtors had failed to perform the debt on its due date (the law day),
rather than permitting the mortgagee to forfeit the property. At first the equity of redemption
was limited to individual borrowers only where the debtor had a good or justified excuse for
his default, such as fraud, accident, mistake, excusable error, impossibility, oppression, or
some similar familiar ground of general equity jurisdiction96. But by the early 17th century,
the courts recognized the borrower's right of redemption as a general rule97. This right became
known as the debtor’s “equity of redemption”, and this right means not only a personal right
to pay late, but a continuing estate in the land on the part of the debtor, amounting to an
ownership interest, until his right to redeem was terminated (“foreclosed”).98And since then,
mortgage law became a unique and separate body of equity law99.
The anti-clogging rule seems to permit the mortgagor to delay the performance of debt for
an unlimited time and then to redeem the property by a delayed payment. And thus the
mortgagee felt no safety regarding to its security interest upon the debtor’s default. So the
mortgagee looked to the Chancery for a decree through which the debtor would be barred
from the equitable right to make a tardy redemption. As a response to this needy protection to
the creditors, the equity court developed the well-known foreclosure proceeding through
which the mortgagee asked the equity court ordering the debtor to redeem by making full
payment of the principle obligation and the corresponding interest within a designated time
after the due date. Otherwise the mortgagor’s equity of redemption will be foreclosed.
96 Powell, at 37.02. According to Turner, the first instance of a court ordering what we now refer to as the equity
of redemption dates to 1456 in a case involving highly unusual circumstances: excessive profit, imprisonment of
the mortgagor in debtor's prison, and the lender's gross fraud and oppression." There were soon other cases
suggesting the court's power and jurisdiction to order equitable relief. But the equity of redemption did not develop
all at once. It developed over a period of time and "only as the result of a very long succession of decisions."
97 See, e.g.,Burkhart, Lenders and Land, at 264.
98 Kenneth C. Kettering, True sale of receivables: A purposive analysis, 16 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 511, Winter,
2008.
99 Morris G.Shanker, Will mortgage law survive? : A commentary and critique on mortgage law’s birth, long life
and current proposals for its demise. 54 Case W. Res. 69.
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The transition of mortgage from a personal right to a real right is closely related with the
intervention of equity courts of England. The development of the equity of redemption was a
complicated game between the lenders and the equity court in a long period. As we have
described above, in medieval England, lenders usually disguised the mortgage transaction as
other types of transaction in attempt to avoid the borrower’s equity of redemption, such as
conditional sale or lease with right of early termination, an outright sale with another contract
where the buyer-lender promises to resell the land at a higher price, or a conveyance to a third
party to hold the land in trust for the lender’s benefit if the borrower failed to repay the debt.
Notwithstanding lenders' above-mentioned attempts to disguise the true nature of the
mortgage transaction or to force the borrower to agree contractually to waive or limit its right
of redemption, the equity courts began to interpret the transaction not only based on the
language and the form of the mortgage contract which often masked its substance, and to
emphasize the substance of the transaction. In scrutinizing the legal structure of the
relationship and the true underlying nature of the transaction, the courts declared one of the
most important and long-held doctrines in real estate law: "once a mortgage, always a
mortgage." It means that if the true nature of the transaction was a mortgage, the law would
treat it as a mortgage. As Marshall Tracht has observed, the courts regard the right of
redemption as "essential, immutable, and unwaivable”, and is an inherent and inseparable part
of every mortgage law100.
The emergence of the borrower’s equity of redemption signaled the courts’ general
reluctance to enforce forfeiture provisions in the mortgage transaction, especially when the
value of the mortgaged land greatly exceeded the amount of the underlying debt. By refusing
to enforce the harsh forfeiture provisions contained in the transaction documents, the courts
simultaneously eroded the "then existing "freedom of contract' rules" and began to develop
mortgage law as a "unique and separate body of equity law."101 But the equity courts looked
beyond the mere words of the contract and they were willing to look at the essence of the
underlying debtor-creditor relationship rather than focusing solely on the formalistic structure
100 Marshall E. Tracht, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 599 (1999).
101 Morris G. Shanker, Will Mortgage Law Survive?: A Commentary and Critique on Mortgage Law's Birth, Long
Life, and Current Proposals for Its Demise, 54 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 69, P71-72, 2003.
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of the secured loan. The intent predominated over the form of the transaction and the court
only protected the parties’ reasonable expectations. That was, the lender expected to be repaid
the loan with interest in a reasonably period, and the borrower expected to recover its
mortgaged property upon payment of the outstanding debt.
2.1.2.3 The reformulation of mortgage: From title theory to lien theory
Since the inception of mortgage, the title theory has dominated the discussion of the nature of
mortgage in England until the revolutionary Law of Property Act 1925. Under the title theory,
the borrower granted its legal title over the mortgaged land or building to the lender,
One possible reason for the harsh treatment of the debtor is the legal structure of mortgage.
Before the revolutionary reform of property law of England in 1925, the title theory
dominated the mortgage transaction, namely, the legal title of the mortgaged land was
conveyed to the mortgagee subject to condition under which the mortgagor could re-enter and
re-vest himself with the legal title upon his performance of the underlying obligation. And this
formalistic transfer of legal title has imposed negative results to the debtors, leaving them
only the right of entry and an equitable protection. So it caused the necessity to reformulate
the mortgage transaction into terms of lien creation. In England, the lien theory officially
replaced the title theory under the Law of Property Act 1925102. And this act provided two
methods for creating a mortgage: (1) a demise for a term of years absolute, subject to a
provision for cesser on the redemption; or (2) a charge by deed expressed to be by way of
legal mortgage. But after the entry into force of Land Registration Act 2002, there is only the
second method left for creating a mortgage.
In the United States, the title theory still is accepted in some states103. However, the
litigation results in these states have demonstrated the true lien character of mortgage. As a
consequence, the same results are reached on most topics in the law of mortgages under both
102 Powell on Real Property, §37.03.
103 Three theories exist regarding who has legal title to a mortgaged property. Under the title theory title to the
security interest rests with the mortgagee. Most states, however, follow the lien theory under which the legal title
remains with the mortgagor unless there is foreclosure. Finally, the intermediate theory applies the lien theory until
there is a default on the mortgage whereupon the title theory applies. See
http://topics.law.cornell.edu/wex/mortgage
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theories104. At the same time, some states the lien theory has wholly replaced the title theory.
For example, Georgia provides that “a mortgage in this state is only a security for debt, and
passes no title.105”
2.2 The Secondary Mortgage Market and Mortgage
Securitization: From stagnant lien to marketable
commodity
Mortgages have always been transferable, and a market for mortgages existed in England as
early as the 13th century106. In the continent Europe, a secondary mortgage market had been
established as early as 1760’s by the Fredrick Ⅱafter the 7 years’ war in Prussia, which was
followed by Denmark and the other European jurisdictions. Meanwhile mortgage-backed
bonds were sold to the public as early as 1880107, and mortgage participation certificates had
been issued by mortgage bankers108 in U.S even before the beginning of 20th century. So the
secondary market is indeed not innovation in this strict sense. However, the secondary market
was relatively underdeveloped until the 1930’s when the American administration acted to
revitalize the housing market by introducing more liquidity. For the reasons of different legal
traditions and mortgage law construction, these jurisdictions have developed two distinct
models of converting the mortgage from stagnant lien into marketable commodity, namely the
European Covered Bond (In Germany the Pfandbrief) and the American Mortgage-backed
Securitization.
104 Surges & Clark, Legal Theory and Real Property Mortgages, 37 Yale L.J.691 (1928).
105 See Ga. Code Ann. §44-14-30.
106 Jo Anne Bradner, The secondary mortgage market and state regulation of real estate financing, 36 Emory L.J.
971, SUMMER, 1987.
107 Edward L. Pittman, Economic and regulatory developments affecting mortgage related securities, 64 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 497.
108 See Report by G. Alger, Moreland Commissioner, to H. Lehman, Governor of the State of New York, on the
Management and Affairs of the Insurance Department 10 (Oct. 5, 1934) [hereinafter Moreland Commission Report]
(copy on file with the Texas Law Review) (noting that guaranteed participation certificates were devised in 1906,
but participation certificates in unguaranteed mortgages had been in use long before that). Cited from Joseph C.
Shenker * and Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 Tex. L.
Rev. 1369, May, 1991.
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2.2.1 The mortgage covered bonds in German
In German, the mortgage financing of large volume has a longer history than that of U.S and
UK, it can be traced back early to 1770. The roots of the German Pfandbrief system go back
to the year 1769, when Frederick the Great issued a “cabinet order” pertaining to the
introduction of the Pfandbrief system as a means of easing the nobility’s credit shortage in
areas of Prussia which had been ravaged during the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763).
According to the Association of German Pfandbrief Banks (VDP), no Pfandbrief has failed
throughout its 200-years long history109. They are said to be attractive even in unfavorable
financial times because they “provide issuers with access to liquidity at all times and can
therefore finance new business with substantial margins even in a difficult market
environment.
The United States is considered as the birthplace of modern securitization, beginning with
the inception of mortgage‐backed security since the 1970s. Different from the mortgage
securitization in U.S, the Germany legislator adopted a distinct statutory approach of
securitization in order to utilize the real estate, especially the land, and to develop the national
economy. European banks were much slower to adopt the technique of U.S mortgage
securitization and were fortunately better placed to weather the initial stages of the
2008‐2009 crisis, although they too have been directly and indirectly exposed to turmoil.
Although structured differently, the covered bond and mortgage securitization both have
commoditized the mortgage, this is the important reason why we parallel covered bonds with
U.S mortgage securitization.
2.2.1.1 The origin of and development covered bond
The roots of the organized German Pfandbrief system can be retrospected to the aftermath of
the Seven Years' War from 1756 to 1763110. The great fortunes of the Prussia had almost been
109 See the Brochure “The Pfandbrief - A safe investment" on the website of VDP, available at:
”http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/0/871CDBC82023C6F5C12578EE0055F78F/$FILE/EN_Pfandbrief_
Broschuere.pdf, visiting date: 2011-10-25
110 For the discussion of the German mortgage banking system here, the reference will be mainly rely upon the
research of D.M.Frederiksen, Mortgage Banking in Germany, Quarterly Journal of Economics. This paper is
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totally destroyed and they suffered losses of every kind, especially for the province of Silesia.
The most valuable and sole fortune left to Prussia was the land. At that time, it was very
difficult to get credit and the interest rate was about 10% even on the mortgage loans. In order
to alleviate this tight credit and promote the economic development, the Prussian government
adopted a plan111 which was initiated by a Berlin merchant, Büring, and aimed at “making
part of the real estate of the country current” in 1770112. And this proposal is the origin of all
modern methods of organized mortgage banking as it is now carried out in the Continent
Europe113. In 1769, Frederick the Great issued a “cabinet order” establishing a compulsory
public-law association of noble landowners (“Landschaften”) that could obtain cheap
agricultural loans by issuing full recourse bonds secured by the nobles’ estates114.
According to this plan, a credit association, Die Schlesisiche Landschaft, was formed by
the noble land-owners, issuing mortgage coupons or debentures and guarantying the
repayment of principle and interest, with the king lending 200,000 thalers at 2% to the credit
association as the starting capital. The coupons or debentures would be of 1/2 or 2/3 of the
value of the land, with an interest rate of 4 percent payable to the holders of these bonds.
While the landowners or the debtors should pay 4.5% or 5% to the landschaftscasse for the
loans they got, and the interest rate difference was used to cover the cost of the
landschaftscasse and form an accident fund. The bonds can be traded publicly and its safety
would be insured sufficiently by the general Hypothekencasse, the mortgaged lands and the
prompt legal remedies115, while the provincial guarantee was not necessary. Through the issue
of these bonds, more currencies were provided for the economic development than before and
the interest rate would fall. For example, the interest rate of the bonds issued by one credit
association was 4.5%, later it was reduced to 4% in 1830, and 3.5% in 1834.
For the control of risk, the ratio of loan-to-value was strictly limited from 1/3 to 1/2, and
maxim of 2/3. There were various measure adopted for the estimate of the value of the
possibly the earliest English literature which did a detailed research on the origin and development of the German
mortgage banking system.
111 For more information about this plan, see D.M.Frederiksen, Mortgage Banking in Germany, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, P47-P51.
112 This plan was initially made in 1767, and at first was rejected. However, it was finally approved with some
alternations on July 9, 1770.
113 D.M. Frederiksen, Mortgage Banking in Germany, Quarterly Journal of Economics, P60.
114 See Association of German Pfandbrief Banks(VDP), History of the Mortgage Bank Act, available at
http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en_116.htm (last visited Jun. 11, 2010).
115 D.M. Frederiksen, Mortgage Banking in Germany, Quarterly Journal of Economics, P49.
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property. For example, the credit associations usually employed well-know land-owners and
members of the association to make the valuation. Some association required that the loan
must not exceed the actual cost of the mortgaged building, and the valuation was further
based on the average income for the past 3 or 5 years.
The “Landschaften” were compulsory public-law associations of noble landowners within
individual provinces, through which the members could obtain cheap agricultural loans.
Initially there was a close relationship between the estate encumbered by mortgage and the
respective Pfandbrief (referred to as “Güterpfandbrief”. The high standard of safety of this
first form of Pfandbrief lays in the fact that, first, the Pfandbrief creditor acquired a direct
claim over the individual estate that served as security for the liabilities of the borrower. Over
and above that, all the estates lent against by the Landschaft served jointly as security. The
high safety guaranteed the good liquidity of these bonds: some of them were listed on the
principle German exchanges, and thus had a good market value; the credit associations
usually made loan by handing to the borrower bonds of the same amount which he could sell
by himself so as to convert it into cash. At the same time, when the borrower repaid the loan,
the payment was made not in cash, but in bonds which he must buy in the open market. Later
this close relationship between property and Pfandbrief was loosened, and the Pfandbrief
became a debt instrument that was issued by the Landschaft itself and was secured by all the
mortgages that the Landschaft had created in respect of the individual properties.
Another particularly important association is the Central Landschaft für die preussischen
Staaten, which was founded in 1873. It functioned in the way similar to the current Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac. It issued bonds, not to make loans but to assist other associations to
obtain funds, based on the loans made by these credit associations.
During a period of more than one century since the inception of Pfandbriefe in Prussia,
there was lack of a uniform mortgage bank law. The statutory requirements for the Prussian
mortgage banks of 1863 could be see as the starting point of this law, and these requirements
were principles stipulated by the ministries for the awarding of mortgage bank licenses in
Prussia. Only mortgage banks that subjected themselves to these legal requirements were to
receive the license and the right to issue Pfandbriefe. And this principle is confirmed by the
later uniform Mortgage Bank Act in 1900 and the current Pfandbriefe Act 2005. For example,
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credit institutions governed by private law which are not mortgage banks may not issue bonds
under the name “Pfandbrief” or under any other name containing the word “Pfandbrief”116.
Under the Pfandbriefe Act 2005, “credit institution with its head office within the purview of
this Act which wishes to engage in Pfandbrief business shall require the written licence of the
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (supervisory authority) in accordance with § 32 of
the German Banking Act”117. With a development of more than one century, Germany
adopted it first mortgage based financing law, Mortgage Bank Act (HBG) on July 13, 1899
and it entered into force on January 1, 1900. For the first time, the whole German Empire was
given a standardized legal foundation for the issuance of Pfandbriefe through this legislation.
After several amendments, it was finally replaced by uniform Pfandbrief Act (PfandBG),
which is largely based on the provisions of the HBG, entered into force on July 19, 2005. The
1900 Mortgage Bank Act (Hypothekenbankgesetz, HBG) allowed Pfandbriefe to be issued by
private mortgage banks. In 1927, the passage of the Public Pfandbrief Act extended this to
public sector banks118. The German Pfandbrief system underwent a major overhaul in 2005
with the passing of new federal laws governing this financial product and the financial
institutions that provide it. The new Act consolidates a number of older laws119, and provides
a comprehensive licensing scheme for financial institutions wishing to participate in the
market.
The historic importance of this plan is that it put forward the idea of utilizing the mortgage
to issue bonds so as to raise the funds for the economic development. From our observation,
we can find the embryo of the modern mortgage financing institutions, such as the
installments, the loan-to-value ratio and the quasi-GSE institutions in the U.S. The excellence
of German mortgage banking system based on the real estate is one of the important reasons
for the Germany’s emergence in the late 19th century.
This Landschaften system proved so successful that it was adopted outside of Prussia in
116 See§5a (Protection of the name “Pfandbrief”).
117 See§ 2 Licence (1).
118 Patrick Quirk, Cover Me: The Economy Is on Fire (The German Pfandbrief), Ge rma n L aw J o u r n a l , Vol.
11 No. 12, P1329.
119 Specifically, the Act on Pfandbriefe and Related Bonds of Public Sector Credit Institutions (Gesetz über die
Pfandbriefe und verwandten Schuldverschreibungen öffentlicher‐rechtlicher Kreditanstalten; ÖPG); the
Mortgage Bank Act (Hypothekenbankgesetz; HBG); the Act on Ship Pfandbrief Banks (Gesetz über
Schiffspfandbriefbanken; SchBkG).
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German states. Later this model was copied by the other European countries, including the
Russian Baltic provinces and in Poland as well, and eventually spread to North, Central,
South-East and Eastern Europe (Denmark120, Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Baltic states,
Poland, Romania and Austria).
2.2.1.2 The covered bond markets within Europe
The covered bonds now are considered as an instrument of funding and liquidity management
tool of systemic importance. The covered bond markets are critical to both funding real estate
and public sector loans and for commercial banks’ liquidity management121. Covered bonds
are increasingly used in the marketplace as funding instruments, in addition to family deposits.
It enables credit institutions to obtain funds with lower cost in order to grant new mortgage
loans for housing and non-residential property as well as, in certain countries, to finance
public debt. By the end of 2010, there are EUR 2.5 trillion outstanding covered bonds in more
than 25 countries122, they play an important role in the financial system and contribute not
only to the efficient allocation of capital, but also ultimately to economic growth. Despite its
increasing importance of covered bond in the European capital market, little attention has
been paid to it by the specialized financial press. There is only one specialized annual market
research commenced by the European Mortgage Federation
Germany is still the largest covered bond or pfrandbrief market in Europe, which has a
story more than 200 years and has experienced many changes in the management and
regulation of these instruments. The latest regulation about pfandbrief was introduced in 2005.
Under this act, any lenders with a special license can be involved in the covered bond market,
no longer required to have a specialized bank status. The covered bonds are mainly based on
the following four kinds of assets: Mortgage, Public sector bonds, Ship and Aircraft123.
120 Danish covered bond lending emerged after the Great Fire of Copenhagen in 1795, when a quarter of the city
burnt to the ground. After the fire, a great need arose for an organized credit market as a large number of new
buildings were needed over a short period of time. Nearly all real estates are today financed with covered bonds in
Denmark, and Denmark is the 3rd largest issuer in Europe.
121 Jay Surti, Can Covered Bonds Resuscitate Residential Mortgage Finance in the United States? IMF Working
Paper, December 2010, P21.
122 In 2010, the US outstanding ABS, including agency-and GSEs-backed securities and MBS, is 2341.5 billion
dollars. In this sense, the EU zone share a similar market scale with the U.S counterpart.
123 See Germany Pfandbrief Act (PfandBG), section 1 “definitions”.
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The name for covered bond in France is Obligations foncières, which are issued by sociétés
de credit foncier, specialized credit institutions under the dual supervision of French banking
regulator and special rules. They are governed just by a single purpose: to grant or acquire
eligible assets, as defined by law and to finance these assets by issuing covered bonds, which
benefit from a legal privilege124.
The covered bond in Spain is “Cédulas Hipotecarias” and the first issuance of covered bond
dates back as far as 1861125. CB are regulated by the Spanish Mortgage Act of 1981, which
was subsequently developed by a series of Royal Decrees up until 1991.
The Danish mortgage system is among the most sophisticated housing finance markets in
the world and presents some unique characteristics126. Mortgage bonds comprise just over
seventy percent of the Danish bond market127. The combination of a tight regulatory
framework with developed specialized, "in-house" expertise in lending and credit assessment,
and in wholesale funding and risk management has translated into a highly rated system (and
institutions), able to deliver a variety of mortgage products at close to capital market
conditions128.
2.2.1.3 The basics of mortgage covered bond
The legal frameworks for covered bond are distinct across different jurisdictions within
Europe. However, covered bonds are homogenized in the following aspects: they are debt
instruments secured by a cover pool of mortgage loans (property as collateral) or
public-sector debt to which investors have a preferential claim in the event of default129. The
assets so constituting collateral are called “cover-pool” assets. Unlike normal collateral,
however, these assets are “ring-fenced” or “bankruptcy remote” to give covered bondholders
124 Raquel Bujalance and Eva Ferreira, An analysis of the European covered bond market, first draft, P6. Available
at: http://www.uibcongres.org/imgdb/archivo_dpo3674.pdf.
125 Raquel Bujalance and Eva Ferreira, An analysis of the European covered bond market, first draft, P6. Available
at: http://www.uibcongres.org/imgdb/archivo_dpo3674.pdf.
126 IMF, The Danish Mortgage Market - A Comparative Analysis ,2007, P3, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07123.pdf.
127 Jocelyn H. W. C. Chong, Danish Mortgage Regulations - Structure, Evolution, and Crisis Management, 9 Wash.
U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 371,2010, P373.
128 IMF, The Danish Mortgage Market - A Comparative Analysis ,2007, P3,available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07123.pdf.
129 See the website of European covered bond council: http://ecbc.hypo.org/Content/Default.asp?PageID=504,
visiting date 2011-5-11
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greater protection in the event of the issuer’s bankruptcy. It is argued that covered bonds
combine the scale advantages of capital market funding with on-balance sheet credit risk
management by the lender. The participants thus have more sufficient incentives for a right
assessment of the collateral quality, repayment capacity and closer monitor over the activities
of borrowers.
The Cover for Pfandbriefe
Among the institutional lenders in Germany, the Pfandbriefe banks are in a dominant position
for the supply of housing credit. They are operated in a distinct way compared to the
traditional banks: the funds for extending credit are collected not by gathering the household
deposits, rather by the issuance of covered bonds (Pfandbrief).
Bondholders have a claim against a cover pool of financial assets in priority to the
unsecured creditors of the credit institution. A cover pool is a clearly identified, “ring-fenced”
pool of assets dedicated to secure the covered bonds. In the event of the insolvency of the
credit institution, the assets in the cover pool will be used to repay the covered bondholders
prior to the unsecured creditors of the credit institutions. In order to“ring-fence” the cover
pool, the special law of most jurisdictions either excludes the cover pool from the insolvency
estate of the credit institution, or provides covered bondholders with a preferred claim within
the insolvency estate itself. In some other jurisdictions, the SPE is employed to preserve the
cover pool from the insolvency estate of the credit institution.
The credit institution has the ongoing obligation to maintain sufficient assets in the cover
pool to satisfy the claims of covered bondholders at all times. A) In order to maintain the
sufficiency of assts, over-collateralization is required, namely the value of the cover pool is
required to exceed the value of the covered bonds by a prescribed amount130. B) The credit
institution has the ongoing obligation to ensure that the value of cover pool assets is equal to
130 See§ 6 (Cover for Pfandbriefe) of Germany Mortgage Bank Act, which provides that “1The total volume of
Mortgage Pfandbriefe (“Hypothekenpfandbriefe”) outstanding must at all times be covered at their nominal value
by mortgages of at least the same amount and with at least the same interest yield (ordinary cover).” In addition,
the cover for the Mortgage Pfandbriefe (“Hypothekenpfandbriefe”) must be ensured at all times according to the
net present value and the net present value of the recorded cover pool must exceed the total volume of liabilities
resulting from Mortgage Pfandbriefe (“Hypothekenpfandbriefe”) and derivatives to be covered in accordance with
par. 6, sentence 2 by 2 percent (securing excess cover).
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or higher than the value of the covered bonds at all times. if some assets become matured or
defaulted, The credit institution may therefore be required to add further assets to the cover
pool to compensate the asset reduction. However, the sponsoring credit institution in
securitization is generally not compelled to replace assets which enter into default after they
have been transferred into the securitization portfolio.
Supervision of the credit institution’s obligations in respect of the cover pool (“special”
supervision) is specifically and only for the benefit of covered bondholders, as opposed to
supervision relating to the general stability of financial or other markets, general customer
interest, deposit protection, and the like. This “special” supervision is distinct from the
general supervision of the credit institution. The typical features of “special” supervision
include: a special cover pool monitor; periodic audits of the cover pool by the cover pool
monitor; and ongoing management and maintenance of the cover pool upon the credit
institution’s insolvency to ensure the timely payment of covered bondholders.
Pfandbriefe and the “True Sale” Doctrine
German Pfandbrief does not result in a ‘true sale’ of the relevant mortgages to the Special
Purpose Entity (SPE), upon which the magic of securitization depended131. In fact, there is no
‘sale’ at all. They must remain on the balance sheet of the originating bank. At the same time,
the special provisions of the Pfandbrief Act render them specially immune from the
bankruptcy of the originating bank and secured from the claws of its general creditors and this
“Bankruptcy remoteness” is a key attraction of the entire Pfandbrief supervisory regime.
Pfandbrief holders are said to enjoy an insolvency privilege whereby the “assets recorded in
the cover registers do not form part of the insolvency’s estate.” §30(1) of the Pfandbrief Act
provides that:
If insolvency proceedings (Insolvenzverfahren) have been commenced against the
assets of the Pfandbrief bank, the assets recorded in the cover registers shall not be
131 See Kettering, Kenneth C., Securitization and Its Discontents: The Dynamics of Financial Product
Development, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1553; NYLS Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07/08‐7 (2008)
(explaining the criticism by leading authors criticizing of this magic), available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012937
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part of the insolvency estate (Insolvenzmasse). The claims of the Pfandbrief
creditors shall be satisfied in full using the assets recorded in the respectivecover
register; they shall not be affected by the commencementof insolvency proceedings
against the assets of the Pfandbrief bank. Pfandbrief creditors will participate in the
insolvency proceedings only in the scope of para. 6 sentence 4.
Many other insolvency privileges also accrue. First, Pfandbriefe do not automatically
accelerate when the issuer becomes insolvent132. This prevents them becoming due
immediately and allows payment in the normal course. Second, judicial intervention in the
insolvency estate (e.g. in the form of a stay) will not affect the cover pool, or “special legal
estate” of the Pfandbrief. Third, Pfandbrief bank insolvency will result in the appointment of
“cover pool administrators” who oversee the cover pool of Pfandbrief assets for the benefit of
the Pfandbrief holders. These administrators then receive the right to “administer and dispose
of the registered assets.”133 Fourth, if cover assets are not sufficient to satisfy the claims of
Pfandbrief holders, they may have recourse against other assets of the bank134. Fifth, the sale
of cover assets to other issuers is facilitated by specific provisions in the Pfandbrief Act.135
So we can observe that this statutory bankruptcy isolation indeed protects the safety of the
bond investors. More importantly, it eliminates the legal uncertainty about the bankruptcy
isolation, which are frequently criticized in the U.S. Mortgage securitization practices.
2.2.2 The mortgage-backed securitization in USA
If we want to be clear about the origination and the development of the mortgage market and
securitization, there are three important historical points that deserve our close attention.
132 See Questions on German Covered Bond Legislation Dr Otmar Stöcker, Managing Director, Association of
German Pfandbrief Banks, 13 Sept. 2006.
133 Pfandbrief Act §30 (2), sentence 2. If the Pfandbrief bank has disposed of an asset recorded in the cover
register after the appointment of the cover pool administrator, such disposal shall be invalid (sentence 3).
134 In most covered bond structures, the bonds granted investors direct full recourse regarding to the credit
institution’s full resources. Full recourse to a credit institution is a key difference between the U.S mortgage
securitization and EU covered bonds. In the U.S mortgage securitization, MBS holders’ only recourse is to the cash
flow from a securitized portfolio of assets. The banks which originated the assets typically do not guarantee the
performance of the securitization. Therefore, if the cash flow from the securitized portfolio is insufficient to make
payments on the securitization units when expected, holders of the units would generally have no claim against the
credit institution which originated the securitized assets.
135 See id. §32 (I).
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Through historical research, we can understand the great changes of mortgage lending during
the past 80 years in U.S. The first point is the era of the Great Depression in the 1930’s in
which system-wide changes occurred in the mortgage market through the New Deal
legislations. The new deal has transformed the mortgage radically with respect to its structure
and consequently its market size, namely from a separated mortgage market in individual
community to a nationwide mortgage market136. Taking into consideration of the current
financial crisis, we find that the institutional infrastructure established by the New Deal
legislation still has great influence on the existing housing finance system in U.S, and it needs
detailed scrutinization of these legislation so as find the causes of the current crisis. The
second one is the inflation of the late 1960’s, bringing about a new crisis to mortgage lending
because of the increase of interest rate which was caused by the disruption of the Bretton
Woods System. Since then the interest rate risk becomes increasingly obvious for the banking
industry and finally caused the thrift crisis in America in the late 1970’s. The securitization
grew steadily from that time. In this period, there occurred an important event which is crucial
to the origination of securitization: the standardization of mortgage. The third historic is the
disaster of "9.11" in 2001. The Bush Administration created a long-term low-interest
environment in order to foster the wounded American economy. This low-interest
environment, combining the deregulation and the other factors, causes the sub-prime crisis
and consequently a worldwide financial crisis.
During these three historical periods, the government and legislators have played a very
important role reacting to the changing economic environment, although not always positive.
In this part we will scrutinize these three periods of mortgage lending and demonstrate how
the mortgage has been transformed from a lien into a commodity in the capital market of the
U.S., and how these changes have sowed the seeds for the current financial crisis.
2.2.2.1 The creation of Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) supporting
the amortizing mortgage
There are two key features of the modern housing finance system that make mortgages on
136 At the same time, the mortgage lending is supported on the local deposit in the thrift locating in the
corresponding community.
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U.S. residential properties extremely liquid: the insurance that the mortgage investor receives
against default risk and the deep secondary market in bundled-mortgage securities137. With
particular reference to the “insurance”, it was first provided by the federal programs and
agencies since the New Deal in the 1930’s which also helped establish the secondary
mortgage market and later encourage the proliferation of MBS. The great contributions of
these federal entities include: encouraging affordable housing through lowering interest rates
and transaction costs, increasing credit supply and enhancing liquidity of the housing and
mortgage markets. In this sense, it is necessary to do a retrospective overview of the origin
and development of these federal programs and agencies.
2.2.2.1.1. The introduction of amortizing mortgage
The origin of “insurance” for mortgage loans could be attributed to the structural change of
mortgage, namely the amortizing mortgage imposed credit risk over the lenders. One
far-reaching influence of the Great Depression legislation on the mortgage industry is the
introduction of the amortization. The structure of the modern American mortgage has evolved
over time. The U.S. mortgage before the 1930’s would be nearly unrecognizable today: it
featured variable interest rates, high down payments and short maturities, usually from 5 to 10
years. Payments were made of interest only, a rate of usually no less than 8%. Upon maturity,
the borrower should pay the entire principle. The lenders usually finance less than 60 percent
of the price of a house. So before the 1930’s, there no existed the amortizing mortgage loan.
And the predominant use of short-term mortgage loans, typically requiring no amortization
and a balloon payment due in 3 or 6 years, to finance housing, was a significant factor
contributing to the mortgage market crisis of the Great Depression in the 1930’s. For this
reason, one of the most important responses of the Federal government was by enacting
legislations encouraging the development of long-term amortizing mortgage loans and this
significant innovation made homeownership accessible to more American families, much
smaller down payment, less monthly payment, and fix interest rate during the life of the loan.
137 Price V. Fishback, William C. Horrace, and Shawn Kantor, The Origins of Modern Housing Finance: The
Impact of Federal Housing Programs During the Great Depression, University of Arizona and NBER, Working
paper, September 2001.
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The importance of the amortization lied in the fact that it gave households the opportunity to
gradually own their homes, and would prevent, or at least reduce the likelihood of a future
mortgage money crunch. By the creation of a sound mortgage instrument with amortization,
or periodic payments of the entire mortgage balance over a long period of time138, borrowers
could thereby pay off the loan from their monthly incomes without confronting a balloon
payment every few years, and an ensuing scramble to refinance the expiring mortgage. The
periodic equal payments similar to rent reduce the likelihood of mortgage foreclosures
because homeowners would grow accustomed to the mortgage payments as one of their usual
household expenses. On the other side, the monthly mortgage payment could also enhance the
certainty lenders felt that satisfaction of mortgage debt would follow139. So the lenders could
risk issuing larger mortgages with higher percentages of the value of homes, and lend to an
increasing number of American families who only have the money for the down payment.
For this purpose, the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 which was aimed “to refinance
home mortgages and to extend relief to the owners of homes who occupy them and are unable
to amortize their debt elsewhere”140. The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC)141 was
created to achieve these goals through originating mortgage loans to borrowers. The HOLC
could also issue its own bonds to local lenders in exchange for delinquent mortgages in their
portfolios. The lending record of the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation exhibited its
pervasiveness in the 1930’s American society and showed that the HOLC held an important
place in American mortgage history. As Kenneth T. Jackson has identified, the HOLC
“introduced, perfected and proved in practice the feasibility of the long-term self-amortizing
mortgage with uniform payments spread over the whole life of debt”142. It received 1,886,491
applications for home mortgage refinances between June 13, 1933 and June 27, 1935, which
was the dead line for the application. Over 50% of those loans were closed by the HOLC with
a total outlay of mortgage money exceeding ＄3 billion. And the Corporation has made 20%
138 James S. Olson, Saving Capitalism: the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the New Deal: 1933-1940,
Princeton University Press, 1988.
139 Peter M. Carrozzo, A new deal for the American mortgage: the home owners’ loan corporation, the national
housing act and the birth of the national mortgage market. 17 U.Miami Bus. L. Rev.1, Winter 2008.
140 Rossevelt’s Bill Proposing Refinancing of Mortgage for Home Owners, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1933, at 2. See
141 The HOLC stopped lending circa 1935, once all the available capital had been spent, and began the process of
liquidating its assets. HOLC officially ceased operations in 1951, when its last assets were sold to private lenders.
See Jonathan D. Rose, The Incredible HOLC? Mortgage relief during the Great Depression, January 15, 2010.
http://www.uncg.edu/bae/econ/seminars/2010/Rose.pdf visiting date: 2011-7-13.
142 Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization of the United States, 193 (1985).
68
of the mortgaged loans originated since the outset of 1933143. The essence of the HOLC is
merely to handle “extreme emergency cases” by Federal government’s assuming the
mortgage debt. But this is not a permanent solution, so it was liquidated in 1951.
2.2.2.1.2. The insurances offered by federal programs
In order to stimulate the building without government spending, improve conditions with
respect to home financing and rely mainly on private capital, a second important New Deal
legislation, the National Housing Act come into force in 1934 which offered the “insurances”
necessary to protect the safety of lenders’ loans, namely the government guarantee and direct
purchase of conforming mortgage loans. This legislation followed approach described as
“creating employment through home improvement loans, creating a sound mortgage
instrument, enhancing lender confidence through insurance for mortgages and a national
appraisal system, and increasing liquidity by creating a secondary market for sound, safe and
(thus) tradable mortgages”144. Thus, this legislation has made many institutional innovations
and modernized the mortgage industry as hereinafter explained.
The most important agency established by the “National Housing Act” is the Federal
Housing Administration (hereinafter referred to as FHA), which is designed to provide credit
insurance to eligible loans of and purchase obligations from the lending institutions according
to section 2 of this legislation. The guarantee from the U.S government gave lenders
confidence and thus provide safety and liquidity to the secondary mortgage market. The FHA
mortgage insurance program preserved the role the private lenders as the major suppliers of
residential mortgage credit, and at the same time encouraged those lenders to make credit
available by promising to purchase these mortgages that went into default145. Through the
FHA insurance program, lenders received protection for originating long-term loans with
relatively small down payments made by borrowers. As the administrator Steward McDonald
143 Peter M. Carrozzo, A new deal for the American mortgage: The home owners’ loan corporation, the national
housing act and the birth of the national mortgage market, 17 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev.1, Winter 2008.
144 Peter M. Carrozzo, A new deal for the American mortgage: the home owners’ loan corporation, the national
housing act and the birth of the national mortgage market. 17 U.Miami Bus. L. Rev.1, Winter 2008.
145 James Charles Smith , Economic regulation during turbulent times: The structure causes of mortgage fraud, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
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testified in the hearings in 1937, the FHA has issued debentures of ＄37,000 and insured
mortgages in a total amount of 614,000,000 as of January 1937. And during the period from
1935 to 1937, there only occurred 12 foreclosures in the entire United States. The philosophy
or the main object of the FHA is to assist low-and moderate-income families to buy homes on
more favorable terms and with lower interest rate than ever before, while the philosophy of
HOLC was to “relieve individuals in distress” because the borrowers and lending institutions
were in financial trouble.
The FHA and the later VA mortgage guarantee program created a national market for the
eligible loans. However, they did not create national markets for the origination and holding
of mortgage loans and the federal intervention in residential mortgage lending did not
transform local lending markets during the period between the 1930’s and the
1970’s146.
. At the same time, the Administrator of FHA is further authorized and empowered to
provide for the establishment of national mortgage associations (1) to purchase and sell first
mortgages as are commonly given to secure advances on real estate; (2) to borrow money for
such purposes through the issuance of notes, bonds, debentures, or other such obligations as
hereinafter provided. Although the concept of mortgage associations was in the National
Housing Act, these institutions never came into being in the form of private enterprises
because of the lack of confidence from investors about the mortgage market. So some
professionals proposed an amendment which would create a national mortgage association as
an extension of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. With the government-guarantee
feature, the insured mortgages would be turn into safe debentures which will attract various
investors, such as trust funds, insurance companies. This national mortgage association would
restore the flow of private capital into the American mortgage system.
As a result, these proposed amendments to the National Housing Act were passed and
signed by the President on February 5, 1938, and the National Mortgage Association of
Washington, D.C was charted as a subsidiary of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Two
months later, this association was changed to Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)
146 James Charles Smith, Economic regulation during turbulent times: The structure causes of mortgage fraud, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
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or Fannie Mae, aiming to enhance the liquidity to the mortgage industry. It was initially a
government agency that issued bonds to raise funds for the purchase of FHA-insured
mortgages and Veteran's Administration (VA)-guaranteed mortgages. In 1968147 Congress
divided Fannie Mae into two entities - Fannie Mae, which became a GSE and was allocated
the secondary market operations of the former entity, and the Government National Mortgage
Association (Ginnie Mae), which remained a division of HUD148. The concept of mortgage
market embodied in these national mortgage associations ultimately would liberate and
reinvent mortgage as a new investment vehicle; a deluge of new money would flood the
mortgage industry and democratize homeownership, making it accessible to a number of
American families149.It provided local banks with federal money to finance home mortgages
through creating a liquid secondary mortgage market. It became possible for banks and other
loan originators to issue more housing loans, primarily by selling their mortgage loans to the
secondary mortgage market. This is the most revolutionary proposal in the legislation because
it is the origin of the idea of “secondary mortgage market”. The creation and functioning of
this national mortgage association, together with the credit insurance from FHA, made the
mortgage become into a marketable commodity, and enhanced the liquidity to the mortgage
market.
Besides, in order to increase the security in the soundness of mortgage investments, the
Federal Credit Insurance Corporation was created to insure amortized mortgages which met
certain requirements, such as amortization, ceiling interest rates, a certain percentage of down
payment relative to the overall value of the mortgage loan. This “insurance feature” would be
of no cost to the government.
147 In 1954, an amendment known as the Federal National Mortgage Association Charter Act made Fannie Mae
into "mixed-ownership corporation" meaning that federal government held the preferred stock while private
investors held the common stock; since then Fannie Mae became a quasi-private corporation with partial
ownership by private shareholders.
In 1968, Fannie Mae was divided into two separate entities, the new Fannie Mae and Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA or “Ginnie Mae”), according to the Housing and Urban Development Act. The new
Fannie Mae, a publicly held corporation through which the activity and debt were removed from the federal budget,
continued to purchase the FHA and VA mortgages from originators. Ginnie Mae, which remained as a pure federal
agency in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, supports FHA-insured mortgages as well as
Veterans Administration (VA) and Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) insured mortgages, with the full faith
and credit of the United States government.
148 See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 802(c), 82 Stat. 476, 536 (codified at
12 U.S.C. § 1717(2),2006.
149 Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Efficiency Home Finance Act of 1970,
Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J.765 (2005).
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Finally, during the period from 1933 to 1938, the New Deal legislations discussed above
has inspired a system-wide change and radical evolution in the American mortgage market.
They established a national mortgage system, increased the security of mortgage investment
and enhanced the liquidity for the mortgage industry through the establishment of a secondary
mortgage market. As a result, the mortgage loans since then were featured as “lower rates,
lower down payment, lower payments and longer terms of home-buying finance”.
So we can find that the idea of converting mortgage from stagnant lien into marketable
commodities arose in the provisions of “national mortgage associations” in the National
Housing Act, which were specialized in purchasing mortgage loans and obligations. Since
then, mortgage was no longer a stagnant lien, and also a tradable commodity on the secondary
mortgage market. As time evolved, the commoditization of mortgage was further deepened as
discussed in the sequent parts.
2.2.2.2 The expansion of secondary mortgage market: Origin and
development of mortgage securitization
Although the New Deal legislations have established the national secondary mortgage market
for the FHA and VA insured residential mortgages, the secondary mortgage market remained
largely inactive during the 1950’s and most of the 1960’s150. This was for the reasons that (1)
the majority of the mortgage lending, the conventional mortgages, did not get the
governmental guarantee as the FHA and VA mortgages to which the secondary mortgage
market was limited at that time. (2) at the same time the mortgage lending has always been a
practice of local market before the 1970’s. Even the FHA and VA mortgage market has been a
series of local submarkets loosely tied together151. As observed by the chief economist of
Freddie Mac, U.S residential mortgage markets were dominated by the primary market
between the end of second word war and the 1970’s.152 The conventional mortgages, which
constitute the mainstream of the mortgage lending in US, were mainly dominated by the
150 Joseph Shenker & Anthony Coletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 Tex.
L. Rev. 1369, 1372 (1991).
151 Raymond A. Jensen, Mortgage standardization: History of interaction of economics, consumerism and
governmental pressure, 7 Real Property, Probate and Trust Journal, 1972, P397.
152 Robert Van Order, The U.S. Mortgage Market: AModel of Dueling Charters, Journal of Housing Research ·
Volume 11, Issue 2, Fannie Mae Foundation 2000.
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Savings & Loan whose operation is limited into a local territory because of the locality of the
legal framework surrounding real property. That is, the real estate law in US is legislated by
states, not the federal government, and thus constituted its local natural. This, to a certain
extent, inhibits the development of uniformity and standardization of mortgage lending.
The local characteristics of mortgage finance system of U.S were greatly transformed by
the economic inflation since the late 1960’s, second only to the Great Depression in the
1930s153. The negative effect of this inflation is the burst of a mortgage credit crunch from the
Savings & Loan, and finally the Savings & Loan insolvency crisis 154ensued at the beginning
of 1980’s. This credit crunch has imposed great influences on the role of banks and thrifts
which were transformed from spread banking155 to conduit banking.
2.2.2.2.1 The expansion of secondary mortgage market
In order to increase the supply of mortgage credit, U.S administration reformed its mortgage
finance system through expanding its secondary mortgage market, so as to channel more
private capital into the primary mortgage market. Under The Emergency Home Finance Act of
1970, the federal government authorized Fannie Mae to purchase conventional mortgages
primarily from commercial banks and mortgage banks156, i.e. those not insured by the FHA
and VA. And at the same time, a new entity, named the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
153 Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970,
Standarization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 765 (2004-2005), P767.
154 Because of the serious inflation, interest rates to depositors rose while the interest rates to the borrowers of
saving $ loans were limited by the regulation Q, which put a ceiling on the interests rates that the thrift could pay
for the deposits. The saving $ loans thus beard a loss for the reason of interest rate regulation. In order to lessen the
loss, the saving $ loans could only pay a lower interest rates to their depositors. As a result, the investors move
funds out of savings institutions. The amortization made the situation worsen, because of decreasing spread
between the interest rate of the long-term mortgage loan and that of the high and volatile short-term deposits from
the families in the community in the 1970’s and 1980’s. So the saving $ loans could not attract enough savings
from the families of community and advanced new mortgage loans.
155 The spread banking is based on a straightforward operation: gather deposits to fund loans and keep the spread
between the total costs and the yields of the loan transaction as the profit. As long as the interest rates are kept
stable and thus the spread is positive, the thrifts and banks can get deposits to fund loans and thus gain profit from
this intermediary operation. However, the situation changes when the interest rate becomes higher and volatile and
the short-term floating interest rate of deposits increased above the long-term fixed rate of mortgage loans. The
families withdrew their deposits out of the banks and thrifts and redirected them to investments offering higher
profits. And thus the banks and thrifts had lost millions of dollars to fund new mortgage loans. Consequently, the
banks and thrifts became less important suppliers of mortgage loans. These changes caused the decline of these
credit institutions’ profitability from the late 1970’s through the early 1980’s, and they had to find new alternative
funding sources which at the same time could help them hedge or reduce their exposure to interest rate risk
resulting from the mismatch between funding sources and mortgage loans.
156 James E. Murray, The Developing National Mortgage Market: Some Reflections and Projections, 7 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 441, 445-446,1972.
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Corporation (FHLMC), colloquially known as Freddie Mac, was created, under the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, to provide secondary mortgage market for mortgages originated by
the savings and loan industry. It competes with Fannie Mae and thus facilitates a more robust
and efficient secondary mortgage market. In this respect, the secondary mortgage market was
expanded from conforming mortgages to conventional mortgages. The expansion of
secondary market to conventional mortgage can help improve the availability of mortgage
credit. According to the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Fannie Mae would have the
power to purchase and sell any mortgage with a loan-to-value not more than 75% or less. If
the loan-to-value is in excess of 80%, the involved mortgage should be guaranteed or insured.
According to some scholars, this legislation has “forever transformed the mortgage from that
understood by 12th century English common law as a dead pledge burdening land into the
freely transferable commodity of toady.” And this act was a decisive step toward the
marketing of American Mortgage.
This expansion of secondary market to conventional mortgage declaimed the end of the
fragmented local mortgage market. The lenders, once prevented from making direct mortgage
loans outside of their locality for the difficulty of evaluating the credit quality of the
mortgaged properties and the legal restriction on interstate banking, could be involved in
national mortgage transactions. Consequently, a national integration of the mortgage market
was achieved and the mortgage capital can flow around the whole country, from the regions
where the supply exceeds the demand to the regions where the mortgage funds are not
sufficient. Thus, the 1970’s is a fascinating period for the development of the secondary
market for conventional home mortgage loans.
2.2.2.2.2 The proliferation of MBS
It is notable that GSEs’s operation was limited to issue bonds, use the proceeds to purchase
mortgages, either conforming or conventional, and hold them in their portfolio until maturity.
However, this secondary market under such operating model, the buying and selling of
mortgages, was relatively illiquid. The lenders were subject both the default risk and interest
rate risk. The buyers, namely the GSEs, were not able to sell their loan portfolios both quickly
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and at an acceptable price. Holding the loans also meant exposure to the risk that rising
interest rates could drive a lender's interest cost higher than its interest income157. In order to
enhance the liquidity of the purchased mortgage loans and attract more investors, mortgage
pass-throughs, and later collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO) which was a more
complicated twist on pass-throughs, were created by financial institutions. Through pooling
similar loans, the payments to mortgage principles and interests are no longer hold by GSEs,
but transferred to the certificate holders or investors, and these are the Agency and
GSE-backed securities. What were traded on the capital market are no longer the illiquid
mortgages but transferable mortgage certificates or MBS. Investors now had a liquid
instrument and lenders had the option to move any interest rate risk associated with
mortgages off of their balance sheet. As a result, the secondary mortgage market became more
attractive both to investors and lenders.
In 1971, Freddie Mac issued the first mortgage pass-through security158 which was backed
by conventional loans159 and thus was a dramatic innovation in the secondary mortgage
market. In 1983 Freddie Mac issued the first Collateralized Mortgage Obligation (CMO) 160,
which created multiple classes of bonds all backed by the same mortgage pool but with each
class paid sequentially as principal payments were received from the underlying mortgages.
Fannie Mae began securitizing mortgage loans in the 1980's161. Since then, the agency
mortgage securitization began to proliferate, based on the guarantee granted by the GSEs.
Through their purchases and securitization of residential mortgage loans, the two GSEs
together provide the largest source of home mortgage financing in the nation. And the above
proposals laid out for marketing mortgages and developing a broader secondary mortgage
157 See Statement of Cameron L. Cowan, Partner Orrick, Herrington, and Sutcliffe, LLP On behalf of the
American Securitization Forum, Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Opportunity,
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit United States House of Representatives, Hearing on
Protecting Homeowners: Preventing Abusive Lending While Preserving Access to Credit, November 5, 2003, P2.
158 With pass-through MBS, the investor purchases a fractional undivided interest in a pool of mortgage loans, and
is entitled to share in the interest income and principal payments generated by the underlying mortgages. see Julia
Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to
Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1077, Fall, 2007.
159 Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers,
69 Tex. L. Rev. 1369, May, 1991.
160 A collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO) is a type of financial debt vehicle that was first created in 1983
by the investment banks Salomon Brothers and First Boston for U.S. mortgage lender Freddie Mac.
161 Andrew R. Berman, Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage — The Use and Misuse of Mezzanine Loans and
Preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 76, 92, 2005.
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market is respected as one of the greatest business innovation in the 20th century162.
2.2.2.2.3 The institutional standardization of mortgage documents since the 1970’s
Another profound progress facilitating the expansion of secondary mortgage market is the
standardization of mortgage documentation which helped supersede the local characteristics
of mortgage lending mentioned above.
In the 1970’s, the expansion of the secondary mortgage market to the conventional
mortgage produced the potential hazard that made the GSEs remain as the permanent
repository for all such mortgages. In order to convert mortgage into a publicly tradable
commodities, it was necessary to develop a standard mortgage form. The lack of uniformity in
mortgage documents and procedures createed less liquidity and poor investment alternatives.
Thus a government agency involved in a secondary mortgage market for these illiquid
conventional loans would require greater capital to meet the potential increased losses and
costs involved. So less uniformity means less liquidity for the mortgage market. The investors
of MBS want safe, predictable investments with moderate returns, so investments in pools of
heterogeneous conventional mortgages is very speculative and thus of high risk. Uniformity
of mortgage makes the mortgage-backed bonds or securities more predictable and thus
reliable. Without a standardized mortgage document and uniform lending techniques, the
secondary mortgage market never would have gotten off ground163.
At the same time, the establishment of secondary mortgage market had a positive influence
on the standardization of conventional residential mortgage. The legislators anticipated the
emergence of standard-form conventional mortgage as what has happened in the Fannie Mae
secondary market in FHA and VA mortgages. Document and procedure standardization
accelerated the loan review process, because uniform mortgages created certainty and
translated into marketable mortgages and secure investors164.
162 Among these business innovations, they also include Harley Earle’s ideas for market American cars, William
Levitt’s ideas for rapid construction of affordable housing and the McDonald brothers’ and Ray Croc’s ideas for
the production of affordable housing and the marketing of fast foods. See David Halberstam, The Fifties (1996).
163 Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970,
Standarization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 765 (2004-2005), P778.
164 Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970,
Standarization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 765 (2004-2005), P800.
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The standardization of mortgage documents was initiated by the FHA which attempted to
modernize or standardize mortgage within each state taking into consideration of the diversity
of mortgage laws in different jurisdictions. Meanwhile trade associations and larger lenders
had also developed standard forms. The greater concern of institutional investors requires the
standardization in the areas such as underwriting criteria, appraisal practices, and all the
non-legal documents supporting the loan. However, the initial efforts for standardization were
for the convenience of the lenders rather than to make the loans transferable on the secondary
market165, and never intended to create fungible product and saleable mortgages for the
development of the secondary mortgage market.
Conventional home mortgage documents needed to be standardized in order to create a
secondary market for the loans, and this standardization of mortgage documentation was
studied and enforced by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Fannie Mae formed a task force
composed of attorneys and representatives of lending institutions which concentrated on the
analysis of substantive mortgage clauses which would be essential to make the mortgage
saleable to investors. On November 18,1970 and On February 3, 1971 two exposure drafts
were published which completed to standardize the mortgage documents. By 1975, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac had reached a compromise and jointly published a set of uniform
mortgage instruments which retained the consumer-friendly provisions negotiated in the early
1970s166.
Because of their market dominance on the secondary mortgage market at that time,
originators who wish to sell their loans to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac must use the uniform
instruments. At the same time, the GSEs gradually established some requirements for the
loans they purchase, such as the maximum amount of loans, the loan-to-value ratio, the
documentation, credit scores and etc. According to whether loans satisfied the established
requirements, loans are divided into "conforming" and "non-conforming" ones. Loans that are
non-conforming because they exceed the conforming loan limits167 set by OFHEO, are called
165 Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to
Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1077, Fall, 2007.
166 Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments: The Forgotten Benefit to
Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. Rev. 1077, Fall, 2007.
167 The Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 expanded the definition of a "conforming" loan. Two sets of
limits are provided for first mortgages -- general conforming loan limits, and high-cost area conforming loan limits.
The 2011 general conforming loan limits are identical to those of 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, for example
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"jumbo" loans. The use of Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform mortgage instruments is, in fact,
widespread in the prime mortgage market for both conforming and non-conforming loans and
even in the subprime market to some extent. And this standardization of mortgage
documentation greatly facilitates the securitization in the secondary mortgage market.
2.2.2.3 The changes to the banking industry caused by mortgage
securitization
The mortgage securitization largely solved the problem of inadequate capital of the mortgage
lenders by offering new source of funds, and their ability to originate new mortgage loans was
no longer limited by the family deposits from the local communities. At the same time,
mortgage securitization was also utilized by the financial institutions to offset the side effects
of the changing macroeconomic environment, such as the serious inflation.
As a funding source, securitization offers several advantages over deposits and other
funding alternatives. Firstly, asset securitization avoids certain "regulatory taxes" associated
with deposit-taking. Secondly, securitization is often more cost effective than sales of loan
participations or whole loans because it offers investors a more liquid investment (a tradable
security) with more desirable risk characteristics and thus appeals to a wider pool of potential
purchasers. Thirdly, by using securitization as a funding source, depository institutions may
reduce the costs of maintaining capital in compliance with regulatory requirements. Finally,
even after assets have been securitized, the depository institution still receives a steady
income stream by retaining the right to service the asset on behalf of the investors.
Another influence caused by securitization to the banking industry is the uncoupling of the
component functions in the mortgage lending once served by banks and thrifts as financial
intermediaries, allowing for specialization by institutions with comparative advantages in one
or more of these functions. This phenomenon was described by the scholars as
“disintermediation”. For example, the banks and thrifts focus more on the origination function
of mortgage lending, while the funding is left to the secondary mortgage market through the
the limit for single-family loan is $417,000. The high-cost areas are established by the Federal Housing Finance
Agency and may vary depending on the geographic location and loan origination date. See
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-us/loan-limits/, visiting date: 2011-12-2.
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securitization of the loans they originated. Sometimes, the loans are extended by a mortgage
broker, thus enabling them to expand loan volume faster than deposit growth. The loans are
usually serviced by a mortgage banker who does not originate it. The credit risk is beard by
the GSEs, or along with insurance company. The investors in mortgage-backed securities are
not involved in the origination, service or bearing the credit risk, just bearing the interest rate
risk.
At the same time, the risks inherent in the traditional intermediary functions of banks and
thrifts that became more pronounced as a result of volatile interest rates in the 1970s and
1980s168, such as prepayment risk and interest rate risk, could be better managed through
mortgage securitization, which essentially provides a direct match between the assets and the
liability. Interest rate risk can arise from a mismatch of assets and liabilities: banks and thrifts
with long-term, fixed-rate assets (e.g., mortgage loans) and short-term, floating-rate liabilities
(e.g., money market accounts) are exposed to a high degree of interest rate risk.
Securitization can help depository institutions manage interest rate risk in two ways. While
variable-rate loans and the sale of loan participations enable a lender to share interest rate risk
with borrowers or other depository institutions, asset securitization may, in certain cases,
permit a lender to remove the asset from its portfolio altogether, thereby shortening the
portfolio's average maturity, and to eliminate all interest rate risk associated therewith.
Moreover, as buyers of MBS and other ABS, depository institutions can select securities with
shorter weighted-average lives to match their short-term deposits. Thus, banks and thrifts
have been big purchasers of "fast-pay" tranches of collateralized mortgage obligations.
Finally, securitization is also useful in managing the credit risk inherent in a depository
institution's intermediary role. Credit risk is the risk that the obligor on a loan or receivable
will not make full and timely interest and principal payments. In traditional lending, a bank or
thrift tries to minimize credit risk by a review process before granting the credit and by a
continuous monitoring and servicing process after granting the credit. Securitization permits a
bank or thrift to reduce or reallocate its credit risk exposure with respect to the securitized
168 For example, the prime interest rate charged by banks was 6.83% in 1977. The rate increased to 18.87 in1981.
See See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Average majority prime rate charged by banks on
short-term loans to business, quoted on an investment basis, available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Build.aspx?rel=H15, visiting date: 2011,10,09.
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asset.
Conclusion
Through this long research about the history of mortgage evolution, accompanied by the
analysis of the economic environment at the specific historic moment, we understand why
there occurred these changes in the mortgage finance. More important, both the legal rules
and economic institutions are studied in a dynamic environment, rather than in a stable point
of the history. And thus we get a more dynamic description about the interplay between legal
changes and the changing economic environment. The evolution of mortgage from a
contractural arrangement to a lien and finally to a commodity is accompanied by the
evolution of different economic patterns, the simple agriculture economy, the industiral
economy and the current financial economy. We could also see that mortgage the civil law
system and common law system shares a similar evolutionary track in the two
transformations.
For the purpose of the topic of this dissertation, we have paid more attention to the second
step of evolution. The idea of converting the mortgages from stagnant liens into marketable
commodities in fact has a long history, and has been promoted both in Europe and the U.S,
each of which develop distinct securitization approach,namely the EU statutory covered bond
and the U.S mortgage securitization. Facing the grave economic crisis, the EU and U.S
predecessors made this similar policy choice.This simple proposal gave birth to an investment
revolution: the mortgages become a popular marketable commodities and mortgage financing
becomes a trillions of dollar international industry as we see today. Comparaticely, the EU
housing market and covered bond system were generally kept stable, while the U.S housing
and mortgage market have experienced several market meltdowns since the start of the 20th
century. Why does this difference has happened? Why the capital market in common law,
which is asserted to be more efficient that that of civi law system, is not efficient in detering
financial crisis? In the following analysis, we will try to answer this confusing question.
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III The rotten legal foundations of Mortgage Securitization
and the institutional causes of the financial crisis
In part two, we have in detail analyzed the evolution of mortgage since the Roman law and
revealed the developmental track of mortgage transactions until now, accompanied by a
macro-analysis of the dynamics between mortgage securitization and the then existing
economical environment, namely the mortgage has been transformed from a contractual
relationship into a tradable commodity on the capital market through the mortgage
securitization. In this pat, we will examine the legal framework governming mortgage
securitization which facilitates to realize the above-mentioned revolutionary change. The
undergone analysis will demonstrate how this legal framework has been changed since the
1970's, and how the change of the legal framework has rotten the foundations for the healthy
and sustained development of mortgage securitization and for the self-regulation of the
mortgage industry.
Considering the economic substance of mortgage securitization, namely the
commoditization of mortgage, the analysis in this part will follow a different approach,
differentiated from the traditional ones. First, we will discuss the uncertain determinist
relationship between mortgage law and mortgage securitization models in different
jurisdictions, namely the legal framework of mortgage laws determine the model of
securitization or vice versa169? The German or European covered bond and U.S mortgage
securitization experiences will offer us some new insightS about the dynamic relationship
between mortgage law and financial innovations. Although we are prone to analyze mortgage
securitization from the point of view of its economic substance, the advocates and practicers
of mortgage securitization prefer to structure it in a more simplistic or formalistic way,
namely a true sale of mortgage receivables to a bankrupt-isolate entity. In this formalistic
sense, the securitization, in lieu of using the securitized assets as collateral for secured
169 It is notable that the German mortgage law provides a non-accessory mortgage, which facilitates the free flow
of mortgages, parallel with the accessory mortgage, its pfandbrief practice adopts the originate-to-hold model of
securitization; while the U.S jurisdiction strictly adheres to the accessoriness principle of mortgage law, which
constitutes a great obstacle for the flow of mortgages, its mortgage securitization practice adopts the
originate-to-diversify model.
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financing, brings advantages to the debtors, including improved liquidity, diversified funding
sources, better risk management, accounting-related benefits and lower financing costs. The
possibility of lower financing costs170, relative to secured financing, is the central motive for
the securitizing firms. These are the possible reasons why a product with such shaky doctrinal
foundations has grown so vastly and became dominant in the marketplace. However, the past
financial crisis revealed that it is this formalistic understanding of the mortgage securitization
transactions which has rotten the legal foundations for the healthy development of mortgage
securitization and the market self-regulation of securitization industry, and this is an important
insight with respective to the dynamic correlation between private law and financial
innovations, a process which is described as “destructive innovation”. This insight will lay
down a stable ground for the future analysis of credit risk control from the point of view of
private law and market self-regulation in a microeconomic sense.
Although the term “securitization” is very commonly used in the marketplace of U.S,
Europe and some other areas of the world, it has not been very well defined by the private law,
and been doubted and criticized on a various grounds since its inception. According to some
scholars’ observation, the legal regime governing securitization has been outpaced by the
growth of the securitization market171 and there are a few cases addressing legal issues
relating to securitization172. So, in this part, we will carefully scrutinize the legal aspects of
securitization from the point of view of private law, including mortgage law, secured
transaction law and bankruptcy law. Three important topics will be covered: the accessoriness
principle between underlying obligation and mortgage; the true sale of mortgage receivables
to special purpose vehicle; and the bankruptcy isolation of SPV.
America and German developed different mechanisms to circumvent the limitation of
accessoriness imposed by the traditional mortgage system and it is the distinction of the
mortgage laws which determines the two distinguished models of securitization respectively
in U.S and Germany. At the same time, it is also possible for us to probe into the institutional
170 The financing cost of securitization is cheaper than that of secured financing because the originators transfer
the securitized assets beyond the reach of the originators’ bankruptcy estate, namely the bankruptcy isolation. The
great attractiveness of the ABS or specifically MBS is determined by the extent of the isolation of these assets
from the credit risk of the originator. We will discuss it later in 3.2.
171 Lois R. Lupica, Revised article 9, Securitization transactions and the Bankruptcy dynamic, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst.
L. Rev. 287, Spring, 2001.
172 There are two important cases usually discussed by the scholars in this field, Octagon Gas Sys., Inc. v. Rimmer
(In re Meridian Reserve, Inc) and United States V. Whiting Pools.
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cause of the current financial crisis, concluding that the institution changes, including secret
liens, form dominates over substance and bankruptcy privileges, have rotten the legal
foundation for the healthy and sustained development of mortgage securitization and the basic
mechanisms for market self-regulation. These "negative" institution changes, succumbing to
the funding efficiency and profit-maximization impulse, have conduced to undesirable
competition of legislations which was described as "race-to-the-bottom", and thus destroyed
the inherent mechanisms for market rehabilitation. This insight tells us that the indiscreet
assertion of LLSV that the common law is more efficient than civil law in the capital market
is not correct, and we will find that the efficiency of common law in financial innovations is
at the expense of the violation of some fundamental market rules which is vital for the
survival and robust development of the market.
This chapter will be organized as following: 3.1 will analyze the accessoriness principle of
mortgage, which has imposed a transaction cost to mortgage securitization, and the ways to
circumvent this legal obstacle in both U.S and Europe; 3.2 will concentrate on the
institutionalization of securitization; 3.3 will discuss the way to reduce the transaction costs
through the bankrupt isolation; based on the above analysis, 3.4 will analyze how the legal
foundations of mortgage securitization have been rotten and consequently how the past
financial crisis has occurred.
3.1 The accessoriness of mortgage and mortgage
securitization
3.1.1 General review of accessoriness principle
Mortgage is a security interest on immobile property of the debtor or a third party granted by
the borrower to lender to secure the repayment of an underlying debt, and the right in security
depends on there being an underlying debt. This is the fundamental “accessoriness principle”
of security rights which is applicable to various categories of security interests, including
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guarantee173, pledge and mortgage. The difference between the guaranty and mortgage: the
first derives from overflow of the underlying obligation into the guaranty obligation, while
the later emerges from the fact that the mortgage relationship is connected to the proprietary
responsibility existing in the underlying obligation.
Different from the other basic principles of mortgage law, such as specialty and
indivisibility which are clearly provided in the civil code174, the accessoriness of mortgage is
the fruit of doctrinal elaboration. The accessoriness principle was, in fact, the result of
conceptual work of the German pandectists in the 19th century which elaborated a more
dogmatic and strict approach with respect to the accessoriness. Observing the civil codes of
different countries, we can not find the concept of “accessoriness” and thus can not make a
uniform discipline over the relationship between principle obligation and accessory guarantee.
The accessoriness principle in different historical periods adopted different patterns and, it is
easy to conceptualize this principle in the ancient law using the modern law ideas. And this
accessoriness principle can be traced back to the Roman law of both personal security and
real security175.The Roman lawyers took a much more flexible approach and never allowed
themselves to be hemmed in by rigid dogmatic accessoriness principle. As Prof. Zimmerman
has clearly pointed out, any discussion of the accessory nature of the Roman suretyship
stipulations immediately involves the danger of superimposing modern concepts and thinking
patterns upon historical legal system176.
This principle has been well adopted in the German Civil Code, and can be evidenced by
various provisions in the code177. This approach has also been typically followed by the other
continent Europe mortgage law178. In Asia, this accessory mortgage has also been introduced
into Japan, China (including Taiwan) and South Korea179. However, this principle also has
173 Zimmerman generally discussed the accessoriness principle in the personal security, and I will discuss it below.
See Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990).
174 For example, art. 2809 of the Italian civil law code provides that (1) the mortgage should be registered on
specifically indicated property for a certain amount of obligation; (2) the mortgage is indivisible and it exists on all
the mortgaged property, on every mortgaged property and all the parts of mortgaged property.
175 Andrew J M Steven, Accessoriness and security over land, working paper of University of Edinburgh, 2009.07.
176 Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1990), P121.
177 See art.767 and art 1153 of BGB.
178 Art. 2421 of the French Civil code provides that “A hypothec can be created for the security of a existing or
future obligation; when it offers security for a future obligation, the amount of the obligation should be
determinable”. Art 3:227 of the Dutch Civil Code provides that hypotheek is a limited real right burdening the
immovable property.
179 For example, art. 172 of the “China Real Property Law” provides that “For creating real rights for security, a
security contract should be entered into under the present law and the other related laws. The security contract is
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some well known exceptions, one of which is the mortgage created to secure future claims. At
the same time, unlike the French and Italian civil law, the German and the Switzerland civil
law code have established another parallel mortgage, non-accessory mortgage.
First of all, the concept of “accessoriness” indicates the functional connection between
mortgage and the secured obligation: the right of mortgagee to expropriate the property and
its right of preemption are considered as the instrument to satisfy the credit, and they are not
considered as autonomous instruments to collect a certain amount of money in event of
assigning or expropriating property. The relationship between mortgage and guaranteed credit
represents the functional aspect of the connection180, or it can be said that the relationship of
hypothec is of second grade which has a functional relationship with the guarantied credit,
and thus constitutes a dependent or auxiliary one relative to the underlying obligation. This
dependence can assume different functions, one of which is to strengthen the effect of the
principle obligation. It is thus titled as “accessoriness” in this narrow sense. One important
function of the accessoriness is to protect the interests of creditors. If the underlying claim
was transferred without the mortgage, the interests of creditors relating to the claim were
prejudiced. So it is necessary to transfer mortgage with the assignment of underlying claims.
And for this reason, the conception of hypothec is considered as a accessory one: the
hypothec is of second grade which assumes the specific and typical function of guaranty for
the satisfaction of a determined obligation. So, the mortgage exhibits a structural autonomy
and a functional dependence with respect to the secured credit181.
With respect to the accessory nature of mortgage, it signifies a subordinate or accessory
relationship between the mortgage and the secured obligation in most of the law systems: the
creation, transfer and extinction of the mortgage are determined by the existence, transfer and
extinguishment of the secured credit. Specifically speaking, the accessoriness can be
expressed in four aspects in the mortgage transaction. Firstly, there must be an underlying
obligation to be secured so as to establish the mortgage. Without a debt, there is nothing for a
security to secure, and real security presupposes a existing obligation owed by a debtor to a
subordinate to the principle contract. Unless otherwise provided by law, the security contract should be invalid
when the principle contract is nullified.”
180 The structural aspect of the connection lies between mortgage and the rights of mortgagee; the essential aspect
of the connection lies between mortgage and mortgaged right.
181 L’ipoteca, Angello Chianale, seconda edizione, P57
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creditor. The change of mortgage automatically follows the changes of the underlying credit,
even if the later would be rescinded. Before the credit relationship is claimed to be rescinded,
the credit exists and operates among the interested parties. The validation of the relationship
from which the credit emerges, will extend its effect to the mortgage. One Scottish judge,
Sheriff Andrew Bell, has described a security without an underlying debt as “a mere husk,
empty of any content”.182 One exception of this is the mortgage for future obligation183.
Secondly, the debt must be specific. The mortgage is usually employed to secure the
fulfillment of a debt of certain sum and the need for a certain sum gives specificity to the
security so as to limit the mortgagors’ liability to the extent of the market value of the
mortgaged property. At the same time, the other potential creditors can ascertain the extent to
which the mortgaged property is encumbered and consider the viability of a second mortgage
loan in favor of the debtor. Thirdly, where the debt is assigned, the accessory mortgage is also
transferred. The mortgage can not be assigned separately from the secured claim for the
reason that the assignor has no reasonable interest in having a mortgage without having the
secured claim184. Fourthly, when the underlying debt extinguishes, the securing mortgage also
ends. At the same time, in some cases, the mortgage can be considered independent from the
secured credit in certain situations, and enjoys a certain extent of autonomy with respect to
the change of the secured credit. For example, the mortgage has its own cause of extinction
which does not affect the underlying obligation: the maximum duration of the mortgage is
disciplined in an automatic way from the prescription of the underlying obligation. Besides, a
third acquirer, who has paid the original secured creditor, can invoke the subrogation getting
the position of the original creditor.
Although the changes of mortgage usually follow the steps of the underlying debt because
of the accessory nature, there typically exists a time gap between the change of underlying
debt and the change of mortgage. The intimation for the debt assignment and registration for
the transfer of mortgage are not simultaneous. Consequently, the accessoriness principle poses
182 Andrew J M Steven, Accessoriness and security over land, working paper of University of Edinburgh, 2009.07,
P7.
183 For the purpose of this research, I will not do a further study on mortgage for future obligation. Another reason
is its broad applicability in the commercial practices, rather the real estate mortgage transactions.
184 Dr. L.P.W. van Vliet, Mortgages on immovables in Dutch law in comparison to the German mortgage and land
charge, see http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1147543, visiting date: 2010-9-8.
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a dilemma: the accessoriness principle does not mean the immediate transfer of mortgage
upon the transfer of underlying debt and it need the further registration in the immobile
registry. The answer to this question is a little complex. According to the accessoriness
principle, the mortgage was transferred upon the assignment of the underlying debt after
intimation. However, under the current mortgage law, the registration of the transfer of
mortgage is necessary. So the assignment of underlying debt does not signify the automatic
transfer of mortgage. This time gap would give the fraudulent debtor the possibility to conceal
the true information about its credit situation and to create a secret lien for their creditors.
More importantly, the registration of mortgage transfer required by the accessoriness rule
imposes costs on the mortgage transactions, especially the mortgage securitization involving a
great amount of mortgage loans, because the securitization usually needs the transfer of
mortgage so as to secure the safety and liquidity of the mortgage-backed securities, and thus
constitutes a legal obstacle for the development and proliferation of mortgage securitization.
This constitutes the major reason for the creation of MERS (Mortgage Electronic Recording
System) in U.S under the originate-to-diversify model of securitization, and the adoption of
originate-to-hold model of securitization in Europe, so as to avoid the transfer of mortgages
among mortgagees and securitizers; and it also constitutes the main consideration for the
creation of non-accessory mortgage in German and Switzerland. In the following discussion,
we will find that the two legal systems have given different institutional response to the
inconveniences incurred by the accessoriness principle.
Because of the accessoriness principle, the mortgage itself is usually considered to be
unalienable without the transfer of the underlying obligation. Generally, the rights, except
those which are closely related with the right holder itself, should be transferred freely.
Followed this logic, mortgage should also be transferable. However, because of the
accessoriness of mortgage, it is the claim secured by mortgage which is assigned, rather that
the mortgage itself is transferred. This idea is contrary to what has happened in the market:
for the loan transaction, it is mortgage which plays a vital role for the primary mortgage
lending and mortgage securitization, rather the claim itself. This argument could be confirmed
by the following facts: the credit institutions may not advance loans if the borrower does not
provide a security for the performance of loan or they provide loans with a very hash terms;
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the first lien is more valuable than the second lien and thus the loan with first lien enjoys a
lower interest rate; the securitization of mortgage owns a bigger market share than that of
consumer and trade credit. As one professor has stated, the accessoriness principle has made
the provisions on the transfer of mortgage eclipsed185. However，BGB has also made some
compromises so as to satisfy the requirements of the practice.
According to some law professors, the mortgage needs not stick to the principle of
accessoriness between the underlying obligation and mortgage. It is the law system which
could decide whether to establish the accessoriness of mortgage, especially in the situation of
the mortgage’s transfer186. When the principle of accessoriness is executed more rigid, the
creditor will get more advantage expropriating the secured property. In contrast, if this
principle is executed weakly, there will be more efficiency in the immobile mortgage market.
In the following discussion, we will scrutinize the acceptance of accessoriness in the
legislation both of the common law system and civil law system and its influence on the
securitization markets in these jurisdictions.
3.1.2 The approach of mortgage securitization in common law system
The law scholars in U.S conventionally strictly stick to the accessoriness of the mortgage to
its underlying obligation. But the creation and the operation of the Mortgage Electronic
Record System (MERS), for the purpose of lowering cost and fostering efficiency,
circumvents this fundamental principle. To a great extent, MERS makes it possible to cancel
the transfer of mortgage in securitization practices so as to avoid the registration costs for the
mortgage transfer. In this part, we will discuss the accessoriness principle in the mortgage
transaction practice, and see how this principle is circumvented for the reason of
cost-reduction and efficiency and which kind of problem has been created for this practical
innovation in the mortgage securitization.
185 Paul, Real property law of Germany (Chinese version), Vol 2, Law press, 2006, P88.
186 See Angello Chianale, L’ipoteca, seconda edizione, P56; see also Pietro Boero, Le ipoteche, 2ed edizione, P52
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3.1.2.1. The accessoriness principle in common law system
In the common law system, the “accessoriness” is typically discussed in the sources on
personal security and less visible in the treatments of real property.187 As professor Sparkes
has stated in his work, “Discussion of mortgages in English law makes little reference to
accessoriness as a principle188”. In fact, the accessoriness principle was reflected in different
forms, implicit or explicit, and sometimes it is hidden in various provisions of the mortgage
law in common law system. For example, with respect to the origination of mortgage, the
accessoriness was expressed implicitly: under section 203 (a) of the Uniform Land Security
Interest Act, a security interest attaches to real estate when value has been given, and the
“value” indicates an underlying obligation. However the “subsistence of an obligation” is just
one of the pre-requisites for the attachment of security interests. It means that the secured
party (lender) must have given value to the borrower before the security interest (mortgage)
attaches to the real estate as a lien. It has been held that there is no mortgage if the note
secured thereby is invalid189. Mortgage can be granted to give security for the repayment of an
underlying debt, even future obligation.
Besides, a more important rule regarding to transfer of mortgage expresses the
accessoriness principle in a more direct way: (a) A transfer of an obligation secured by a
mortgage also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree otherwise. This
provision is provided for the mortgage transfer occurred in the secondary mortgage market.
The essential premise of this section is that it is nearly always sensible to keep the mortgage
and the right of enforcement of the obligation it secures in the hands of the same person. This
is so because separating the obligation from the mortgage results in a practical loss of efficacy
of the mortgage. This result is sometimes justified on the ground that "all the authorities agree
that the debt is the principal thing and the mortgage an accessory," as the United States
Supreme Court put it in 1872 in Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 271, 21 L.Ed. 313
(1872).190 The mortgage becomes useless in the hands of one who does not also hold the
187 Andrew J M Steven, Accessoriness and security over land, working paper of University of Edinburgh, 2009.07.
188 Peter Sparkes, European land law, 2007, P399.
189 See Powell on Real Property, §37.12.
190 See Official comment of §5.4, Restatement of the Law, Third, Property (Mortgages).
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obligation because only the holder of the obligation can foreclose; and when a separation of
the two has occurred, some courts have imposed a constructive trust on the mortgage in favor
of the holder of the obligation in order to make it available for foreclosure. With respect to the
relationship between underlying obligation and mortgage, Professor Chester Smith of the
University of Arizona College of Law has made the following analogy: The note is the cow
and the mortgage the tail. The cow can survive without a tail, but the tail cannot survive
without the cow191.
There is an exception for the above principle, the mortgage for the future obligation. The
mortgage is valid in providing a security for a projected future transaction and thus it can
been employed to secure the payment which is to become due in the future, such as the
alimony payments and progress payments for a building contract. The amount of the future
obligation need not to be precisely indicated, and it is sufficient that the value of obligation is
ascertainable.
3.1.2.2 The violation of accessoriness in the U.S securitization -- MERS
3.1.2.2.1 The origin and development of MERS
In the current research on the cause and effect of the subprime crisis, the scholars have
explored the role of rating agencies, mortgage originators, mortgage brokers, and loan
servicers, while little academic attention has been paid to one particular company, the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, inc. (hereinafter referred to as MERS), which has
played an important role both in the mortgage loan transactions and in the circumvention of
accessoriness of the mortgage law. This company is a corporation registered in Delaware and
headquartered in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C. It has two functions in the
mortgage transactions: one is traditional and conservative while the other is innovative and
aggressive. First, MERS operates a database designed to track servicing and ownership rights
192of mortgage loan in U.S193. Originators and players in the secondary mortgage market
191 See Official comment of §5.4, Restatement of the Law, Third, Property (Mortgages).
192 The public recording of the conveyances and mortgages in U.S has a long history and social supports. Even
early in the 17th century, Americans has begun its public recording practices for the conveyances and mortgages,
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could access and use the records of MERS paying membership dues and transaction fees194.
Second, MERS usually acts as nominee in the county land records for the lender and servicer,
a more aggressive legal function. As stated on its website, any loan registered on the MERS is
inoculated against future assignments because MERS remains the mortgagee no matter how
many times servicing is traded or even after the mortgage loans are transferred into a pool of
loans that are ultimately sold to investors of mortgage-backed securities. MERS as original
mortgagee (MOM) is approved by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Ginnie Mae, FHA and VA,
California and Utah Housing Finance Agencies, as well as all of the major Wall Street rating
agencies195. So the mortgage is recorded under MERS’s name, although it does not originate,
fund or service any mortgage loans. For this reason, it is reasonable to predict that the public
land records no longer reveal who is the true owner of a mortgage on the property in question,
once a loan is assigned to MERS.
Rick Amatucci, a Fannie Mae vice president and the agency's liaison with MERS, recalls
that the idea grew out of an Interagency Task Force in October 1993, which brought the
secondary marketing agencies and the Mortgage Bankers Association of America (MBA)
together "to identify ways to bring efficiencies to the industry196 and they thought that an
electronic book entry system of tracking mortgage loans would be better for the mortgage
lending industry than the legal system county recording offices197. In 1995, MERS was
incorporated in Delaware as a non-stock corporation owned by mortgage banking companies.
MERS was designed to:
(a) Lower costs for servicers, which offers benefits to themselves as well as their
borrowers;
such as Massachustts and Connecticut. And in 1717, Pennsylvania adopted the first recording act which remains in
force today. Besides, the UCC9 also creates a similar recording system for all personal property. However, it
becomes increasing difficult for the potential lenders to search the legal status in the real property recording system.
Now the mortgage originators usually buy title insurance policy from insurance companies which specialize in
searching title records and maintain computer-based “plant” copies of public real property records. See
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, subprime mortgage lending and the mortgage electronic registration system,
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2010.
193 Howard Schneider, MERS aids electronic mortgage program, Mortgage Banking, January 1, 1997. see
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5246/is_n4_v57/ai_n28683978/
194 Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, subprime mortgage lending and the mortgage electronic registration
system, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2010.
195 See http://www.mersinc.org/about/index.aspx.
196 Howard Schneider, MERS aids electronic mortgage program, Mortgage Banking, January 1, 1997. see
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb5246/is_n4_v57/ai_n28683978/.
197 Phyllis K.Slesinger & Daniel Mclaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 ID .L.Rev. 805,
810-811,1995.
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(b) Provide immediate access to information on mortgage ownership rights to both
consumers and the industry;
(c) Lessen the potential for fraud by giving lenders the ability to track individual
mortgages throughout their life span.
In 1997, the firm started generating an 18-digit mortgage identification number (MIN) for
every origination. A MIN will stay with a loan throughout its life - even as ownership of the
loan and its servicing changes hands.
Today, MERS has legally involved in the origination of approximately 60% of all mortgage
loans in the U.S198, although it is still a company of sever years’ history. In 2002, MERS had
recorded its name, instead of the actual assignee or mortgagee, in ten million residential home
mortgages. One year later, the total number increased up to 20 million199, and by the May
2007, MERS’s has been recorded as the mortgagee or assignee on 60 million residential
mortgages.
3.1.2.2.2 MERS’s role in the securitization
At first, MERS only attracted the participation of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and since
1999 the private label mortgage securitizers began using MERS. MERS is typically involved
in the securitization practices in two ways, MOM and non-MOM. As shown above, MOM
signifies that MERS is recorded in the county recording offices as the Original Mortgagee,
while non-MOM signifies that the mortgage at the start was recorded in the actual lender’s
name and later was assigned to MERS which was listed as the mortgagee. In a chronological
order, we first analyze the non-MOM practice and later the MOM practice.
Under the non-MOM recording strategy, the originator issues a traditional mortgage loan
recording itself as the mortgagee on the security document and as the payee on the promissory
note. For the purpose of securitization, the loan should be assigned to a seller and ultimately
to a SPV (usually a trust) for pooling and repackaging. In order to lower the cost for the
198 Kate Berry, Foreclosures Turn Up Heat on MERS, American Banker July 10, 2007.
199 Scott Lowell Podvin, MERS may not have standing to initiate foreclosure proceedings or lift automatic stays in
Bankruptcy, see
http://goarticles.com/article/MERS-May-Not-Have-Standing-to-Initiate-Foreclosure-Proceedings-or-Lift-Automati
c-Stays-in-Bankruptcy/4580139/ . (This author is a attorney in Florid specialized in offering protection for
homeowners from mortgage foreclosure actions. http://homesteadlegal.com/attorneys.php )
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assignment, the originator pays MERS a fee to record it as the fictional assignee in the county
recoding offices and thus MERS becomes a fictional “mortgagee” even though it does not
actually own the mortgage.
With respect to the MON recording strategy, MERS is recorded as the original mortgagee
so as to do away with the first assignment of mortgage to MERS. The loans were made by the
originator to the borrowers while MERS was recorded as mortgagee rather the actual lenders.
So the registration of originators as mortgagee in the county recording offices is eliminated,
and also the further assignment of mortgage to seller and SPV. So the recording fees paid by
the originator to the county recording offices are saved and cost for securitization is further
lowered.
With respect to MERS’s role of cost-reduction in the mortgage securitization, it mainly
refers to the second function mentioned above, namely its role acting as a fictional
“mortgagee” in lieu of the true lenders. It can be specified as following: The registration fees
for the assignment of mortgages are charged by the county recording offices to cover the cost
of maintaining the real property records and the cost for the other public expenditures
including education, legal aids and so on. These fees typically range from ＄25 to ＄50,
while the registration fee in MERS only costs ＄11.95 and the Intracompany Transfer Fee
only needs ＄ 2.5200. As shown on the website of MERS, if MERS is nominated as the
Original Mortgagee (MOM), each loan will save ＄30201 for the reason that the possibility of
the future assignment of the mortgage has been eliminated. For the Non-MOM Loans202, the
additional assignment of mortgage will also be eliminated after its assignment of MERS,
unless the servicing rights are sold to a non-MERS member. In the traditional mortgage
securitization, the originators usually are indicted in the promissory note and mortgage
document, signed by the homeowner or borrowers, as the mortgagee; later the originator
assigns the mortgage loans to a seller which is usually a subsidiary of an investment bank203;
later the mortgage loans are assigned to a special purpose vehicle which transfers the right to
receive the income stream to various investors. Regarding to the assignment of mortgage to
200 See http://www.mersinc.org/MersProducts/pricing.aspx?mpid=1 visiting date 2011-5-6.
201 See http://www.mersinc.org/why_mers/mom.aspx, visiting date 2011-5-6.
202 It signifies the loan which has already been closed in the lender's name and later is transferred to MERS.
203 Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, subprime mortgage lending and the mortgage electronic registration
system, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2010.
93
the seller and the SPV, it is obligatory to record the assignments in order to keep their
mortgage priority against subsequent competitors, otherwise they will risk losing priority
vis-à-vis the other creditors. After the creation of MERS, these two assignments of mortgages
can be eliminated and thus the corresponding fees are saved, maximum up to ＄100 per loan.
Consequently the securitization industry saves more than one billion dollars for the
elimination of additional assignments of mortgages. In one word, by paying MERS a fee, the
securitization participants lower their operating costs.
Besides MERS’s fictional nominee role, it also become involved in consumer finance
litigation against the defaulted mortgagor bringing foreclosure proceedings in its own name
for the benefit of the true owners. Because MERS is the nominal mortgagee in the county
recording offices, it is the appropriate plaintiff to bring the foreclosure action in the courts. At
the same time, MERS has allowed actual mortgagees and loan assignees or their servicers to
bring foreclosure actions in MERS’s name in order to move foreclosures along as quickly as
possible204.
Although MERS has greatly increased the efficiency in the securitization practices, it also
has been subject to criticism and there occur many legal controversies surrounding MERS.
One central issue is that, MERS is not the payee on the promissory note which represents the
underlying debt although it is listed as the fictional mortgagee in the county record offices. As
we will analyze the distinction between true sale and transfer for security below, the American
legal tradition historically looks the economic realities of a underlying transaction so as to
determine its essence in law. According to this realty principle, we can conclude that MERS is
not the actual mortgagee with respect to any loan registered on its database. This is because
that MERS does not actually originate any loans and are neither entitled to receive the
borrowers’ monthly payments nor the proceeds from foreclosure. Following this logic, it is
also questionable that MERS brings foreclosure actions against mortgagors because MERS
lacks justified standing to bring the foreclosure actions. So we conclude that MERS helps
create the secret lien problem which conceals the real identity of creditors and the true debt
exposures of debtors. The information disclosure of public registry is greatly weakened.
204 Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, subprime mortgage lending and the mortgage electronic registration
system, University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, 2010.
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Because the mortgage securitization participants are usually the great investment banks, it
allows them to operate with a high leverage as the bankrupt Lehman Brothers in 2007205.
After the above discussion about MERS’s role in securitization accompanied by some
disputes, it is no doubt that MERS has successfully circumvented the accessoriness principle
of American mortgage law, made legally possible to re-assign underlying mortgages without
cumbersome registration in county courts as customary required, and thus saved billions of
dollars for the securitization industry.
3.1.3 The approach of mortgage securitization in civil law system
The civil law countries, especially those in Europe, developed a model of securitization
distinct from that of U.S, namely the covered bond which employs different ways to
circumvent the accessoriness rule imposed by the mortgage law. In this part, we will
concentrate on the German model of securitization, characterized by the originate-to-hold
model. Contrast with the contractual way of circumvention of accessoriness through the
establishment of MERS in U.S, the German securitization legislation and practices own more
statutory characteristics, as the Mortgage Bank Act before 2005 and the comprehensive
Pfandbriefe Act since 2005 providing in detail the covered bonds' construction and operation.
This statutory securitization shares many differences with the U.S contractual structure
securitization in many ways, which have effects on the credit control of securitization as
illustrated in part 4.
3.1.3.1 The accessoriness principle in German and its circumvention
In Germany. the accessory relationship between mortgage and its underlying obligation is
strictly followed, namely the creation, existence, transfer and termination are determined by
the underlying obligation. For the creation of mortgage, BGB has several provisions
providing detailed the requirements to the underlying claim for create a valid mortgage by
205 As confirmed by the financial crisis inquiry commission, the leverage ratio of Lehman Brothers has reached up
to 80 times because it has successfully concealed its obligation.
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encumbering a plot of land. Under section 1113 and section 1115, the underlying claim should
be monetary obligation no matter what is the legal basis for this claim206, even if this claim is
future or conditional207, and the claim should be certain. Regarding to the certainty of the
underlying claim, the creditor, the debtor and the amount of money of the claim should be
certain. So the secured creditor and mortgagee should be identical, namely who is granted the
mortgage depends on who is the creditor, and these two can not be separated under section
1153. At the same time, the creditor, the amount of the claim, interest rate and the other
supplementary payment should be stated in the land register and this statement constitutes a
description of the claim. In BGB’s definition of mortgage, it provides that the land may be
encumbered in such a manner that a certain sum of money is to be paid out of the land to the
person in whose favor the encumbrance is created for the satisfaction of a claim on the land to
which he is entitled (mortgage). Here, the wording “a certain sum of money” also indicates
the accessory relationship between mortgage and the underlying obligation. So we observe
that the accessoriness principle is strictly applied. With the assignment of claim, mortgage is
also transferred to the new creditor208. Under section 1153, the transfer of claim and mortgage
should be implemented at the same time and they can not be separated. The assignees of the
transferred claims should ascertain the creation and existence of the claim when they become
the new holders of the mortgage which secure the performance of a specific claim.
For the reason of the rigidity of the accessoriness principle advocated by the German civil
code, it has laid down a great obstacle for the flow of mortgage in the market and thus a great
amount of immobile wealth was illiquid which causes efficiency losses. In order to loosen the
rigidity in German, the civil code provides has made several attempts to circumvent this rigid
accessoriness principle.
First, the land charge is provided by the civil code and has always been employed by the
real estate transaction participants. Parellel with the mortgage, the land charge is another
important category instrument for the real estate financing, which is widely used in Germany.
206 In this sense, any claim that can be expressed by a certain amount of money can be secured by mortgage.
207 See section 1113, (2) The mortgage may also be granted for a future or a conditional claim.
208 Section 1154, Assignment of the claim: (1) For the assignment of the claim, it is necessary to submit the
declaration of assignment in writing and to hand over the mortgage certificate; the provision of section 1117
applies. The previous creditor shall, upon demand by the new creditor, have the declaration of assignment
notarially certified at his expense.
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The land charge is characterized by its abstractness and independence relative to the
underlying obligation, although the performance of this obligation is usually secured by the
land charge. The creation and existence of land charge do not depend upon the existence of
the underlying obligation, and its transfer is independent from the assignment of the
underlying obligation and it can be transferred without the underlying obligation. So the
principle of accessoriness is not applicable to land charge and this was confirmed by Art.1192
of BGB. In theory, this is called the “abstractness of land charge”. The rational for land charge
is that it could be transferred very easily in the marketplace, so it owns a high liquidity and
market value. The land charge can be created for the benefit of the proprietary; and it can be
reassigned to successive creditors to secure their obligations. Because the land charge and the
obligation whose performance it secures can be transferred separately, there exist potential
risks for the land charger-debtor. For example, one debtor D grants a land charge to its
creditor C securing the performance of the claim. Later, C assigns the claim to A, while C
transfers the land charge to B. with the complement of registration in land registry, B becomes
entitled as the owner of land charge. And A becomes the owner of the claim. So the debtor is
facing a potential risk to perform the claim for two times, namely the enforcement of land
charge by B and enforcement of claim by A. This risk could only be mitigated by security
agreement among parties. However, this risk can be eliminated or mitigated by the prudential
debtors.
Although mortgage and land charge are constructed differently in law, they are identified as
having the same economic function and aims which have been confirmed by the statutory
rules. For this reason, art. 1192 of BGB provides that, “The provisions on mortgage may
apply with the necessary modifications to the land charge, unless a contrary intention may be
inferred that the land charge requires the existence of a claim.”
Second, in order to enhance the liquidity of mortgage, BGB developed one important rule
to limit the application of accessoriness principle. Section 1138 209provides that the
presumption of the accuracy of the content of land registry also applies to mortgage and the
underlying claim. It signifies that the underlying claim would be presumed to exist according
209 Section 1138 Presumption of the accuracy of the contents of the Land Register. The provisions of sections 891
to 899 apply also to the mortgage, taking into consideration the claim and the defences available to the owner in
accordance with section 1137.
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to the registration in land registry. So the participants in mortgage transactions will not
necessarily to ascertain the existence of the claim. This shows that the acquisition of mortgage
is vital for participants of mortgage transaction, rather the acquisition of underlying claim.
This rule, to a great extent, satisfies the requirements of mortgage transaction practices and
strengthens the liquidity of mortgage. At the same time, this presumption of the existence of
underlying claim could be excluded by the participants. At the same time, this presumption
for the existence of mortgage can also be excluded. For example, section 1184 provides that
“A mortgage may be created in such a manner that the creditors’ right under the mortgage is
determined solely by the claim and the creditor may not invoke the registration for the
purpose of proving the claim (debt-securing mortgage).” And this debt-securing mortgage
strictly adheres to accessoriness principle and excludes the application of presumption of
claim. It can be transferred only if the secured claim exists. Otherwise, even if the registration
in land register can not be cited for proving the existence of claim.
Another attempt to enhance the liquidity of mortgage is the creation of the certificated
mortgage (Briefhypothek) by BGB, except the registered mortgage in land registry. The most
important advantage of certificated mortgage is its high liquidity, for the reason that it needs
not to be registered in land registry for its transfer. It requires only the agreement of parties,
registration and the delivery of certificate210. Although this certificate could be replaced by
Registration in the Land Register, it is preferred by the land loan practices. According to the
wording of section 1116, the certificate mortgage is the common form and is more popular,
while the registered mortgage in land book constitutes an exception. The issuance of
certificate mortgage can be excluded only in the situation where the creditor and owner of
land have made a specific agreement of exclusion and have registered such “exclusion” in
land register211. The certificated mortgage facilitates the transfer of mortgage in market. It
enables the mortgagor to control the loan transaction so as to insure that the reception of loan
and delivery of certificate occur at the same time. However, it also causes some problems,
210 Section 1154 (1) For the assignment of the claim, it is necessary to submit the declaration of assignment in
writing and to hand over the mortgage certificate; the provision of section 1117 applies. The previous creditor shall,
upon demand by the new creditor, have the declaration of assignment notarially certified at his expense.
211 Section 1116 (2) The issuance of the certificate may be excluded. This exclusion may also take place
subsequently. The agreement of the creditor and of the owner as well as registration in the Land Register are
required for the exclusion; the provisions of section 873 (2) and of sections 876 and 878 apply with the necessary
modifications.
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especially to the register record in land registry whose contents will not be exclusively relied
upon by assignee. So we will find that the achievement of high liquidity of mortgage is at the
expense of less reliability of land register. On the land book, we could just find the existence
of a encumbrance and the amount of the secured claim, but we could not know who is the true
right holder of mortgage. It may be the initial mortgagee registered in the land book, and it
also could another one to whom is subsequently assigned the mortgage. Section 1140212and
section 1155213 give a detailed ruling about mortgage certificate and the inaccuracy of land
register. The above discussions with respect to mortgage are also applicable to land charge.
3.1.3.2 The way for the circumvention of accessoriness in civil law system
For the securitization in the civil law countries, the covered bond was developed, such as the
German term Pfandbriefe. The key difference between covered bonds and MBS is that banks
which make loans and package them into covered bonds will keep those loans on their books.
This is the so-called in-balance securitization or originate-to-hold securitization. Pfandbriefe
is quite popular in Germany, and is utilized as a financial instrument with great success. In its
history of more than 200 years, there was not even a single case of a defaulted Pfandbrief,
asserted by VDP, the Germany mortgage association214. For this reason and due to the security
provided by the cover pool, covered bonds were one of the first markets to recover following
the global financial crisis of late 2008.
With respect to the originate-to-hold securitization, the old Mortgage Bank Act and the
current Pfrandbriefe Act are both characterized by the cover pool which is clearly identified
by law and composed by eligible mortgage loans secured by residential or commercial
property, mortgage loans secured by ships and aircraft, and public obligations. Most cover
pools also include cash deposits and loans against credit institutions. These "ring-fenced" pool
212 Section 1140, Mortgage certificate and inaccuracy of the Land Register: “To the extent that the inaccuracy of
the Land Register appears from the mortgage certificate or from a note on the certificate, invoking the provisions
of sections 892 and 893 is excluded. An objection to the accuracy of the Land Register, which appears from the
certificate or from a note on the certificate, is equivalent to an objection entered in the Land Register.”
213 Section 1155, Presumption of the accuracy of certified declarations of assignment: “If the right of the holder of
the mortgage certificate as creditor ensues from a connected series of notarially certified declarations of
assignment leading back to a registered creditor, the provisions of sections 891 to 899 apply in the same manner as
if the holder of the certificate were registered as creditor in the Land Register. A notarially certified declaration of
assignment is equivalent to a judicial transfer order and a notarially certified acknowledgement of an assignment
of the claim effected by virtue of the law.
214 See http://www.pfandbrief.de/cms/_internet.nsf/tindex/en.htm.
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of assets dedicated to secure the covered bonds, namely these assets in the cover pool will be
used to repay the covered bondholders before they are made available for the benefit of the
credit institution's unsecured creditors in the event of the insolvency of the credit institution.
The methods used to "ring-fence" the cover pool vary across jurisdictions215. In most
jurisdictions, the special law either excludes the cover pool from the insolvency estate of the
credit institution, or provides covered bondholders with a preferred claim within the
insolvency estate itself. For example, section 5. (1a) of the German Pfrandbriefe Act provides
that "Insofar as recorded cover assets are only partially to serve as cover for the Pfandbriefe
of the Pfandbrief bank, the cover register must contain precise details regarding the scope of
the part to serve as cover and its rank in relation to the part not serving as cover; in case of
doubt, the part to serve as cover shall have priority." Under this provision, the cover pool will
be specified by the cover register. At the same time, the recorded assets are managed in their
entirety or in part by the Pfandbrief banks as a fiduciary, although these assets are not
transferred to them.
The on-balance securitization needs no transfer of mortgage out of the balance sheet of the
originator. In order to safeguard the safety of covered bonds and the priority of holders' rights,
the cover assets used to cover the Pfandbriefe will be recorded by the Pfandbrief bank in the
register (cover register), as provided by section 5 (1) of the Pfandbriefe Act. This recording is
aimed to perfect the rights over the cover pool rather than the individual mortgages in the
cover pool. So the securitization of a pool of mortgage loans does not incur the cost for the
recording of the transfer of the covered mortgages.The creation of this statutory cover pool
and its recording in the cover register together entail the circumvention of accessoriness
principle in the covered bonds transactions.
So we find that the design of mortgage law has important impact on the approach of
mortgage securitization, and the securitization industry in different countries has created
distinct methods to circumvent the legal obstacles imposed by the accessoriness principle.
215 In some jurisdictions, the cover pool is preserved from the insolvency estate of the credit institution by being
transferred to an SPE, which guarantees the credit institution's obligations under the covered bond. Finally, some
structures use the implementation of European Collateral Directive in their jurisdiction to pledge the cover pool
assets. See ECBC ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF COVERED BONDS,
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However, these innovations have produced different consequences: MERS results in secret
lien, while the Pfandbrief keepts the legal cerntainty and transparency.
3.2 The doctrine of true sale
In 3.1 we have analyzed the mortgage accessoriness principle and its effect on the
securitization practices. From now on, we will focus on the securitization approach
commonly adopted in U.S, the originate-to-diversify model through which the mortgage loans
are transferred from the originators to the SPV. This transfer is treated as a "true sale" in the
secured transaction law, as we will see the provisions of the UCC-9. For the purpose of
bankruptcy remoteness, the principle of true sale is just applied in the American mortgage
securitization practices, while the European covered bonds follow another way to implement
the ring-fence of covered assets so as to protect the safety of covered bonds’ investors. So the
discussion of true sale will mainly concentrate on the U.S securitization practices, and I will
articulate the evolution about the doctrinal foundations of securitization from the perspective
of secured transaction law and the bankruptcy law.
On its appearance, the securitization is an account receivable (a right to payment owed to
the originator) financing through which the originator sells its account receivables to a third
party (Special purpose vehicle or special purpose vehicle) issuing securities to the investors in
the capital market. Usually, the SPV is a wholly-owned subsidiary formed by the originator
and it is formed only for the purpose of the securitization transaction and its operations are
limited to those relating to the transaction. Once the SPV is created, the originator conveys
the assets to the SPV for securitization. This conveyance, which is later referred as “true sale”,
is designed to be insulated from any future bankruptcy of the originator. The SPV raised funds
by issuing debt instruments (in the context of this dissertation, the mortgage-backed securities,
MBS) to the investors in the capital market, and immediately passing the proceeds to the
originator. So we can conclude that the bankruptcy isolation is the final purpose, while the
true sale is the legal mechanism through which the former is realized.
The criticism to securitization mainly focuses on its most important underpinning: true sale.
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Professors David Carlson216, Lois Lupica217, and Kenneth C. Kettering218 criticized its legal
robustness. David Carlson asserted flatly that securitization does not achieve its goal of
isolating the securitized assets from the bankruptcy estate of the Originator219, while Lois
Lupica focused primarily on the normative question of whether securitization is efficient in
the economic sense of increasing the aggregate net welfare of all individuals in society,
asserting that it probably is not efficient. In addition, she briefly sketched weaknesses in the
doctrinal foundations of securitization, suggesting (without reaching any firm conclusions)
that such transactions may be susceptible to invalidation in the event of the Originator's
bankruptcy on various grounds.
Based on their research, I will focus on the relationship between UCC-9 and the
proliferation of mortgage securitization, finding that the motive and achievement of the 1998
revision to UCC-9 is to institutionalize the securitization in legislation so as to mitigate and
eliminate the legal uncertainty.
3.2.1 The origin and history of Article 9 of United Commercial Code
Before the enactment of Article 9, various security instruments were employed by the lenders
to secure the repayment of their loans, including pledge, chattel mortgage and a conditional
sale. And they were governed both by the common law and state statutes. Moreover, the
statutes varied from state to state. Different consequences derived from different
characterization of a financing transaction as one or another. This caused the uncertainty and
high risk to the underlying transaction with respect to the creation of security, the priority and
the remedies available in the event of default.
As the expansion of commercial economy, the substantive differences in the legal
provisions governing the credit transactions differentiated by type of collateral began to
216 David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 (1998)
217 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization,
33 Conn. L. Rev. 199, Fall 2000;
218 Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its discontents: The dynamics of financial product development, 29
Cardozo L.Rev.1553, 2008
219 David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 (1998)
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blur220, and many states failed to distinguish between conditional sales and chattel mortgage.
So the introduction of a uniform law governing all security devices was necessary. The
development of uniform secured transaction law helps remove the impediments to further
proliferation of collateralized transaction. The Article 9 was aimed to facilitate the secured
credit transactions, making it easier and less costly to take and perfect security interests in
various personal properties. The secured creditors were granted supremacy over the debtor’s
assets through the use of floating lien and after-acquired property provision.
The aim of Article 9 is to provide a simple and unified structure, within which the immense
variety of present-day secured financing transactions can go forward with less cost and with
greater certainty. However, when Article 9 is originally drafted, it did not take into
consideration of the need of the securitization market.
3.2.2 Article 9 of UCC and the proliferation of securitization
The growth of securitization has a close relationship with the revision of secured transaction
law and the amendment of bankruptcy code.
Although securitization was first introduced in market in the form of mortgage-backed
securities in the 1970’s, this financial innovation was also applied to the other non-real estate
related receivables in the 1980’s. However, the realization of this expansion needs the support
from the governing laws. Securitization is, in essence, involves a sale of accounts which own
a stable underlying cash flow as the source of repayment to the investors. The revised Article
9 makes some modifications designed to facilitate securitization transaction so as to satisfy
the need of the MBS or ABS market which has developed with astonishing speed. These
modifications are to address the legal uncertainties and exposure to risks facing the
securitization participants. The revised Article 9 contemplates to foster the growth of
securitization through resolving two fundamental issues relevant to securitization process: (1)
the re-characterization of the asset transfer; and (2) how to perfect the transferee’s interests in
the transferred assets so as to reduce the risk and uncertainty of the transaction. For the
220 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization,
33 Conn. L. Rev. 199, Fall, 2000.
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characterization of underlying transaction, Article 9 governs both the outright sale of accounts
and chattel papers and the transfer of account for security. With respect to the second question,
Article 9 requires the transferee of accounts to publicly file a financing statement as the
accounts transfer as security, in accordance with Article 9’s procedure, in order to perfect their
interests in such property. By doing so, the transfer of accounts as the most important step for
securitization is exposed no legal risk and thus the cost to the transaction is reduced greatly.
On April 15, 1998, Article 9 was revised and proposed for enactment by the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws and the American Law Institute
because of the growth and continued innovation of credit markets. And this revision further
promotes the proliferation of securitization hereinafter. The revised Article 9 introduces new
types of assets as collateral under its governance facilitating financial innovation. Moreover, it
addresses the legal uncertainty regarding to the important relationship among creditors and
purchasers of collateral, and thus reduces the transaction costs. As a scholar has maintained,
Article 9 is believed “having the effect of institutionalizing securitization transactions” and
thus constructs a safe harbor for parties seeking to securitize assets that fall under the revised
definition of “accounts” and ”chattel paper” 221. In the following, we will discuss the changes
made by Article 9 for facilitating the securitization transactions.
3.2.2.1 The expansion of the definition of "account receivable"
In order to facilitate the development of securitization, the definition of “account receivables”
is also expanded broadly after every revision to UCC 9 so as to bring more securitized assets
under the governance of UCC 9. These gradual and continued revisions are aimed to address
the most vexing concerns of participants in the securitization industry: the ambiguity in asset
characterization and the consequent applicable law to the transaction. The parties to the
securitization transaction must accurately characterize the assets to be securitized, and then
determine the law applicable to the asset transfer. If the transferred assets fall into the
definition of “accounts” governed by the UCC 9, the transaction is safe and has no legal risk.
221 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization,
33 Conn. L. Rev. 199, Fall 2000.
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Otherwise, the participants have to take other necessary steps to perfect the transferee’s
interest under the non-uniform, non-article 9 laws. If these steps are not correctly or not taken,
the transferee’s interest will be threatened by the competing creditors of the originator, in the
event of the originator’s bankruptcy.
In response to this uncertainty, the revised Article 9 has bought the “instruments”, “general
intangibles” and other non-Article 9 governed property into the definition of “account”. In the
following, we will exhibit the evolution of Article 9 with respect to the expansion of the
definition of “account” and also its relationship with the several related concepts, such as
general intangibles.
After the revision in 1992, §9-106 provided that "Account" means any right to payment
for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not evidenced by an instrument or
chattel paper, whether or not it has been earned by performance. While "General intangibles"
means any personal property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel
paper, documents, instruments, and money222. In conjunction with§9-102 of the 1992
version223, the 1992 version of Article 9 is only applicable to the sale of accounts and chattel
paper, rather than general intangibles.
After the revision in 1999, the definition of account is broadly expanded. According to
current §9-102 (a) (2),
"Account", except as used in "account for", means a right to payment of a monetary
obligation, whether or not earned by performance, (i) for property that has been or
is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of, (ii) for services
rendered or to be rendered, (iii) for a policy of insurance issued or to be issued, (iv)
for a secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred, (v) for energy provided or to
be provided, (vi) for the use or hire of a vessel under a charter or other contract, (vii)
arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for
use with the card, or (viii) as winnings in a lottery or other game of chance operated
222 See http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/9/9-106.html
223 §9-102 provided that (1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article
applies
•(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property or
fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts; and also
•(b) to any sale of accounts or chattel paper.
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or sponsored by a State, governmental unit of a State, or person licensed or
authorized to operate the game by a State or governmental unit of a State. The term
includes health-care-insurance receivables.
It is notable that the term “goods” is substituted by that of “property”. As the Official
Comment states, this substitution signifies that it (account) is no longer limited to rights to
payment relating to goods or services, and various rights to payment that were classified as
general intangibles under former Article 9 are currently under the definition of accounts under
the revised Article 9224. So the right to payment deriving from the mortgage loan in the
securitization transaction is also a kind of “accounts” subject to Article 9. This new broader
definition of “account” will fundamentally affect the market for securitization by eliminating
the need for securitization participants, in most instances, to distinguish between accounts,
general intangibles and other Article 9 and non-Article assets.225 So the account transferee
will be sure that its interests in the transferred accounts will be free from the strong arm
powers of the originator’s trustee in bankruptcy.
At the same time, the current revised Article 9 also expanded to the sale of the commonly
securitized assets, payment intangibles, and promissory notes226. "Payment intangible" is a
newly identified category of collateral and means a general intangible under which the
account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation227. It can be referred from this
definition that "Payment intangible" is a subset of the definition of "general intangible. As
Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt 5d states, the term "payment intangible, includes only those general
intangibles under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation. At
the same time, the term "General intangible" is the residual category of personal property,
including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral.
According to §9-102 (a) (42), "General intangible" means any personal property, including
things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts,
documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit,
224 See Rev. U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt 5a.
225 Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst.
L. Rev. 287, Spring, 2001.
226 See UCC§9-109(a)(3) which states that “this article applies to: ……(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper,
payment intangibles, or promissory notes;……”
227 See UCC§9-102 (a) (61).
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money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. Besides the payment intangibles, the
term also includes software.
With the inclusion of the sales of promissory notes and payment intangibles, virtually
very asset with a payment stream and thus every asset that can be securitized, is governed by
the Revised Article 9228.
3.2.2.2 The identification of outright sale of collateral with the security transfer
One important character of Article 9 is its identification of outright sale of collateral with the
security transfer. And each version of Article 9 follows this approach as shown in the
following.
Under §9-102 (1) b of the 1952 version, the article covers, in addition to security transfer,
any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper229. However, this apparently unqualified
reference to “any sale” is considerably restricted by §9-104 (f) which provides that
“This article does not apply to a sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper as
part of a sale of the business out of which they arose, or an assignment of accounts,
contract rights or chattel paper which is for the purpose of collection only, or a
transfer of a contract right to an assignee who is also to do the performance under
the contract.”
In the 1992 version of UCC9, 9-102(1) (b) states that Article 9 applies "to any outright sale
of accounts."
Under the current §9-109, this article applies to:
(1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal
property or fixtures by contract;
…...
(3) a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles230, or promissory notes231;
228 Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 Am. Bankr. Inst.
L. Rev. 287, Spring, 2001.
229 With respect to the sale of accounts, debtors also sell their accounts as a means of financing their business
operations, and this transaction is known as factoring.
230 As defined by 9-102 (a) (61), "Payment intangible" means a general intangible under which the account
debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation. While "General intangible" means any personal property,
including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents,
goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other
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So we can find that Article 9 was at the beginning applicable to the sale of accounts
subject to some limitations; later these limitations were eliminated after the 1992 revision; in
the end, the application of Article 9 is extended to the sale of payment intangibles or
promissory note beside the accounts and chattel paper.
There are several possible reasons for the adoption and preservation of this approach. (1)
According to the co-drafter of Article 9, Grant Gilmore, the inclusion of sales of certain
intangibles is novelty and Article 9 merely follows the pre-code receivable assignment232.
These statutes were in reaction to an ephemeral problem arising from the Supreme Court’s
unexpected construction of an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act in a way that could have
disastrous consequences for a receivables financier who took either a sale or a security
transfer. Therefore, the UCC’s coverage of sales of receivables was the result of an historical
accident that had nothing to do with difficulty in distinguishing a sale from a security
transfer233. (2) According to the official comment of Article 9, this approach generally has
been successful in avoiding difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions in
which a receivable secures an obligation and those in which the receivable has been sold
outright234. And the coverage of sales of receivables can help avoid the risks of secret liens
inherent in secured transactions235. (3) The principal effect of making the Article applicable to
sales of receivables is that a transferee must file or otherwise perfect his interest in order to
have protection against his transferor’s creditors and subsequent assignees.
In order to realize the internal harmony of the legislation, the other terms used in the text of
UCC9 also signifies the applicability of its rules to the sale of accounts. For example, in
section 9-102 (12) "Collateral" includes: …… (B) accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangibles, and promissory notes that have been sold. Also in the same section, the definition
(72) of "Secured party" means: …… (D) a person to which accounts, chattel paper, payment
minerals before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.
231 As defined by 9-102 (a) (65) ,"Promissory note" means an instrument that evidences a promise to pay a
monetary obligation, does not evidence an order to pay, and does not contain an acknowledgment by a bank that
the bank has received for deposit a sum of money or funds.
232 Grant Gilmore, Security interests in personal property, Little, Brown and Co., 1965, Vol. 1, P308.
233 Kenneth C. Kettering, True sale of receivables: A Purposive Analysis, 16 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 511, Winter,
2008.
234 See official comment 4 of section 9-109.
235 Dan T. Coenen, Priorities in Accounts: The Crazy Quilt of Current Law and a Proposal for Reform, 45 Vand. L.
Rev. 1061, 1073-1074, 1992.
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intangibles, or promissory notes have been sold. In the definition of “security interest236”, it
specifies that "Security interest" includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts,
chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to
Article 9. These provisions clearly indicate that the buyer of an account owns a status of a
secured party, his interest in the account is treated as a security interest, and the account sold
is treated as collateral. Moreover, Section 9-302 requires that the purchasers of accounts and
chattel paper publicly file a financing statement, in accordance with Article 9’s procedure, in
order to perfect their interests in such property.
Although this Article occasionally distinguishes between outright sales of receivables and
sales that secure an obligation, it refuses to establish any rules under which a given
conveyance of receivables should be re-characterized as a sale or a security transfer. That
issue is left entirely to the courts which make an equitable determination base upon various
factors, including the presence of a residual interest to be retained by the originator, the sale
price set at fair market value by independent appraisers, the absence of recourse to the asset
seller, the acquisition of dominion and control over the asset by the purchaser, and the intents
of parties as evidenced by their writings.
3.2.2.3 The expansion of Article 9’s scope: Inclusion of sales of loans
The above-mentioned expansion of the accounts definition facilitates the securitization of
various accounts. However, as described in the official comment of 9-102, “the right to
payment fro money or funds advanced or sold” is expressly excluded from the definition of
accounts, and it is deem as general intangibles which falls out of the reach of Article 9. As a
result, when a bank-lender credits a borrower's deposit account for the amount of a loan, the
bank's advance of funds is not a transaction giving rise to an account237. So the sale of loans
236 "Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of
an obligation. "Security interest" includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a
payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9. "Security interest" does not
include the special property interest of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale
under Section 2-505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article 2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of
the goods is not a "security interest", but a seller or lessor may also acquire a "security interest" by complying with
Article 9. The retention or reservation of title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the
buyer under Section 2-401 is limited in effect to a reservation of a "security interest." Whether a transaction in the
form of a lease creates a "security interest" is determined pursuant to Section 1-203.
237 See Official Comment of 9-102, 5. Receivables-related Definitions.
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can not fall under the provisions governing the sale of accounts and this would impede the
growth of securitization of various loans, including mortgage loans.
In order to remove this obstacle to the growth of securitization of loans, the 1998 revision
to Article 9 includes the sale of payment intangibles and promissory notes and this expansion
has exposed significant influences on the growth and proliferation of securitization. This is
because the securitization transactions usually involve sale of loans of great volume and the
securitization participants look to Article 9 to eliminate the uncertainty inherent under current
law. A compromise was reached in order to satisfy the market’s needs: sales of loans are
included under Article 9, but purchasers of such assets are not subject to the filing
requirement for the perfection of its interests in the transferred assets. And consequently, the
security interests in sold payment intangibles and promissory notes are automatically
perfected, thus eliminating the uncertainty and ensuring the priority of loan purchasers as
against competing buyers. In this way, the securitization of mortgage loans has been
institutionalized and legitimated.
3.2.2.4 The evolution of the rules governing “true sale”
Despite its great success of securitization since the 1970’s, there always are debates about its
doctrinal validity, which usually focuses on whether purported sale of the securitized assets
should be respected as such or should be re-characterized as a secured loan by the SPV to the
originator. UCC 9 governs both the outright sales of account receivables and the security
rights on them from its inception. The determination of whether an asset transfer is a “true
sale” or a secured loan is not governed by a statutory rule, because the drafters of the original
version of UCC 9 declined to give any guidance as to the circumstances in which a purported
sale of receivables should be re-characterized as a loan secured by these receivables or a true
sale. And they explicitly relegate this issue to the courts. And the later revisions of UCC9
follow this approach.
The rule of “true sale” signifies the transfer of the securitized assets from the originator to
the SPV removing them from the originator’s asset balance and thus not subject to the
subsequent bankruptcy estate. This is the central concern of the parties participating in the
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securitization transaction. A huge portion of the securitization transaction involves the sale of
account receivables (especially the loans secured by mortgage in the case of MBS). The “true
sale” determines what assets are included in a securitizing originator’s bankruptcy estate and
what not. The consequences to the above characterization are very clear. According to the
bankruptcy law and Article 9, the assets subject to security interest is in the reach of the
bankruptcy estate. So the transferee’s interest in the account by “true sale”, once filed and
consequently perfected, is not subject to the claim of any subsequent creditor in the event of
the transferor’s bankruptcy, while the transferee of a secured loan is subject to the bankruptcy
of the transferor enjoying the “adequate protection” granted by the law.
The question is whether the sold assets are included in the bankruptcy estate. We could
observe the evolution of the rules governing the true sale of account receivables as following.
The Octagon V Rimmer: Identical treatment to outright sale and assignment of account as
security
This case is a historically important one because of its great influence on the development of
securitization. It established a rule in the negative sense with respect to the sale of the account
receivables. In this case, the appellee Rimmer owned “a full Five Percent (5%) perpetual
overriding royalty interest on all proceeds payable to [Poll] under the [System].” In 1988, Poll
commenced a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case. In January 1990, the bankruptcy court confirmed
the trustee's reorganization plan. Under this plan and the subsequent operations, the Poll
system was finally conveyed to Octagon "free and clear of liens, claims, interests, and
encumbrances." After assuming control of the System, Octagon refused to recognize any
interest held by Rimmer in the System gas sale proceeds and failed to make any payments to
Rimmer238.
Throughout this litigation, Rimmer argued that he had title to the account and "owned" the
account through buying the account, and Poll no longer had any ownership interest in the
account. and therefore his interest has never been property of Poll's bankruptcy estate.
Through citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., the court held that property of the
238 See Octagon V Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948; 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 12423.
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bankrupt's estate includes any property subject to a security interest. So the impact of
applying Article 9 to Rimmer's account is that Article 9's treatment of accounts sold as
collateral would place Rimmer's account within the property of Poll's bankruptcy estate. At
the same time, the court worried about that the acceptance of Rimmer's transfer of ownership
or title argument would allow an account buyer to benefit unfairly, at the expense of the
bankrupt debtor's other creditors, from the debtor's filing for bankruptcy. Because under
Rimmer's theory, once the debtor declares bankruptcy, the fact of bankruptcy alone places the
accounts sold to the unperfected account buyer beyond the reach of the bankruptcy trustee
and all of the bankrupt's creditors. This result is contrary to the similar aims of Article 9 and
the Bankruptcy Code.
By citing United States v. Trigg239, the court reasoned as following: Article 9 does not
attempt to classify a debtor's interest in the collateral as a property right or a specific legal
interest. Article 9 also does not speak in terms of who has title to collateral among competing
parties. Rather, Article 9 focuses on the rights and duties of the secured party, the debtor, and
third parties. Article 9 grants rights in the collateral to creditors in the event a secured party
fails to perfect his interest, regardless of the location of title and regardless of the debtor's or
secured party's legal interest in the collateral.
The policy behind Article 9 is to ensure certainty for creditors and provide notice of
security interests to third parties. Likewise, certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Code "are
designed to protect creditors by eliminating secret liens." In keeping with these policies, the
court hold that because, under Article 9, a sale of accounts is treated as if it creates a security
interest in the accounts, accounts sold by a debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy remain
property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate
240.
So we can find that although Article 9 applies to sales of accounts as well as assignments of
accounts for security, the assigned account receivables remain property of the debtor's estate.
In this respect, the courts did not take into consideration of the nature of the underlying
239 See 465 F.2d at 1268.
240 With respect to the protection of the buyers’ interests in the bankruptcy process, the court stated that “Although
property subject to a security interest is property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate, secured creditors of the debtor
are provided "adequate protection" for their interest. See 11 U.S.C. 363(e) (providing that upon a secured creditor's
request, bankruptcy court must place limits, as necessary to protect creditor, on trustee's power to sell, use, or lease
property of the estate).”
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transaction, despite they adopted the distinction between the outright sale and assignment of
account as collateral.
This case had a great negative influence on the development of the securitization because
the account receivables transferred to the SPV are also considered to be the property of the
originator and thus in the reach of the bankruptcy estate in the event the originator falls into
bankruptcy. This is not a true sale and consequently the bankruptcy isolation can not be
realized.
3.2.2.5 The 1999 revision to Article 9 overrules Octagon V. Rimmer
Later in 1998, because of the growth and continued innovation of the credit market, the UCC9
revised the rule established by the Octagon V. Rimmer in order to remove this block to the
development of securitization. Section 9-318 (a) of the revised Article 9 states:
A debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory
note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the collateral sold.
The official comment of this rule maintains that:
The fact that a sale of an account or chattel paper gives rise to a "security interest"
does not imply that the seller retains an interest in the property that has been sold. To the
contrary, a seller of an account or chattel paper retains no interest whatsoever in the property
to the extent that it has been sold. Subsection (a) also applies to sales of payment intangibles
and promissory notes, transactions that were not covered by former Article 9
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. Subsection (a)
makes explicit what was implicit, but perfectly obvious, under former Article 9: The fact that
a sale of an account or chattel paper gives rise to a "security interest" does not imply that the
seller retains an interest in the property that has been sold. To the contrary, a seller of an
account or chattel paper retains no interest whatsoever in the property to the extent that it has
been sold
242
.
So §9-318 makes it clear that once an asset is sold and the transferee’s interest is perfected,
the debtor remains no residual interest in the asset. If we read in conjunction with the
241 See official comment 2 of section 9-318.
242 See official comment 2 of section 9-318.
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amendment to §541 of bankruptcy code, section 9-318 (a) completes the institutionalization
of securitization transaction and allows certain securitization investors to circumvent the
bankruptcy proves. And once it is determined that an asset conveyance is a true sale, the
securitized assets are not subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy process.
Conclusion: Because of the reluctance of the court system's acceptance of the sale of
account receivable as a true sale, the securitization advocates revised the provisions of UCC-9,
so as to facilitate the development of securitization. Their efforts concentrate on two aspects:
in the first place, they expanded the definition of "account receivable" so as to bring the sale
of mortgage loan into the jurisdiction of UCC-9 and thus to eliminate the uncertainty of the
applicable law; later, the revised UCC-9 clarifies the legal consequence of the sale of account
in section 9-318 (a) , providing that a debtor that has sold an account does not retain a legal or
equitable interest in the collateral sold. These two provisions together institutionalized the
securitization in law and reduced the legal uncertainty.
3.3 Bankruptcy isolation
Although the revision to UCC-9 has institutionalized the securitization in law, it is only the
fist step to facilitate the proliferation of mortgage securitization. The more important thing is
to eliminate the bankrupt risk of the MBS investors so as to lower the funding costs of the
originators.
First of all, the inception and the later revisions of the secured transaction law (UCC- 9)
and the amendment of bankruptcy code facilitate the growth of securitization through
eliminating the transaction cost which was an outgrowth of an uncertain legal regime. The
recent revision of Article 9 in 1998 and the amendment to the Bankruptcy Code have
significant impact upon secured credit transactions and financial innovations such as
securitization.
Secondly, the Article 9 revision, combined with the recent amendment to the Bankruptcy
Code, has significant economic and distributive effects - not only upon the participants in the
transaction, but also upon the originator’s shareholders, creditors, and other stakeholders both
in and out of the bankruptcy process. In case of bankruptcy, it would allow certain
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securitization participants to avoid participation in the bankruptcy process and thus carve out
from the bankruptcy estate the securitized assets. This results in fewer assets available for the
distribution among the other creditors, such as employees, consumers, tort claims and
unsecured creditors in the event of bankruptcy. So as some scholars have argued, these
changes induce consequently the potential abandonment of two socially desirable objectives:
(1) the reorganization of potentially viable business and (2) the equality of distribution of
debtor’s assets among creditors243.
3.3.1 The transition of the bankruptcy code from pro-creditor legislation
to pro-debtor legislation
Before the enactment of the bankruptcy code in the 1978, the pro-creditor legislation
bankruptcy act of 1898 was in force. According to the provisions of that act, the jurisdiction
over collateral was limited. In the liquidation case, only when the collateral was possessed by
the debtor, could the trustee have power over it, otherwise, the trustee had no power over the
collateral. Provided the trustee's possession of the collateral in the liquidation case, he could
retain and sell the collateral only if some debtor equity existed. If no debtor equity existed, the
secured party could claim that retention of the collateral would cause irreparable harm, which
constitutes a grounds enough to lift the stay that a court would have instituted in a
reorganization case, by denying interest compensation during the bankruptcy proceeding244.
However, the enactment of the 1978 bankruptcy code changed this creditor-oriented
legislation and became debtor-oriented. Historically, there has been a strong bankruptcy
policy favoring the reorganization of the debtor. This policy is based on a assumption that an
enterprise in operation is worth more than a bankrupt one, and thus an enterprise on the edge
of bankruptcy is worth preserving for the benefit of debtor, the creditors, the employees,
suppliers and the community, compared to a liquidation proceeding. So an estate is
automatically created comprised of all the debtor's legal and equitable interests in property,
243 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization,
33 Conn. L. Rev. 199, Fall 2000.
244 David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 ,1998.
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including the collateral in a secured transaction. The secured creditors are subject to the
bankruptcy’s automatic stay and are forbidden to exercise all remedies that they have under
state law with respect to the collateral until the stay has been lifted.
At the same time, the power of the bankruptcy trustee is expanded so as to help
implement the reorganization of enterprises on the edge of bankruptcy. According to section
363 of 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy trustee is empowered to retain all the collateral
contributing to the reorganization at the expense of the secured creditors' rights. It owns a
potential risk that the trustee may abuse the property of another on behalf of the unsecured
creditors.
The change of the bankruptcy policy has a great impact on the development of
securitization wich was later employed to circumvent these unfavorable rules to the secured
creditors.
3.3.2 Bankruptcy Tax: Why mortgage securitization has chosen "true
sale" rather than secured lending?
The principle of "true sale" was adopted mainly for the purpose of separating the risk of the
originators' bankruptcy, namely circumventing the bankruptcy jurisdiction that the
Bankruptcy Code places on the lender of a secured loan to an Originator who has gone
bankrupt. And this legal risk is entitled as "bankruptcy tax" by professor David Carson245. In
order to understand why the securitization adopts the mechanism of "true sale" rather than
secured lending, we should distinguish between (a) liens upon and (b) sales of intangible
personal property which are both governed by the UCC 9, and discuss their discriminating
treatment before the Bankruptcy Code in U.S..
Precisely speaking, Section 541 (a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Code of U.S provides that the
bankruptcy estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case". In 1979, Congress radically extended bankruptcy jurisdiction
over secured creditors, with the spirit of encouraging the secured lender to contribute the use
245 David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 ,1998.
116
of collateral to the rehabilitation of debtors by preserving the necessary bankruptcy estate. But
this contribution was given no consideration, namely entitlement to post-petition interest. So
the bankruptcy code helps the debtor recover from insolvency at the cost of the secured
creditors. This uncompensated use of capital can be viewed as a wealth transfer or tax on
secured creditors, "Bankruptcy Tax". Since then, this pro-debtor legislation remains to sustain
the bankruptcy tax that the financial markets wish to circumvent.
So if the securitization adopts the mechanism of secured financing rather than the "true
sale"--that is, if the Originator simply conveys a lien to the SPV on the account receivables
(usually bank loans secured by mortgage), these secured assets are still owned by the
Originator and would not escape the bankruptcy jurisdiction. So in the event of the filing of a
petition under the Bankruptcy Code by or against the Originator, they would be part of the
Originator's bankruptcy estate. The Bankruptcy Code would preserve for the benefit of the
bankruptcy estate certain rights in those assets notwithstanding the SPV's security interest,
and logically the Bankruptcy proceeding would impair substantially the SPV's power to
enforce their security interest in those assets.
This injury imposed by the bankruptcy code to the rights of the SPV could be shown as
following. In the first place, the automatic stay would prevent the SPV from exercising
remedies against those assets. As a result of the automatic stay, a secured creditor in a
reorganization case is typically compelled to wait a long time before realizing value on its
secured claim, and thus the foreclosure is absolutely delayed by the automatic stay. Although
a secured creditor has the right to have the stay lifted if its interest is not adequately protected,
adequate protection has not been construed to require the secured creditor to be paid interest
by way of compensation for the delay in realization that the stay itself forces on the secured
creditor. Other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code may entitle the secured creditor to
post-petition interest to the extent he is over-collateralized, but a secured creditor who is
under-collateralized, or who is not sufficiently over-collateralized to be entitled to
post-petition interest for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding, must suffer the delay in
realization imposed by the stay without any compensation. Secondly, the lenders have to obey
the mandated notice provisions for secured lending under UCC-9 or the mortgage law of each
states. Thirdly, the secured lenders' rights and interests over the collateral are in a pending
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situation, because of the defaulted debtors' eventual exercise of the equity of redemption.
If the “true sale” principle is to be respected, the Originator sells the receivables and it
is supposed to retain nothing, neither legal interests nor equitable interests. This alleged
non-relationship between Originator and the sold assets is considered to be the very key to
securitization. So when the originator falls into insolvency, the creditors of originator can not
get paid by the disposition of the assets transferred to the SPV.
So there is a direct conflict between the securitization and the policies of bankruptcy
code with respect to the Bankruptcy Tax. The bankruptcy code imposes bankruptcy tax on
secured transactions for the purpose of promoting reorganization by assuring that the debtor
can use collateral during the reorganization process. But when a debtor decided to engage in
the securitization, the legal structure of securitization would prevent it from collecting and
using the cash flows deriving from the assets transferred to and owned by the SPV.
3.3.3 The creation of securitization for the purpose of bankruptcy
isolation
Because of the influences of pro-debtor legislation, the creditors sought to circumvent the
bankruptcy risks imposed by the bankruptcy code of 1978. The invention of securitization
satisfied the urgent need of the financial sector to a great extent. It is notably that the rapid
development and expansion of the securitization occurred shortly after the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code.
The fundamental goal of all securitization transactions is to isolate the financial assets
supporting payments on the ABS and MBS. Isolation ensures payments associated with the
securities are derived solely from the segregated pool of assets and not from the originator of
the assets. Investors of MBS are mainly concerned with two central issues: (1) the character
and quality of the payment stream of their investment's underlying assets and (2) the efficacy
of the transaction's structure246. The first issue is usually resolved by risk containment
246 Lois R. Lupica, Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization,
33 Conn. L. Rev. 199, Fall 2000.
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measures built into every asset securitization so as to guarantee the quality of the underlying
assets. The second issue in part turns on the characterization of asset transfer, which in turn
determines how the MBS investors will be affected by the originators' bankruptcy.
The distinctive feature of securitization is that the transaction is structured to isolate the
asset pool from the originator in such a way that, if the originator later becomes subject to an
insolvency proceeding, the proceeding will not interrupt the continued receipt by the SPV of
the payment due to them through realization on the asset pool247. It means that the SPV will
not be influenced by the insolvency of its originator, the asset pool will not be subject to the
bankrupt estate and the bankruptcy law will not be applicable to the asset pool of the SPV.
Because the securitized assets are the property of the SPE, they will not be part of the
originator’s bankruptcy estate.
For the purpose of bankruptcy isolation, the SPV is subject to an array of constraints.
There are mainly three kinds of such constraints illustrated as following. The first constraint is
the involuntary bankruptcy is countered by provisions in the SPV's organic documents
authorizing it to engage only in activities necessary to the securitization transaction and by
obtaining waivers of the right to file an involuntary petition against the SPV from third parties
who deal with the SPV. The second is the voluntary bankruptcy which is countered by
provisions in the SPV organic documents requiring a unanimous vote of the SPV's board of
directors to authorize the filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition and requiring one or more
members of SPV's board to be independent of the originator. The third constraints is the
non-substantive consolidation with the originator, which is required by covenants requiring
the originator and SPV to avoid acting in ways that would invocate the usual grounds for
substantive consolidation, i.e, the SPV should comply with its proper corporate formalities, its
assets are not to be commingled with those of the originator248.
The achievement of the“bankruptcy isolation”helps the originator successfully transfer
the credit risk associated with the securitized asset to the investors in the capital market and
thus makes the credit risk independent of the creditworthiness of the originator.249 .
247 Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its discontents: The dynamics of financial product development, 29
Cardozo L.Rev.1553, 2008
248 Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its discontents: The dynamics of financial product development, 29
Cardozo L.Rev.1553, 2008
249 In fact, the securitization industry has tried to validate securitization in the amendments to the Bankruptcy
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What can we learn from the triumph of securitization in the marketplace despite its shaky
doctrinal foundation? Some commentators maintained that the soundness of the doctrinal
foundations of securitization is a moot question250. But the products of securitization have
become too big to fail.
3.3.4 The critics to the relationship between true sale and bankruptcy
isolation
According to what we have discussed above, the risk of bankruptcy isolation depends on the
lien- sale distinction as is usually supposed by the securitization industry. But some scholars
said that the bankruptcy jurisdiction only was decided by the fact whether any debtor interest
in a thing exists- no matter how remote or improbable251. Naturally, if some hypothetical
connection between the debtor and things can be located, the bankruptcy jurisdiction is
justified. In some circumstances, the sold receivables could even be subject to bankruptcy
jurisdiction, provided the debtor has some “legal or equitable” interest.
With respect to the sale of account receivables and chattel papers, there are at least three
property interests, which have been explained by professor David Carlson252. The first is the
debtor’s power to convey the account receivables and chattel paper to a subsequent purchaser
even after the SPV perfects its purchase by filing a financing statement according to Article 9.
The second power refers to the power to collect the receivables, because in practice the
originator is generally appointed as the collecting agent for the sold receivables. Although this
power is of fiduciary nature, it can be thought as a legal title—— held for the benefit of
another, which thus constitutes a foundation for bankruptcy jurisdiction. The third power
belongs to the bankruptcy trustee who has a strong-arm power over the sold account
receivables and chattel papers.
At the same time, the originator always retains the risk where the underlying assets go into
Code in 20005, but it failed. At the same time, the industry has procured the enactment by a number of states of
securitization-validating statutes that attempt to make an end run around the Bankruptcy Code.
250 Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitization and its discontents: The dynamics of financial product development, 29
Cardozo L.Rev.1553, 2008.
251 David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 (1998)
252 David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1055 (1998)
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default or other economic troubles according to some accounting rules. Usually the originator
are allowed to retain substantial dominion over the transferred assets and substantial
ownership of the SPV253. At the same time, the SPV is granted recourse to the originator
which may be required to repurchase these assets from the SPE in the event the underlying
account obligor defaults. This recourse to the originator makes the transaction look less like a
"true sale" and more like a secured financing. The law and practices have made confronting
choice with respect to the characterization of the transfer of financial assets, sale or lien: On
one hand, U.S law has long permitted a buyer to "put" defective assets back to a seller without
calling into question the sale character of the transaction; on the other hand, transactions in
which the "seller" guarantees payment, or a particular return on investment, or the "buyer" has
full recourse to the seller are generally viewed as loans and not sales.
These property rights may seem slight or insubstantial. The provisions section 541 (a) (1) is
very expansive, as shown by the rhetoric “all legal or equitable interests in property”. So a
plain interpretation of it helps the judge find bankruptcy jurisdiction on any debtor interest in
a thing. And this will cause a disastrous result for the securitization because the debtor is
considered to have a legal title to the sold receivables and chattel papers in some
circumstances.
Another notable fact is that the actual effect or purpose of "Bankruptcy isolation" has
changed fundamentally. When the securitization first emerged in the late 1970's, there was a
premise that the quality of the securitized assets owned by the SPV is better than that of the
non-securitized assets owned by the Originator. So the principles of "true sale" and
"bankruptcy isolation" are necessary for the isolation of risks from the originator. As
discussed above, with the development of the mortgage-backed security market, there are
increasing amounts of mortgage loans being securitized, and at the same time, the
underwriting criteria for the mortgage loans securitized was cut down, so the quality of the
assets of the SPV is worse than before, and the assets of the SPV is high-risky. Thus there
occurs a fundamental rotation: The quality of the assets owned by the SPV is worse than that
of the originator. Here, the principles of "true sale" and "bankruptcy isolation”"are used by
the originator to transfer the high-risky assets and the credit risks of them to the investors in
253 Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 301, 2002.
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the capital market, and to avoid their responsibility to the MBS investors in the event of the
SPV's bankruptcy. So the bankruptcy isolation has been misused by MBS industry.
3.4 The rotten legal foundations for mortgage
securitization and the financial crisis
Throug the above analysis, we scrutinize the legal underpinings of both EU covered bond and the
U.S. mortgage securitization, paying particular attention to the true sale and bankruptcy isolation
in the U.S context. Comparative to the EU statutory legal regime, the legislations governing the
U.S mortgage securitization have gone a way to long and have deviated the right direction. The
following analysis will show us why and how these legislations have facilitaed the accumulation
of financial risk and finally caused the financial crisis.
3.4.1 The secret lien created by law and practices
In order to make the security interests enforceable against the third paty, particularly those of
non-possessory ones, it is required that the security interests over both the real property and
personal property should be disclosed and thus should be observable by the bona fide parties.
So the security interest over real property is recorded in the public register, and the security
interest over personal property is disclosed in the notice filing system. One of the Ten
Commandments of Mercantile Law is that an effective [notice] filing system is the center pole
that holds up the entire personal property security tent254. Also as Grant Gilmore255 has
observed, "One of the most firmly rooted doctrines of the common law," was "the protection
of creditors against undisclosed interests in property.256" So the secret lien was not encouraged
by the common law system. In fact, the secret lien doctrine ’ s intellectual and legal
underpinnings stretch back to sixteenth century England, to the statute of 13 Eliz., c.5257.
254 James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Priorities in Light of Old Ignorance and New Filing Rules, 79 Minn. L.
Rev. P529, 530,1995 .
255 Professor Grant Gilmore is the co-drafter of the UCC-9.
256 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 3.2, at 67; 8.7, at 274 (1965) ("In the history of our
security law there has been one constant factor: whenever a common law device has been covered by a statute,
some form of public recordation or filing has been required as a condition of perfection of the security interest.").
257 Jonathan C. Lipson, Secret Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21 EMORYBANKR.
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The term "secret lien" here refers to the situations where the security interests in property
that is neither recorded nor otherwise readily observable in the public recording system.
Secret liens are believed to be problematic, preventing potential creditors from accurately
assessing the credit quality of a potential debtor, causing subsequent creditors or buyers to
ignorantly rely upon incomplete or incorrect information or purchase a property interest
which is subject to incumbrances, causing priority or rights conflicts between the titleholders
of the "secret lien" and the subsequent bona fide third parties in various ways. One of the
main purposes of having real property recording statutes was to avoid "surprise liens" (secret
liens afforded priority over subsequent purchasers) and ensure that real estate purchasers and
investors are fully informed258. This can also be applied to the personal security interests. At
the same time, the securitization usually involves two recording procedures for the
assignment of mortgage receivables and the mortgages themselves under different applicable
law. With particular reference to the securitization in U.S, UCC-9 will be applicable to the
assignment of the mortgage receivables, while an individual state property law will be
applicable to the recording of mortgage.
The secret lien problem is historically addressed by recording system and later the notice
filing system, both of which aim to prevent debtor fraud through granting security interests
over the same property without notifying the subsequent secured creditors of the prior
claimants. Preventing the debtor fraud is that believed to be the raison d'etre of the filing
system259, which must reduce, if not eliminate entirely, this fraud risk. However judicial and
legislative authorities are increasingly creating exceptions to this system and permitting
lienors to assert secret claims that are afforded priority over subsequent bona fide purchasers
for value260. Meanwhile, the financial sector also develop some mechanisms to circumvent the
recording of security interests in the public register so as to reduce transaction costs, such as
the creation of MERS in U.S as we have analyzed in 3.1. Here, we discuss the secret lien in
the context of mortgage securitization, concentrating on the secret liens encouraged both by
the real property law and secured transaction law.
DEV. J. 421, P429–432, 2005.
258 Chad J. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens on Real Property, 11 Nev. L.J. 139, Fall, 2010.
259 Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and liens: The end of notice in commercial finance law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J.
421, 2005.
260 Chad J. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens on Real Property, 11 Nev. L.J. 139, Fall, 2010.
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3.4.2 secret liens deriving from the real property law
The problem of secret liens is, in many respects, a subset of the basic informational problems
embodied in the law of property: How do we know who has what rights with respect to what
things?261 Historically, the physical possession of the collateral was a strong evidence of the
enjoyment of security interests over collaterals. This worked very well in a more simpler
society, while we are now in a more advanced and complicated time with abundant new forms
of properties, such as intellectual property and the financial assets. These property can not be
owned by physical possession, only non-possessory security interests can be granted so as to
make them more liquid on the marketplace. As the economy grew in depth, breadth, and
complexity, possessory security interests became neither useful nor appealing to those
engaged in increasingly sophisticated mercantile transactions.
The recordation system was developed to perfect these non-possessory security interests.
The recordation was viewed as a way to address the problem of fraudulent conveyance - a
conveyance intended to place property out of the reach of creditors. Recordation systems
could deter or correct the problems of fraudulent conveyances and secret liens. Recording was
viewed as a means of deterring the actual or constructive fraud presumed to be at the heart of
the non-possessory property interest262.
However, the development of mortgage securitization created secret lien in a more complex
market environment. As we have analyzed in 3.1.2.2 (B), MERS was created as the
mortgagee and they acted in the name of the true mortgagee. Because of the MERS
involvement in mortgage securitization, the potential transaction counterparties of the
mortgagors do not know the true identity of its mortgagee and can not evaluate the credit
quality of the mortgagor. More importantly, the true mortgagees are usually the securitizers
who at the same time are also the debtors for the mortgage-backed securities(MBS). The
creation of MERS help these securitizers remove the liabilities from their balance sheets and
261 Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and liens: The end of notice in commercial finance law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J.
421, 2005.
262 Grant Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property 2.1-2.2,P25-27.
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hide their debts to the investors of MBS. However, these removed assets are usually treated as
the assets of the securitizing investment banks. So the securitizers create secret lien on those
transferred assets.
3.4.3 Secret liens deriving from the secured transaction law
Secret lien doctrine today continues to function in the form of the avoiding power or
in§544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code—the power of bankruptcy trustees to void secret
transfers made prior to bankruptcy. However this goal has been undermined by a variety of
statutory legal changes that replaced the flexibility and breadth of common law secret lien
doctrine with a system that is more formal, more rigid, and less effective..263
For the secret liens deriving from the secured transaction law, two legislative changes have
taken place years before the 2008 financial crisis. First is the loosened standards of
information disclosure as formal filing systems which has de-emphasized meaningful
disclosure to creditors and focused instead on technical compliance. The UCC-9 adopts the
notice filing system, which just requires the filing of a brief description, in substitute of the
traditional recordation system264 which is burdensome both for the filers and searchers. The
second is that various statutory exceptions have be granted to certain favored financial
products—asset securitizations and related derivatives—, preempting them out of the reach of
the Bankruptcy Code. These exceptions were created through amendments both to the
Bankruptcy Code265 and state law provisions related to“property of the estate.”
Firstly, for the attachment of security interests over the mortgage receivables, a financing
statement identifying the borrower, the lender, and the property involved had to be filed under
UCC-9. The financing statement has thus been viewed as a potent antidote to the problem of
263 Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Vol 83,
2009.
264 These early recordation systems required the mandatory disclosure of rich information under secret lien
doctrine. Unless a lien-holding creditor recorded the lien, the law would treat non-possessory liens as fraudulent
and therefore voidable. Early recordation systems required extensive disclosures, including the filing of the
mortgage document itself, and sometimes affidavits and acknowledgements of good faith. See Michael Simkovic,
Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, American Bankruptcy Law Journal, Vol 83, P259, 2009.
265 The most prominent effort to obtain a statutory safe harbor involved 912 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
2001. This provision would have amended the Bankruptcy Code to provide that assets transferred in a qualifying
transaction would be excluded from the debtor's estate. In light of the alleged misuse of SPEs in the Enron case,
912 was challenged and eventually pulled from the Bankruptcy Reform Act. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and
liens: The end of notice in commercial finance law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 421, 2005.
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secret liens. However, the UCC-9 drafters sticked to one idea that, for certain kinds of
transactions," such as those involving inventory or accounts receivable, it is not essential for
all of the details of the transaction to be spread upon the public record so long as the record
gives an indication where an interested party might inquire to learn whether or not particular
collateral of the indicated class or type is subject to the perfected security interest.266 What is
required to be filed is not the security agreement itself, but only a simple record providing a
limited amount of information (financing statement)267. For this reason, the financing
statement is moderately general and flexible, just identifying the name of the debtor and
secured party and briefly describing the collateral by"specific listing," "category," "type," or
"any other method, if the identity of the collateral is objectively determinable." Its main or
unique function is to notify the potential creditors that there exists a potential security interest
over the property of the debtor, while it does not disclose the details of the underlying
transactions. Further inquiry should be made so as to know exactly the coverage of collateral
and the priority among different claims. So the financing statement is most decidedly not a
property recordation device, as might be found in the real property or intellectual property
contexts268.
Because of the ambiguous description of the scope of collateral, it is possible to create
secret lien on the securitized mortgage receivables and thus the investment banks could hide
their debts and thus operate in the market with high leverage. Hidden leverage is a perennial
problem because debtors rationally wish to borrow at the lowest price possible. Debtors can
borrow at more attractive rates by hiding their existing debts and creating an exaggerated
appearance of creditworthiness.269
Secondly, with particular reference to the securitization of mortgage receivable, the
assignment of them to the SPV should also file a financing statement so as to perfect the
SPV's security interest over the securitized mortgage receivables, because the transfer of
mortgage receivables from originators to the SPV is considered as a true sale which
266 Peter F. Coogan, Public Notice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel Security
Laws, Including "Notice Filing," 47 Iowa L. Rev. 289, 1962.
267 See the official comment of section 9-502 about notice filing.
268 Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and liens: The end of notice in commercial finance law, 21 Emory Bankr. Dev. J.
421, 2005.
269 Franco Modigliani & Merton Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investment,
48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, P273, 1958.
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constitutes the heart of securitization. The successful "true sale" of financial assets will help
insulate them from the originators' potential insolvency. However, because the courts are
reluctant to recognize the putative sale of payment obligations as demonstrated in the above
mentioned Octagon Gas Systems v. Rimmer and the recent LTV Steel case, the securitization
industry began to sought legislative safe harbor for the true sale of financial assets so as to
circumvent the filing of the financing statement under UCC-9 which has been very general
and brief as illustrated above. In these legislative safe harbors, the transferred financial assets
n a qualifying transaction would be excluded from the debtor's estate. One example is the
Delaware's Asset-Backed Securities Facilitation Act ("ABSFA"), providing that,
"notwithstanding any other provision of law," any property purported in the transaction
documents to be transferred in a securitization transaction "shall be deemed to no longer be
the property, assets or rights of the transferor."270 The phase "notwithstanding any other
provision of law," in fact excludes the application of UCC-9 and thus the requirement of the
filing of financing statement. It signifies that any purported transfer of financial assets which
is declaimed to a true sale will be treated as a "true sale" and the transferred assets will be out
of the reach of the bankruptcy estate in case of the future insolvency of the originators. So the
ABSFA effectively ends the obligation to give notice and releases the participants in a
securitized transaction from the duty to give notice of the transaction by filing a UCC-1
financing statement. A secured party will have a non-possessory interest in a debtor's property
that is not readily discoverable from the public record.
In fact, the secret liens in mortgage securitization arise from two related doctrinal
principles in the financial innovations, namely form dominates substance and the bankruptcy
privileges are granted to financial products. With respect to the form dominates substance, it
refers to the lien-loan distinction in the mortgage securitization. As some professors have
analyzed, the securitization is in fact a non-recourse loan. However, the "true sale" in the
mortgage securitization is well recognized and thus the securitized assets are out of the reach
of bankrupt estate. Consequently, the form triumphs the economic substance of the underlying
transactions. The most important of this triumph is the bankrupt privileges granted to
270 Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, 2703A(a)(1) (2004).
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securitizing transactions rather than the secured loans. After the 2005 Amendment of the
Bankruptcy Code271, the financial contracts, in its most broad sense, have received protection
from the Bankruptcy Code. When a debtor falls into bankruptcy, the counterparties of the
debtor should be subject to some core provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, such as the
automatic stay, limitations on preferential and fraudulent transfers, and nullification of ipso
facto clauses. However, the counterparties of financial contracts are not subject to these
limitations, and are are free to terminate agreements, liquidate positions, and set off claims
against margin or other collateral posted by the debtor272. These special treatments or safe
harbor for financial contracts are considered to be necessary for the protection of financial
markets. Without this safe harbor, the financial markets will suffer sudden shocks, or a
systemic liquidity crisis, causing markets to collapse. That is because liquidity is vital for the
stability of financial markets, especially those markets for forwards and derivatives. If these
products are subject to the jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Code, they would be unable to liquidate
the volatile financial contracts before the and thus are "locked" in the bankrupt estate. One
debtor's default would have a domino effect, and finally undermine the entire financial market.
In order to reduce this systemic risk, the Bankruptcy Code gradually expand its range of
protection to financial contracts since 1978273 through broad-ranging definitions of protected
transactions and contractual rights. After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, it is believed that any transaction that bears the formal markings of a
swap, repo, forward, commodity contract, or securities contract is protected.274
The problem of "secret lien" reveals the dynamic relationship between capital market and
secured transaction law. Secret lien is the product of private negotiations among market
271 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 amends the Bankruptcy Code to
clarify and expand the existing policy of providing special treatment for parties to financial markets contracts,
including securities contracts, futures contracts, forward contracts, repurchase agreements, swaps and related
derivatives. See Rhett G. Campbel, Financial Markets Contracts and BAPCPA, 79 Am. Bankr. L.J. 697.
272 Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial contracts and the new Bankruptcy Code: Insulating markets
from bankrupt debtors and bankruptcy judges, 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 641, Winter, 2005.
273 At the start, the Code only granted protection to commodity and forward contracts, and the range of protection
was expanded to securities contracts in 1982, repurchase agreements in 1984, and swaps in 1990. With the recent
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, it retains the five basic categories of
protected transactions--securities contracts, swaps, repurchase agreements, forwards, and commodity contracts,
while the definition of each transaction is restructured and updated.See Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel,
Financial contracts and the new Bankruptcy Code: Insulating markets from bankrupt debtors and bankruptcy
judges, 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 641, Winter, 2005.
274 Edward R. Morrison & Joerg Riegel, Financial contracts and the new Bankruptcy Code: Insulating markets
from bankrupt debtors and bankruptcy judges, 13 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 641, Winter, 2005.
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participants and thus represents the endogenous or spontaneous impulse of the market which
should be corrected by public intervention. While the establishment of recording system
under real property law and the notice filing system under UCC-9 is a response to the
drawback fo the market. The public intervention, in the form of mandatory notice filing rules,
constitutes the legal foundation for the healthy and continuous development of the secured
lending market and the securitization market. However, the legislative changes occurred in
the past years have rotten this foundation. The collapse of this legal framework also destroys
the basic mechanisms for the market rehabilitation. At the same time, as a result of the
legislative changes, the new acts or amendments to existing acts such as the bankruptcy code,
with lengthy and detailed definition, deprived the judges of their judicial discretion. Judges
are discouraged from engaging in "substance over form" analysis. The new definitions are
pure form; they protect transactions that fit within formal definitions developed in the
marketplace. The role of the judge is to identify these industry definitions. So the common
law is no longer efficient and sensitive to the changes in the marketplace. It becomes
formalistic, rigid and inefficient. The substitution of traditional secret lien doctrine with the
statutory legal framework is not successful and the aftermath of these legislative changes is
disastrous. In this sense, the 2008 financial crisis is inevitable.
Conclusion
This part has concentrated on three topics, the mortgage law and the different approach of
securitization in two legal systems; the statutory institutionalization of mortgage
securitization from the perspective of true sale and bankruptcy isolation; and the dynamic
relationship between the problem of secret lien and the current financial crisis. Through these
analysis, we find that the legislative changes in the past 40 years have rotten the legal
foundation for the healthy development of mortgage securitization and the market
rehabilitation in case of financial crisis. Particularly, the modification of the secured
transaction and Bankruptcy Code, and the creation of MERS in the 1990's constituted the
most radical institutional changes that have deregulated the mortgage securitization. The
fundamental rules, such as the secret lien doctrine and principle that economic substance
dominates form, were abandoned by the U.S legislators. The efficient and flexible common
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law was replaced by a rigid and inefficient statutory legal framework for mortgage
securitization. The common law system was no longer able to give a timely response to the
market changes. So the assertion of LLSV that the common law is more efficient than the
civil law with respect to the creditor protection is not true. Another fact is that the civil law
countries in continental Europe, such as Germany and Denmark, do not suffer from the
mortgage securitization. Why this happens? Is the civil law system is more efficient than the
common law in this aspect? Chapter four will give an answer about them.
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IV The mortgage’s role in credit risk control in residential
mortgage securitization
In chapter III, we have analyzed the legislative changes surrounding the mortgage
securitization, and its influence on the financial stability. In this part, we want to analyze the
mortgage's role in securitization in a more microeconomic perspective. The analysis will
answer the following questions: why mortgage securitization has replaced the traditional
mortgage lending and become so common in the marketplace of U.S and the other advanced
economy bodies? How securitization has changed mortgage's role in credit risk control? And
is this change is economically relevant to the 2008 financial crisis? What improvements shall
we do in the future so as to avoid the asserted drawbacks of mortgage securitization in credit
risk control so as stabilize the financial markets?
In this part, I will study the transition from secured lending to securitization and the
possible causes of this transition in the first instance. Then the influence of mortgage's role on
credit risk control will be analyzed. In the third part, I will do a comparative research between
the U.S mortgage securitization and the Europe covered bond, discussing their advantages
and disadvantages in credit risk control and finally in stabilizing the financial market through
reduce the systemic risk.
4.1 Mortgage’ role as a collateral in the loan contract:
Analysis from the point of view of secured lending
Before the inception of securitization, secured lending has been employed for financing
economic activities for centuries as we have seen in chapter two, and legal rules favoring the
security and transfer of credit are vital to economic development. The literature on the role of
mortgage in secured lending usually departs from a loan contract in which mortgage is
granted to secure the performance of the underlying obligation. Here, we talk about the role of
mortgage in a more general sense, together with the other forms of security interests over
property., so we will just discus the role of collateral in a loan transaction. Comparatively, the
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analysis of the role of collateral in the loan contract is a micro one. According to this
traditional approach, the collateral is employed to impose influence on the personal
relationship between the lender and borrower, to provide incentives for the borrower’s
performance of the underlying debt.
4.1.1 The role of mortgage in loan contract: A traditional approach
With respect to the secured lending, both the law scholars and economy scholars have done
in-depth research in this field and they have generated an enormous amount of scholarly
literature. In the loan contracts' terms, the grant of collateral for the performance of the loan is
widely accepted and even become the provision of a standardized loan contract. Here I will
try to explain the pattern of secured lending in congruity with its actual pattern in the
economy through comparing the advantages of secured lending relative to the unsecured
lending. In general, the secured lending, to a great extent, can reduce the transaction costs
between the lender and borrower. The transaction-cost-reduction advantages, from the point
of view of the lender, include: the forcible enforcement in case of default, monitoring the
borrowers' future activities, the priority of repayment in the event of borrowers' insolvency.
These advantages can help us explain "why firms sometimes (but not always) issue secured
debt rather than unsecured debt or equity."275 we can arrange our discussion following the
proceeding of a typical loan transaction.
4.1.1.1 During the negotiation process
At the starting stage of the loan transaction, the lenders should determine whether or not to
extend the credit to the borrower. The banks making the loan usually take into consideration
two factors: the interest rate they receive on the loan, and the riskiness of the loan. The
interest rate, which is greatly influenced by the policy of central bank, is usually stable within
a certain period given the market situation. Therefore the interest rate is not the best
instrument to sort the potential "good borrower" because of its administrative limitation. The
275 Robert E. Scott, The truth about secured lending, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1436, 1997.
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lenders should formulate the other terms of the loan contract in a manner designed to induce
the borrower to take actions which are in the interest of the bank, as well as to attract low-risk
borrowers. The borrowers' willingness to grant collateral to secure the future repayment of the
loan, will help them to get the credit for their economical activities. For the lender, the grant
of collateral can lower the lenders' expected loss because of the potential default of the
borrower, and enhance the lenders' ability to force the borrowers to repay the loan even if they
are in financial trouble. In this aspect, Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss discussed the role
of collateral in the context of credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. They
show that collateral requirement is one of the important “screening devices”, together with the
interest rates, the amount of loan and the amount of collateral, to identify the riskiness of the
borrowers. However, Increasing interest rates or increasing collateral requirements could
increase the riskiness of the bank's loan portfolio, either by discouraging safer investors, or by
inducing borrowers to invest in riskier projects, and therefore could decrease the bank's
profits276. And this constitutes the main cause for the existence of credit rationing.
Why the collateral could increase the borrower’s incentive to repay the loan when it is due?
Because of the collateral, the borrower desires to avoid the losses that it would suffer if the
lender enforces the loan forcibly as the legal remedy for the default. As Robert. J. Barro (1976)
has indicated, default on a loan triggers the loss of collateral value to the borrower, where this
value is stochastic at the time when the loan is negotiated. Usually the lenders do not extend a
loan up to the whole value of the loan, while they just advances a loan equal to a certain
portion of the value of the collateral. With particular reference to the mortgage loan, the
loan-to-value ratio is usually floating between 60% to 100%. During the years before the
financial crisis of 2008, the American banking industry required less down payment for the
mortgage loan, and ultimately issue interest only mortgage loans. These marketing measures
has resulted in the declining quality of mortgage loans which were securitized later. This
constitutes one of important causes of the crisis.
The loan-to-value ratio can reflect the strength of the incentive imposed to the borrowers.
And this leverage depends on the loss that the secured creditor can inflict on the borrower by
276 Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew, Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information, the American
economicreview, volume 71, issue 3,1981, P393-410.
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enforcing its legal remedies against the borrower277. The bigger the loss, the stronger the
leverage. And consequently, the borrower will have more incentive to repay the loan. Once
the borrower falls into default, the lender-mortgagee will seek foreclosure of the house by the
court. The value of foreclosed house is usually less than its market value. So the expected loss
of the defaulted borrower will be the difference between the market value and foreclosure
value, plus the necessary legal expenses. For a reasonable lender, it just calculate the
difference between the residual value of the collateral after the foreclosure and the value of
the loan. If it is believed by the lenders that the residual value of the collateral after
foreclosure is greater than the value of loan, they will extend the loan without hesitation,
given the other requirements being satisfied. That is because the lenders will suffer no loss
even if the borrower could not repay the loan, either voluntarily or involuntarily. So the grant
of collateral gives the incentive to a reasonable borrower who will take into consideration of
this loss when he decides to default or not.
4.1.1.2 During the loan period: Monitoring the activities of borrower and
Restraining the borrower from risky investments
When a commercial lending transaction is started, it has differentiated incentives to the lender
and borrower because of the potential different interests. The borrower usually tends to invest
in a high-profit business which also signifies high risk. However, the lender has no claim to
the extraordinary profits besides the interest due, if the borrower succeeds in the investment,
while he will suffer the loss caused by the investment failure. So it is necessary to restrain the
borrower from high-risk investment conduct. The simplest way to limit the borrower’s risky
investment is by focusing the lender’s monitoring activities on certain assets. For example,
the mortgage registration grants the mortgagee strong protection so as to monitor the
mortgagor’s disposal of the collateral. The borrower (mortgagor) has to get the permission to
dispose the mortgaged building. So the lender could focus on monitoring the collateral so
long as the liquidation value of it could secure the repayment of the loan. It is easier than to
scrutinize the activities of the entire company.
277 Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the pattern of secured lending, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 625, January, 1997.
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4.1.1.3 The priority to receive repayment in bankruptcy
Another advantage of the secured lending is the priority in repayment granted to the lender
with respect to the collateral. As we have analyzed in chapter 3, the mortgage over real
property should be recorded in the public registry. Under both the legal framework of
mortgage laws in civil law system and common law system, this recording shares the similar
effect on the law, namely the protection of the security interests by law and its priority
according to their recording time. The protection and the priority is usually implicit and will
become explicit in the eventual liquidation or insolvency of the borrower. If the lender
recorded its mortgage at the first place, they will be granted a first lien over the collateral
against the borrower and the subsequent creditors. When the borrowers falls into liquidation
or insolvency, the lender will be first repaid, then the subsequent creditors, and ultimately the
borrower if there are any residual. If the value of the collateral can not cover all the debt of
the mortgaged lender, the value of the collateral will be used to satisfy the lender with the first
lien; the unsatisfied part of the debt will be treated as an unsecured obligation of the borrower
and get repaid with the other property owned by the borrower together with the other
unsecured creditors. It is notable that this priority will be respected both in the voluntary
and forcible liquidations.
At the same time, in order to get fully repaid, the loan contract usually provides a provision
that forbids or restricts the subsequent borrowing so as to prevent risky operation of high
leverage. The collateral also can help limit subsequent borrowings by reducing the borrower’s
ability to grant a security interest on the collateral to the subsequent lenders. In case of a
mortgage on the housing, the prior lender enjoys a security interest on the housing for the
repayment of his loan, and he also enjoys a priority over the subsequent lenders as a result of
the registration of his mortgage in the registry. So this limitation imposed to the subsequent
lenders reduces the possible borrowing because of its relatively higher cost. It is believed that
the first lien is more attractive than the second lien. They priority of repayment is one
important institutional advantage of secured lending that attracts the lenders in the credit
market. By restraining the future borrowing, the lender limits the borrower’s ability to
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decrease its interest in the business, as long as the lender also can limit the borrower's ability
to dispose its assets in the business.
4.1.1.4 The forcible enforcement of debt in case of default
The most obvious advantage to the lender of issuing secured credit is that receiving collateral
increases the likelihood that the lender will be able to collect the loan forcibly if the borrower
does not voluntarily repay it278. If the borrowers falls into default or they do not want to repay
the loan, the lenders can apply the court to enforce the loan contract and foreclose the
collateral. Through recording in the public register or the filing of a financing statement, the
lenders enjoy a security interest over the collateral.
Because of these advantages, the secured lending is very common and well accepted by the
credit market, especially in the housing market. The loans for each purchase or improvement
of house are commonly secured by the mortgage on the house.
4.1.2 The costs of the secured lending
With respect to the efficiency of secured lending, there are many debates among the scholars,
mainly those in U.S. Currently, there are several standards to judge whether the secured
lending is desirable from the point of view of economy. The first approach is to judge the
economic efficiency which can be determined by two sub-standards: the Kaldor-Hicks test
and the Pareto test. The former considers an activity as efficient if it maximizes the overall
value even if some ones are worse off, while the later considers it as efficient if it maximized
overall value without any participants being worse off.
In 4.1, we have analyzed the benefits of secured lending for the loan transaction
participants, it needs to analyze the costs of it so as to make our discussion more scientific
and meet the economic pattern of credit market. The secured lending imposes transaction
costs to both the lender and borrower relative to the unsecured lending. As Prof. Mann has
278 Alan Schwartz, Security interests and bankruptcy priorities: A review of current theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1,
7-30 , 1981.
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observed in his interview with the various companies, the unsecured lending was preferred by
the borrowers and they are willing to accept a significant increase in interest rates to avoid the
burdens of a secured transaction279. These costs include: Firstly, the secured lending imposes
information cost for the lender and borrower. In order to investigate the financial strength or
creditworthiness of the borrower, the physical situations of the collateral, the existence of
prior security interests or other claims on the collateral so as to insure that there is no
competing interests on the same collateral, the registration of security interests through public
registry, the market value of the collateral and the potential depletion or depreciation of the
collateral, the borrower's title to it and the necessary insurance fee for the collateral, such as
the appartement. Comparatively, the unsecured lending does not engender these costs relating
to the collateral. And thus the secured lending has caused efficiency loss relative to the
unsecured lending. This is why some scholars has suggested to abolish the secured lending,
especially the priority in repayment. As argued by Professor Alan Schawartz, a leading figure
in law and economics, secured lending is evil, irrational.280
Except the transaction costs of the secured lending imposed to lenders and borrowers, it
also has external effects to the other creditors or stakeholders. This external effect of secured
lending is related to the bankruptcy procedure when the there exists competition between the
secured lender and the other unsecured creditors. The secured lenders will be repaid in
priority under the Bankruptcy Code, while the other can only be repaid by the residual value
of the collateral, otherwise they will receive nothing. The protections granted to creditors
could either be contractual or proprietary. The secured lenders enjoy the proprietary
protections, while these unsecured creditors or stake holders can also be described as creditors
without proprietary protections. It is also considered as an extended application of the Pareto
test: it can be unfair for some creditors to suffer for a system which brings overall benefit281.
The second approach is to assess the fairness of secured lending. This approach usually
focuses on the question of fairness to the unsecured creditors or stake holders, such as
creditors extending loans to borrower without collateral, tort claimants, customers and etc, in
279 Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the pattern of secured lending, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 625, January, 1997.
280 Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. Legal Stud. 1,
P33,1981.
281 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance law: Principles and Policy, 2011, P293.
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insolvency. Because of the priority offered by the secured lending to certain creditors, the
unsecured creditors and subsequent secured creditors are worse off, especially in the
bankruptcy procedure, for the reason that they can not recover their credit in full.
The above analysis is the traditional approach of secured lending since the 1970's. However,
the mortgage transaction has experienced great evolution since then, especially the
development and proliferation of mortgage securitization which has radically changed the
nature of mortgage from a stagnant lien into a marketable commodity in the capital market.
And consequently mortgage lending has been replaced by mortgage securitization to a graeat
extent. And at the same time, the establishment and development of secondary mortgage
market has greatly affected the function of mortgage in the credit risk control. This is another
important reason of the 2008 financial crisis. In the following parts, we will focus on why
these have happened and what are their effects on mortgage law. All these work need a new
approach of analysis.
4.1.3 The inherent interest rate risk of the traditional mortgage lending
As a commentator said, a significant fundamental factor underlying the current, as well as the
past, finance market crisis is the failure of policymakers to understand and take into account
the nature and characteristics of mortgage loan as an item of property and, to a lesser extent,
the nature of mortgage loan transactions282. For the owners of the mortgage loans, they are
long-term assets because of the creation of amortization since the Great Depression in the
1930’s. With respect to the credit risk control of the mortgage loan, we should in the first
place understand this nature and characteristic of mortgage loan transactions.
Because of the integration of the primary mortgage market and the secondary mortgage
market, the private mortgage lending is increasingly influenced by the macro-economical
environment, such as the fluctuation of the interest rate. In the traditional bilateral or
contractual approach, the interest rate is an endogenous variables which is determined by
various factors, such as the riskiness of the borrower and the granting of collateral. They
282 Thomas E. Plank, Proposed regulatory solution: Regulation and reform of the mortgage market and the nature
of mortgage loans, Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 SC.L Rev.779, spring, 2009.
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together constitute an equation of loan. While the interest rate in the macro-economical
analysis is an exogenous variable, it was usually determined by the policy of central banks of
each state. For example, the lown interest rate environment during the past decade in U.S is
determined by the Federal Reserve's monetary policy. So the assumption of traditional
mortgage (or secured) lending model has potential conflicts with the economic reality,
especially in the context that the traditional primary mortgage market has been greatly
integrated with the secondary mortgage market. It is necessary to discuss the mortgage
lending taking into consideration of the macroeconomic factors.
With particular reference to the amortizing mortgage lending, the amortization reduces the
possibility of default through changing the way and amount of payment of principle and
interest. It allows more families to purchase housing with a down-payment and a fixed
monthly payment. And this amortization of mortgage loan is still advanced by the banks until
now and is proved to be a successful way of increasing affordability of housing for the
families, especially those of low- and medium-income, because the development of the
long-term amortizing mortgage loan responded to the problems created by using short-term
mortgage loans to finance long-term real estate. However, in order to fund these long-term
assets, the mortgage originators must be able to get long-term finance through long-term
liabilities. Unfortunately, this mismatch between short-term liability and long-term asset had
not been very well eliminated. The mortgage loan originators, the savings and loan
associations and commercial banks, predominantly employ the short-term family deposits to
fund the long-term mortgage loans. This system is vulnerable to the increase of interest rate or
other market conditions that would cause depositors - who were providing short-term
financing- wo withdraw their deposits283. And this regime finally collapsed in the savings and
loan associations crisis in the 1970’s and early 1980’s as a result of the serious inflation and
higher market interest rates at that time.
For the purpose of resolving this mismatch problem and especially the interest rate risk, the
securitization, both agency and GSEs sponsored and private-lable were employed to respond
to the market crisis. In this way, the interest rate risk is shifted from the mortgage lenders to
the MBS investors.
283 Kenneth E. Scott, Never Again: The S&L Bailout Bill, 45 Bus. Law. P1883, 1885,1990.
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4.2 Mortgage securitization, the death of secured lending
and the credit risk control
With the proliferation of mortgage securitization, it has, to a great extent, replaced the secured
lending as the primary funding source in U.S, especially for the financial institutions. This
phenomena is entitled "The death of secured lending" 284and has attracted a lot of attention
from the scholars. In this part, we will introduce the transition form secured lending to
securitization and concentrate on how to control the credit risk in mortgage securitization.
4.2.1 The transition from secured lending to securitization
During the past four decades, a notable phenomena is that mortgage securitization is
increasingly employed as the financing source of the banks, in substitute of the family
deposits.
4.2.1.1 The death of secured lending
Traditionally, secure lending is considered as a safe way to extend credit and secure the
repayment at the moment due. However, the secured lending has been facing great threat from
securitization in the past decades. Compared to the secured lending, the mortgage
securitization saves the costs in two separate sources and thus the originators get benefits
from this cost reduction. The first source is the conversion of unrated liquid receivables into
highly liquid rated securities which can be exchanged in the capital market. So a large number
of investors would buy these mortgage-backed securities, rather than advancing loan directly
to the originator secured by these mortgage receivables. The great demand from the investors
in the capital market help increase the market value of theses underlying receivables, and
consequently the originator can charge a lower interest rate on these mortgage receivables. So
284 See Edward J. Janger, The death of secured lending, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1759, April, 2004; see also Thomas E.
Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1655, April, 2004; Douglas G.
Baird, Secured lending and its uncertain future, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1789, April, 2004.
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the financing cost for the borrower and lender is also reduced.
The second source is deriving from the circumvention of the terrible provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code on the secured lending which was described by David Carlson as
“bankruptcy tax” on secured credit285. In this aspect, the securitization poses threat to both
the secured lending and Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, this threat arises from two aspects.
The first derives from the discriminating treatment before the bankruptcy code as a result of
the differentiation between true sale and lien, because the "true sale" is out of the reach of the
bankruptcy jurisdiction while the secured lending should be subject to the limitations imposed
by the bankruptcy code. This is the so called "bankruptcy tax" we have analyzed in chapter
three. It is notable, however, that whether to impose this bankruptcy tax is determined by the
courts. The second threat derives from the recent development that some U.S states'
legislation286 attempts to abolish the characterization of "true sale" or "sale intended as
security". In this part, we focus on this legislative development which constitutes the biggest
threat to secured lending and provide an advantage to Wall street-style structured finance at
the expense of Main street-style secured lending.
Under the Delaware Asset Securitization Facilitation Act (ASFA), "notwithstanding any
other provision of law ... any property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or
in part, in [a] securitization transaction shall be deemed to no longer be the property, assets or
rights of the transferor". So any transaction, which purports to transfer assets , whether
intended as a sale or a security interest, will be effective to transfer ownership. The purpose or
effect of this statutory "true sale" is to exclude the securitized assets from the Bankruptcy
estate, and consequently to allow the originator and the MBS investors to opt-out the
regulation by the bankruptcy code, and more importantly, to opt-out of the regulatory
components of Article 9 and the law of mortgages so as to circumvent the public notice filing
and registration requirements. At the same time, the wording "any property, assets or rights "
signifies that they can substitute any type of secured loan. Given the same conditions, the
285 Thomas E.Plank, SYMPOSIUM: Threats to Secured Lending and Asset Securitization: Panel 1: Asset
Securitization and Secured Lending: The security of securitization and the future of security. 25 Cardozo L.Rev.
1655, April 2004.
286 Alabama, Delaware, Louisiana, Ohio, North Carolina, South Dakota, and Texas have recently adopted this kind
of gerrymander state property law to provide a safe harbor for securitization transactions. See Edward J. Janger,
The death of secured lending, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 1759, April, 2004.
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lender and borrower prefer the securitization to the secured lending. One important evidence
is that the predominant holders of mortgage loans have become the Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
and the issuers of private mortgage-backed securities, no longer the savings institutions. From
1958 to 1979, savings institutions held more than 50% of all single-family mortgage loans.
Thereafter, the share held by savings institutions declined significantly, and as of the end of
2006, savings institutions held only 7.8% of all first-lien single-family mortgage loans. In
contrast, the share of GSEs and the issuers of private-label securitization of the first-lien
single-family mortgage loans have respectively risen up to 44.4% and 22.7% as the end of
2006287.
This securitization statutes have overruled the traditional regulatory regime under UCC-9.
Under the "true sale" doctrine, most of the courts treat a transaction as a true sale only if the
risks and benefits of ownership have been transferred to the purchaser. The courts usually
look to the "substantial" or "true" intention as manifested in the deal, rather than the pure
stated intention written in the documents. The court system thus plays a role of market
regulation for the financing activities. However, the Delaware ASFA strips the courts of this
regulatory power to re-characterize the underlying transactions. Thus the traditional secured
lending has been substituted both at the level of legislation and court justice.
It is also notable that the usage of securitization is limited to the extent that the market
participants own the expertise and economic scale to carry out the securitization transactions.
That is because the securitization is very expensive to construct and there is only economic
for transactions of significant size. Thus the larger enterprises are favored over the smaller
ones. Those, who can not afford the costs of securitization, would have to choose to raise
money through the secured lending. So we find that the secured lending still thrives even
though the securitization has engendered institutional threats to it. However, as a result of the
integration of the primary mortgage market and secondary mortgage market, the development
of mortgage securitization indeed changes the way that the traditional mortgage lending
functions, especially its role on the credit risk control.
4.2.1.2 The changes of secured lending as a result of mortgage securitization:
287 Thomas E. Plank, Proposed regulatory solution: Regulation and reform of the mortgage market and the nature
of mortgage loans, Lessons from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 SC.L Rev.779, spring, 2009.
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The necessity of a new analysis approach
As the proliferation of mortgage securitization and the development of secondary mortgage
market, mortgage functions not only in the traditional loan contract, but also in the capital
market involving more participants. It is not appropriate to analyze mortgage in the traditional
approach and it requires a new methodology to guide our analysis taking into consideration of
the changes of mortgage lending. Here it is necessary to describe the relationship between the
traditional mortgage lending and mortgage securitization which operates in different markets.
Mortgage lending occurs in the primary mortgage market and produces the mortgage loans
which will be securitized in the secondary mortgage market, while mortgage securitization is
the most important component of secondary mortgage market. It could be said that the
mortgage lending provides the "raw materials" for mortgage securitization. At the same time,
the analysis of mortgage lending is usually in the microeconomic level, while the mortgage
securitization interplays with the macroeconomic environment. The financial crisis since 2008
demonstrates that the primary market and secondary market influence each other in their
development. To a certain extent, the primary mortgage market and the secondary mortgage
market have been integrated. The experience in U.S. Shows this interrelationship clearly.
Because of the proliferation of mortgage securitization, the mortgage transactions have
been restructured and construed differently.
Firstly, the mortgage lending is on longer a traditional bilateral transaction, but a
multilateral transaction involving more intermediatory participants. This phenomena began
since the Great Depression, because of the federal government sponsorship and oversight of
the federal government, the mortgage finance was characterized by a three-party model: a
borrower, a lender, and some government affiliated institution that purchases, insures, or in
some way exercises some underwriting oversight in the capitalization of the loan288. The
federal government's intervention in the mortgage market have stabilized the marketplace and
created high standards of safety and soundness. Since the 1970's, the mortgage finance has
become a transaction involving more than 3 parties, mainly due to the proliferation of
288 Christopher L. Peterson, Subprime Mortgage Market Turmoil: Examining the Role of Securitization –A
hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Securities,
Insurance, and Investment, April 17, 2007, University of Florida.
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private-label securitization. Unlike the two and three party mortgage finance models, the
private label securitization model of mortgage finance has more than 5 different participants
that all play an independent role in originating, pooling, structuring, and servicing mortgage
loans. In a typical mortgage lending, the banks do not originate the loans by itself, usually the
mortgage brokers identify potential borrowers and provide various loan products to the
families which are planing to purchase a new house or do some improvement to their house.
For the determination of the interest rate, the riskiness of the borrower, the broker and
originator usually rely on the information about past credit performance offered by consumer
credit reporting agencies and the credit score given by Fair Issacson & Co., a firm that
specializes in evaluating consumer repayment. Once the loan was extended, it was transferred
to a subsidiary of an investment banking firm which is called the securitization sponsor, or
seller, then transfers the loans into a pool of loans, namely the SPV. The seller sometimes sells
the rights to service the loan pool to a company, namely the servicer, which will correspond
with consumers, receive monthly payments, monitor collateral, and when necessary foreclose
on homes. The issuance of MBS needs an underwriter who purchases all the“securities”
issued and backed by the pool, and then sells securities to a variety of investors with different
portfolio needs. In order to get a higher liquidity on the capital market, the underwriter
employs credit rating agencies to issue a rating to each tranche of the pool on which the
investors rely. Usually a insurance is required for the credit enhancement so as to assign some
tranches higher investment ratings. All these participants, including broker, originator,
sponsor and seller, SPV, servicer, underwriter, rating agencies, and insurer, work together and
are closely connected. The traditional bilateral approach of analysis does not take into
consideration of the interests and incentives of these intermediate participants. The
involvement of more participants in the transaction requires a multilateral approach of
analysis of the role of mortgage in mortgage finance practices.
Secondly, the focus of the mortgage relationship has been shifted from the collateral (land,
building and so on) to the debt in the mortgage transactions289 or the projected cash flow
from the underlying loan. Securitization converts the illiquid real estate into highly liquid
securities in the capital market, they should concentrate to assure the liquidity of securities
289 Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. Rev. 249, Spring, 1999.
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which is determined by the cash flow from the repayment of mortgage loans. The mortgaged
real estate only secure the repayment of mortgage loan in the event of the borrowers'
insolvency, and during the housing bubble the MBS investors did not care where they are
located, who are the mortgagors, how is the credit history of the specific mortgagor. So the
mortgagees and MBS investors' relationship with the mortgaged real estate declined.
Accompanying with the shift of the focus, the personal character of the relationship
between lender and borrower has also been shattered by the development of the secondary
mortgage market and the mortgage-based financial innovation. Prior to the development of
the secondary mortgage market, residential mortgage lending is marked by proximity290. The
lenders always evaluate the credit quality of the borrower, and this evaluation is more
subjective using the lenders' knowledge and experience. The more prestigious the debtor is,
the easier for them to get the loan they need. However, the development of secondary market
produces greater demand for mortgage loans which requires a more standard and objective
evaluation system. In U.S, the Automated underwriting (AU) is employed to undertake this
objective evaluation system, by which the personal reputation of the debtor is neglected, the
information about the mortgaged housing becomes irrelevant.291 At the same time, in order to
enhance the liquidity of the MBS, the credit rating from rating agencies are increasingly relied
on, while the rating agencies are more concerned with the mortgage pool’s projected cash
flow, and less with the quality of the mortgaged land. The secondary market has caused
mortgage holders to become more remote and unfamiliar to the mortgaged land. The
purchasers of mortgage-backed securities in the secondary market have no contact with the
land on which the mortgages exist. More important to them are the borrowers’
creditworthiness and the property’s stream of income. The MBS allows the individuals who
do not own the real estate investing expertise to become mortgage securities investor. The
investors do not have to conduct the necessary property valuation. The investors’
290 James Charles Smith, Symposium: Law and the financial crisis: Economic regulation during turbulent times:
The structural causes of mortgage fraud, 60 Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
291 Automated underwriting (AU) speeds up loan application process and assessment, as well as cuts origination
fees in the hundreds. Freddie Mac's Loan Prospector and Fannie Mae's Desktop Underwriter are the most
commonly used automatic underwriting software packages. The advantage of AU is that it requires less
documentation, speeds up the closing of loans, cuts greatly the costs, and avoids the personal prejudice. However,
the evaluation of the credit quality of borrower becomes more or uniquely relied on the credit score of the
borrower, the factual ability of some borrowers to repay the loan has often been overestimated and they soon
default. So the AU system is inclined to extend credit to unqualifying borrowers.
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unfamiliarity with the mortgaged lands and buildings can be mostly illustrated by the
popularity of American mortgage securities with the foreign investors, especially those from
the Emerging countries such as China and India.
Thirdly, mortgage is increasingly viewed as an investment instrument in the capital market,
not only a personal relationship between borrower and lender. Because of the establishment of
secondary market, mortgage itself has been paid less attention. As a commentator has
observed, “The secondary market is like a great food processor. What goes in comes out
unrecognizable to borrowers and lenders, but looks appetizing to investors”292. This becomes
possible for the fact that there are new intermediate agencies involving the mortgage-based
transactions, such as the credit rating agency which is specialized in evaluating and rating the
quality of the mortgages.
However, once the mortgage itself becomes a commodity in the capital market, its quality
or the repayment of the security debt should also be secured by some other assets or credit
enhancement mechanisms, such as the FHA and VA federal guaranty, GSEs implicit guaranty,
credit insurance, and credit rating, so as to enhance the liquidity of the mortgage securities
and boost the confidence of investors. Credit ratings play a pivotal role for the development
of the commercial mortgage securities. Rather than relying on personal evaluations, the
investors of mortgage securities prefer to rely on credit ratings. However, the investors even
rarely examine the appraisal report about the quality of underlying assets from the credit
rating agencies. The function of the mortgage has been enhanced or replaced by the appraisal
of the credit rating agencies. By doing so, the mortgage is no longer a collateral, but an asset
which needs guaranty from other collateral.
4.2.2 The weakening role of mortgage in securitization and the credit risk
control
As we discussed in chapterⅡ, prior to the creation of the secondary mortgage market and the
proliferation of securitization in U.S, the mortgage market had been a localized one and was
292 Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. Rev. 249, Spring, 1999.
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characterized by the proximity between the lenders and borrowers. At the same time, the
history of mortgage's evolution reveals that the relationship between the mortgagee and the
land (later the housing) becomes more remote293. Following the creation of secondary market
and its further development since the 1970’s, the mortgage market experienced three
fundamental transformations: (1) the once localized mortgage markets in U.S were integrated
into a national and finally a international capital market; (2) the traditional two-party
mortgage transaction was replaced by a multiple-party one as a result of the intervention of
the third intermediary agencies in the process of mortgage transaction, such as mortgage
brokers, rating agencies, appraisers, servicers; and consequently (3) the financial incentives
effective to the borrowers and lenders under the traditional regime are less compatible to this
new multiple-party mortgage transaction, and this created a distorting incentive mechanism
for the participants and caused the irresponsible lending practices. These changes further
weakens the role of mortgage in credit risk control.
One commentator stated that the common thread that links together a number of
development in modern lending practices is distance between the lender (or purchasing
investor) and the underlying assets. The above-mentioned changes can be explained by
various distances between the lenders and borrowers, geographical, transactional and
financial, and these distances own profound impact on the risk control in the mortgage
industry. This "Distance theory" is developed by Professor James Charles Smith who used it
to explain the fraud in modern mortgage market.
1) Geographical distance. Prior to the development of secondary mortgage market in the
1970's, mortgage lending in the nature was heavily localized, and the participants of mortgage
transactions were usually the residents where the mortgage loans were advanced. At the same
time, the existing regulatory regime at that time also prohibited the interstate banking, and
thus the institutional lenders had stable access of capital from the community where they were
located.
293 As professor Ann M. Burkhart has argued, the evolution of both England mortgage law and American
mortgage law followed the same course in this aspect. The adoption of the equity of redemption, the dominance of
the lien theory over title theory of mortgage, the virtual abolition of strict foreclosure and the imposition of more
legal burdens, have together contributed to shift in emphasis from the land to the debt in mortgage transactions.
See Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. Rev. 249, Spring, 1999. Here we just discuss such impact
from the secondary mortgage market whose explosive development has shattered the personal character of the
relationship between the lender and borrower.
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This locally-based home lending, engendering proximity between residential mortgage
borrowers and lenders, lasted until the late 1970’s294. Following the nationalization and
internationalization of the major industries, the real estate began its market integration since
then, the sale of home mortgage loans, through pooling and securitization, became
nationalized and later internationalized. Local mortgage loan origination followed by
immediate sale in the secondary mortgage market creates geographical distance between
borrowers and lenders295. Because the owners of the mortgage loans are no longer the local
institutional originators, the real owners are investors from the other communities, states, and
even foreign counties. Within 40 years’ time, the residential mortgage market has witnessed a
radical transformation from highly localized markets to a highly integrated national and
international market.
However, this geographical distance between the lenders and borrowers increased
substantially the risks. Firstly, the current lenders typically have no direct contact with and
thus no personal information about the borrowers. They only get a record prepared by a third
party, including the name, the social security number, job description which are considered to
indicate the will and ability to borrowers’ repayment of the mortgage loan. And they own no
individualized information about the borrowers. At the same time, the advance of information
technology makes the automatic underwriting popular in the loan origination, and the
mortgage industry are relying more heavily on automated systems for their underwriting and
decisioning functions. Applicant can enter their personal data on website. The software of the
automated underwriting will process the information, run financial checks and evaluate the
application according to criteria specified by lender. Automated underwriting (AU) speeds up
loan application process and assessment, as well as cuts origination fees in the hundreds.
However, this automated underwriting excludes the application of personal experience in the
evaluation process. Secondly, the current lenders typically own no direct information with
respect to the collateral. Because of the secondary market, the true owner of the mortgage
loans -- the public investors – do not own direct personal information about the quality of the
294 James Charles Smith, Economic regulation during turbulent times: The structure causes of mortgage fraud, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
295 James Charles Smith, Economic regulation during turbulent times: The structure causes of mortgage fraud, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
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collateral, the houses. Consequently, the true market value of the collateral is possibly inflated
to a gross extent.
2) Transactional distance
The traditional mortgage lending is characterized by the “transactional proximity”, which
means that the borrower and lender deal with each other directly with respect to the loan
transaction. Typically the two parties have face-to-face contact. The above-discussed
geographical proximity of the traditional mortgage market fits very well with the transactional
proximity. Because of the geographical proximity, the direct transactional contact is very
convenient. Since the perception and development of secondary mortgage market in the
1970’s, the transactional distance between the lenders and borrowers became the new norm
because of the intervention of third parties, including mortgage brokers, real estate appraisers,
servicers, rating agencies and so on. The mortgage loan originations in the past four decades
have been involved the above parties and the borrowers and lenders have less direct contact
for the reason of the intermediaries’ isolation and separation functions. For example,
brokerage began to be applied in the residential mortgage since the 1980’s and mortgage
brokers arranged for 45% of all U.S residential mortgage loans as of 2006296. With respect to
the closing of mortgage loan, the lenders who often directly participated in the loan closings
and approved all documentations are replaced by intermediaries, such as a title company or
attorney, to close the loan, following the loan instructions specified by the institutional
lenders.
3) Financial distance
Under the older mortgage loan practices, the mortgage lenders typically hold the loan until
maturity or the refinance of the loan. Both the lenders and borrowers have long-term
substantial interests in the mortgage loans: the realization of the lenders’ interest relied on the
borrowers’ performance of the loan in stallments, while the borrowers’ equity in the mortgage
property increased as the monthly payment of principles and interests.
Due to the securitization in the secondary market, the originating lenders retain less or no
stake in the loans they advanced. They sold their loans in the secondary market and get the
296 James Charles Smith, Economic regulation during turbulent times: The structure causes of mortgage fraud, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
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new capital by which fund the new mortgage loans. So the lenders have less incentive to care
about the borrowers’ quality and the value of houses as collateral, because they will bear no
loss if the borrowers went into default as a result of the true sale discussed above.
And this has resulted in the loosening criteria for loan grant: firstly, the requirement for the
documentation of the borrowers has been weakened. The documents collected provide
historical and current information about the income and assets of the borrower. The level of
documentation can be classified into full, limited or no documentation. Borrowers with full
documentation provide verification of income as well as assets297. Traditionally the borrowers
should provide full-documentation while the“No-documentation”will be rejected. The full
documentation market grew by 445% from 2001 to 2005, while the number of low
documentation loans grew by 972%. Secondly, the loan-to-value ratio has declined. For many
years, a 20 percent down payment was considered standard, and regarded as some evidence of
the borrowers' financial soundness. But at the height of the housing boom, these standards
were abandoned. Lenders were churning out mortgages that required little or no down
payment, knowing they could pass that increased risk to investors.
At the same time, the other third participants in the securitization also have no incentives to
take responsible measures to control the risk. For example, today in most developed mortgage
markets (especially in Canada, the U.S., the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Spain) mortgage
brokers are the largest sellers of mortgage products for lenders. The mortgage brokers,
servicers298, insurer and rating agencies299 just want to get more income from increasing
297 Benjamin J. Keys, Tanmoy Mukherjee, Amit Seru, Vikrant Vig, Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening?
Evidence From Subprime Loans, Working paper, P7, 2008.
298 The servicers are criticized to have prevented the Mortgage Modification during the past financial crisis in
U.S..
A criticism against securitization in the wake of the financial crisis is that it inhibits modification of the underlying
mortgage loans for troubled borrowers because of restrictions contained in agreements with loan servicers or
because alterations require consent from diffuse MBS holders. Under the servicing agreements, servicers render
services in the “best interests” of MBS holders, and it is sometimes forbidden to alter the terms of loans, or they
were imposed limits on the number of loans modifications for a given asset pool or for a given loan over its
lifetime, maximization of the net present value of cash flows the requirement of consent from outside parties such
as bond insurers, rating agencies, and credit enhancement providers before altering more than five percent of the
loans in a mortgage pool. See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is
Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING
POL’Y DEB. 279, 287-88, 2007.
At the same time, empirical studies reveal that, even in the face of enormous government pressure to adjust
mortgage terms for the benefit of homeowners, actual mortgage restructuring lags behind expectations, in part due
to the structural complications of securitization. See Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The
Failure of 2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 2008-2009, and Alan M.
White, Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage Modifications from 2007and 2008
Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 2009.
299 Because of the large number of mortgage loans in the pools backing residential mortgage securities, rating
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origination and the subsequent securitization of mortgage loans. So more origination and
securitization of mortgage loans means more profits for them and the impulse of pursuing
more profit encourages them to take irresponsible acts in the mortgage transaction.
In fact, securitization in the secondary mortgage market imposes also no incentives on the
investors for the risk control and no investor cares about the investment risk. Because so
many investors share interests in the mortgage-backed securities or mortgage pool, there
occurs a classic commons problem: the percentage of purchasers’ interest in the targeted
mortgage pool is so diluted that they have no incentive to take all necessary measures to
protect its property rights. As one commentator has said, a prime value of mortgage
securitization is that from the investor’s perspective, risk is diluted300. The risks can be
hedged through the distribution of them among many investors, so the impact of any one
borrower’s default could be ignorable. However, the dilution of the percentage of beneficial
interest in the pool of mortgage loans and consequently the hedge of investment risks also
reduces the incentives that the investors have with respect to controlling the performance of
all loans and, interventions to protect their interests if the loan becomes default. So the
decentralization of risk results in no lender or investor having a meaningful long-term interest
in a specific loan.
The financial distance among the mortgage participants, is now the defining feature of
modern mortgage transactions301. The disastrous consequence is that no participant conducts
responsible activities to control the risk in mortgage transactions, and even worse they abuse
their market power to pursue more profits.
agencies evaluate credit risk based on a statistical analysis of the cash flow generated by the pool, rather than the
market value of the collateral or the issuer's own unsecured rating. Indeed, many issuers found asset securitization
attractive because the credit rating that could be achieved for a security issued in a securitization transaction was
often higher than the rating for the long-term unsecured debt of the ultimate issuer or sponsor of the security. See
Joseph Shenker & Anthony Coletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 Tex. L.
Rev. P369, 1372, 1991.
300 James Charles Smith, Economic regulation during turbulent times: The structure causes of mortgage fraud, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
301 James Charles Smith, Economic regulation during turbulent times: The structure causes of mortgage fraud, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 473, 2010.
151
4.3 The credit risk control of MBS: Efficient legislation and
market self-regulation
One of the advantages of mortgage securitization is its risk alteration, shifting the credit risk
from the lender-originator to the MBS investors and the un-adjusting creditors of the
lender-originator. However, we should also acknowledge that the credit risk of the underlying
assets has not been eliminated or mitigated, and it still exist. At the same time, the
diversification of credit risk through securitization to a certain extent has also diversified the
effect of the debtors' default, as a result of the interaction of multiple factors, such as the
high-leverage operation, the loosened standard of underwriting and the wide use of financial
derivatives for risk aversion and speculation. The past experience since 2007 has confirmed
this statement, as the defaults in several states such as California and Florida have caused the
sub-prime crisis in U.S., and later was spread to the other economy bodies. So the
securitization owns the characteristic of both risk diversification and risk diffusion. For this
reason, it needs to develop some mechanisms for the credit risk control of the underlying
assets for securitization and also the systemic risk caused by its risk diffusion.
In fact, the securitizing industry has developed some internal mechanisms for the credit risk
control of the securitized mortgage loans, and they will be firstly discussed so as to get a
comprehensive understanding to the credit risk control in mortgage securitization. Later, the
discussion will focus on the specific rules established by the securitization-related legislation
so as to reveal how to eliminate or mitigate the systemic risk in securitization and thus lay a
robust foundation for the future healthy development of securitization.
4.3.1 The credit risk control under the originate-to-diversify mortgage
securitization
"Most securitization structures employ one or more forms of internal or external enhancement
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in order to reduce security holders' exposure to credit risk."302 Enhancement or support can
come from the reconstruction of the assets themselves or from an external source. The credit
within the structure employed to control the risk include the subordinate structure or tranches;
Over-collateralization of asset pools, and excess spread.
The most basic and the most natural form of credit enhancement for any pool is the level of
excess spread inherent in the transaction303. Excess spread is the difference between the
weighted average net interest rate on the receivables and the weighted average rate at which
interest accrues on the securities. The later is in fact the average funding cost of the
securitization transaction. The receivables are usually transferred at part to the SPV, while the
average funding costs are lower than the interest rate of the transferred loans, and thus the
excess spread is produced.
An important feature of securitization is that securities are usually subordinated or
“tranched”304. Recognizing that investors have varying time horizons and risk tolerances,
issuers of mortgage-backed securities have created debt instruments with multiple classes, or
"tranches," with varying maturities and payment streams that are vastly different from the
underlying mortgage pool305. For example, the MBS are usually divided into triple A, B and C
securities, while class C is the first-loss class which is the first class to suffer losses if the
losses exceed the excess spread. As a result of this pre-fixed tranches, the order of payment
to different groups of investors is thus pre-determined. The investors of senior tranches are
paid first, followed by those of the Mezzanine tranches, and the investors of junior tranches
are paid the last. The junior tranches are usually held by the originators and suffer the losses
from the default of mortgage debtors in the first place. And in this sense the junior tranches
are called “equity” of the originator in the SPV306. In order to compensate the higher risk of
the lower tranches, they are entitled a higher interest rate payment. So the “equity” tranches
302 Faten Sabry & Chudozie Okongwu, Study of the Impact of Securitization on Consumers, Investors, Financial
Institutions and the Capital Markets, NERA Econ. Consulting, Available at
http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF_NERA_Report.pdf.
303 Frank J.Fabozzi and Vinod Kothari, Securitization: The tool of financial transformation, Yale ICF Working
Paper No. 0707, P7, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=997079.
304 Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law: Principles and Policy, P403, Hart Publishing,
2011.
305 John W. Uhlein, Breakdown in the mortgage securitization: Multiple causes and suggestions for reform, 60
Syracuse L. Rev. 503, 2010.
306 In this sense, these junior tranches function like the legal capital of a limited company which can be used to
provide fund to pay creditors in event of insolvency. So when a company falls into insolvency, the shareholders
will be paid in the last, in case that there are some residual assets left.
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holders can be paid the highest interest rate. Besides, they are also entitled to collect and hold
any surplus after all the debt due on the securities has been paid307.
In some cases, the Over-collateralization is created to absorb the expected losses. For
example, the SPV issued 100 million MBS, while the assets pool backing the MBS is worth
110 million. The residual 10 million assets constitute over-collateralization. It has a similar
impact with that of the subordination.
However, the effect of credit risk control of these mechanisms has unfortunately been offset
by originate-to-diversify model of securitization. Prior to 1980, the vast majority of all home
mortgage loans were made by savings and loan associations, namely the theft. These
institutions originated, serviced and held mortgage loans in their portfolios, in what is widely
referred to as an originate-to-hold model. Then, as early as 1970, the model began to change
as single institutions no longer provided all three functions. Home mortgage loans were
increasingly securitized (i.e., put into pools and packaged into securities backed by the
individual loans) which is referred to as the originate-to-distribute model by the securitization.
In the traditional banking, the banks originated loans by attracting deposits from the
households, so a decline in deposit supply will reduce the loan supply. Securitization has
changed the model of banking and caused the "disintermediation" of banking. Loans become
more liquid because banks often securitize them, replacing deposits with bonds as a main
source of finance. The capital market provides a substitute source of funding to finance the
origination of mortgage loans in the primary market through securitization and at the same
time the credit risk of the banks is transferred to the capital market.
The subordination, over-collateralization and excess spread can only work for risk control
after the securitized assets were transferred to the SPV. They can not impose any influence on
the assets quality before the transfer. Although the financial crisis occurred in the market for
MBS, the problems derived from the primary market. These mechanisms can only work in the
secondary market and the MBS market, while they can not affect the primary mortgage
lending market and thus create serious problems of moral hazard which is widespread in the
307 The originators’ holding of “equity” tranches can help them avoid the characterization of the transaction as a
secured lending, because they bear no credit risk of mortgage loans, they just bear the risk from the
mortgage-backed securities of junior tranches. This arrangement in law is one of the techniques used to achieve the
“true sale” and “bankruptcy isolation”. See also Louise Gullifer and Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law:
Principles and Policy, P405, Hart Publishing, 2011.
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whole chain of mortgage securitization, and thus causes a systemic incentive problem in the
funding and loan management chains, incentives driving households’ repayment and default
decisions under the personal bankruptcy framework, and incentives for loan servicers and
investors to choose foreclosure over loan modification308. Regarding to the mortgage lending,
securitization does not offer the proper incentives for effective mortgage underwriting309.
Because the originators usually sold their loans directly through securitization or to
investment banks which are specialized in securitizing mortgage loans for the capital markets,
they lacked enough incentive to carefully screen the credit status of mortgage borrowers, but
did have an incentive to produce as many saleable loans for secondary markets as possible so
as to produce more profits. The originators screen the mortgage lending only to the extent
necessary to make mortgages marketable on the secondary market310. Moreover, the mortgage
purchasers in secondary market value more the “hard” underwriting than the individualized
“soft” information which often falls out of practice311. It further makes the situation worse
that the underwriting standard has been greatly loosened for the reason of the banks’ impulse
to advance more mortgage loans during the housing boom in U.S since 2000. Ameliorating
these incentive problems should be a central component of any post-crisis strategy to better
manage credit risk and set future financial sector growth on a stable footing.
The mortgage loan securitization fosters financial integration and investor diversification312.
Integration allows capital to flow between the credit markets and the capital markets,
dampening the consequences of shocks to local banks and other lenders. For example the
recent home price drop in the US spread rapidly across the financial system. Diversification
facilitates risk sharing and risk management, but at the same time it weakens the incentives
for investors to engage in proper due diligence and credit evaluation.
308 Jay Surti, Can Covered Bonds Resuscitate Residential Mortgage Finance in the United States? IMF Working
Paper, December 2010, P3.
309 For contrary view on moral hazard and securitization, see Future of Securitization, (arguing that other factors
contributed to atrophied underwriting standards such as excess liquidity and conflicts of interest within firms
responsible for underwriting).
310 Kurt Eggert, The Great Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 CONN. L. REV.
1257, P 1277, 2009.
311 Because of the technology improvement and the application of automatic underwriting, the originators were
reluctant to collect and prove soft information on the borrowers’ repayment capacity, relying exclusively on hard
information presented in the automatic underwriting system.
312 Elena Loutskina and Philip E. Strahan, Securitization and the declining impact of bank finance on loan supply:
evidence from mortgage originations, The Journal of Finance, Vol. LⅥⅤ, No. 2, April 2009, P 887
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4.3.2 Is the market self-regulation in MBS market possible?
As Prof. Malloy has stated, most modern markets of major significance, tend to be formal and
are the institutional product of human action. In particular, housing and mortgage markets are
formal institutional frameworks that rely on legal infrastructure to facilitate long distance and
impersonal exchange networks of trade and exchange313. When discussing the causes of the
financial crisis since 2007, the government deregulation was always cited as the most
important excuse. Many scholars maintained that the mortgage markets has lost their ability
of self-correcting, and made suggestions to develop volitional and purposeful regulation of
housing and mortgage markets314. Is this kind of assertion true or false? In my opinion, it is
not a simple choice among the theories of different economy schools, such as those from
Chicago school and the Keynesianism, it needs further examination with specific study on
certain markets and sectors.
4.3.2.1 A general discussion
In the first place, as a formal modern market, the creation of mortgage market could be
attributed as the result of the Government's institution-building, and this has been evidenced
by the inception of the Prussia mortgage banking and the U.S secondary mortgage market
since the Great Depression. So the creation of secondary mortgage market is the produt of
human design, not evolution. However, at the starting point, the governments had established
some rules for the risk control according to the then existing human experiences, which were
considered as prerequisites and inherent requirement for the survival and further development
of the market. If these rules were followed strictly by the market and the participants, the
market will regulate itself and keep long-term stability. The Germany Pfandbrief market is a
good example in this sense. For example, the loan-to-value ratio is usually at about 60%315.
313 Robin Paul Malloy，Flawed Economic Assumptions: Critical Perspectives: Mortgage Market Reform and the
Fallacy of Self-Correcting Markets,30 Pace L. Rev. 79, Fall, 2009, P82.
314 See Brooksley Born, Deregulation: AMajor Cause of the Financial Crisis, 5 Harv. L. & Pol'y Rev. 231,
Summer, 2011; Robin Paul Malloy，Flawed Economic Assumptions: Critical Perspectives: Mortgage Market
Reform and the Fallacy of Self-Correcting Markets,30 Pace L. Rev. 79, Fall, 2009.
315 See article 14 of Germany Pfandbrief Act 2005, "Mortgages may be used as cover only up to the first 60
percent of the value of the property (mortgage lending value) established by the Pfandbrief bank on the basis of a
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That is why there occurred no mortgage meltdown in the past two centuries in Germany. In
contrast, the securitization standard in the past 4 decades has been greatly loosened, and the
securitized mortgage loans were extended from conforming loans, to conventional loans, and
finally to non-conventional loans, including sub-prime ones. During the process of this
expansion, the financial risk could not burst immediately, but accumulated gradually. Since
the introduction of sub-prime mortgage securitization in the 1990's, the mortgage market
collapsed just within a decade. The foundamental reason is that the mortgage market in U.S
abandoned the self-regulation bending to the industry's profit-maximizing desire.
Here, we could find two distinct thinking model with respect to the market development.
The civil law systems follows a deductive thinking - "to making plans, to regulating things in
advance, ... to drawing up rules and systematizing them.316" The only potential risk is that
these rules do not reflect the true requirement of the mortgage market regarding to its healthy
and sustainable development. In contrast, the common law system follows the "Try Out
Method", whereby the market is encouraged to expand until the tolerance boundary. However,
this boundary is unknown or very difficult to predict in advance. In this sense, the unlimited
expansion of the market is very dangerous and the consequence will be disastrous. So the
statutory mortgage securitization is more appropriate for the market self-regulation.
With respect to the relationship between public regulation and the market self-regulation,
the experience of the Germany Pfandbrief show us a very interersting phneomena. The public
regulation mainly refers to the license to the credit institutions, the trasparency provisions and
the statutoty bankruptcy isolation. While the provisions about mortgage lending limit, asset
evaluation, risk management, and cover pool recording are implemented by the pfandbrief
banks. Although these provisions are imposed by the act and regulated by the Authority, they
are mainly undertaken by the pfandbrief banks for the benefits of themselves. Withouth thses
provisions, the mortgage market will fall into chaos as what has happened in the U.S
mortgage market as a result of the unlimited expansion.
With particular reference to the MBS market, once it has been created and developed, it
valuation in accordance with § 16".
316 Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law 70 (Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998) (1977),
cited from Mark J. Roe, Legal origins, politics and modern stock markets, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460, December,
2006, P470.
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shall follow its own rules of development, and the development of it, to a great extent, relies
on its capacity of self-regulation and self correcting under the legal regime based on which it
was initially created. The regulatory authority does not own the capacity to control each
individual transaction in the marketplace. The past sub-prime crisis demonstrated that the
development of the mortgage securitization has been out of the control of the federal
government as a result of the wrong police incentives granted by the federal government.
At the same time, once the market has been established, it must follow some
fundamental rules which are vital for the healthy development of the market and could not be
violated, otherwise the market will fall into turmoil and ultimately into financial meltdown.
Moreover, these rules should be respected by the federal government policies and regulatory
authorities. For the stability of the housing and mortgage market, these rules include
"avoiding secret mortgages so as to keep transparency; the equity of market participants
before law, particularly the bankruptcy law which is fatal for the mortgage securitization and
the financial contracts; the substance dominates form; the fiduciary duty of market
participants to the stakeholders in the market; ...". According our research in Chapter 3, we
find that the "race-to-bottom" legislation has undermined the legal regime which constitutes
the prerequisites for the healthy and continuous development and for the self-regulation of
mortgage securitization industry, and thus jeopardize the restoration or self-correcting
capacity of the mortgage market. At the same time, the provisions regarding to the cover pool
recording, mortgage lending limite and evaluation of property also contitute the fundamental
rules to be repsected by the market participants. These fundamental rules may be provided in
the form of public regulation, but they are of private self-regulation in their own nature.
So the public regulation is necessary, while the most fundamental way is to reform the
legislation referring to self-regulation of the housing and mortgage market and thus to keep
the risk under the market tolarance.
4.3.2.2 Why the market-self regulation in the U.S mortgage market failed?
As we have demonstrated in chapter 2, the housing and mortgage markets have been and
continue to be supported by the federal programs and other government interventions to
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achieve desirable economic efficiency and to implement the government's housing policy at
the same time. These efforts have indeed produced many positive results, including the
lowering cost of mortgage borrowing, the rise of homeownership, the reduction of risk and
enhanced liquidity for the primary mortgage market lenders, and increasing investment
opportunities for the investors. We must admit that the government created and developed the
secondary mortgage market, and still play an very important role in the modern housing
market and mortgage markets.
However, we should also notify that the majority of the MBS are not those issued by the
GSEs or Agency securities, rather the private-label mortgage securitization. The private-label
securitization has experienced a fast growth since the 1990's, and has dominated the
secondary mortgage market since the 2000. For example, the issuance of agency and GSEs
security in 1984 was $8.8 billion, and the issuance of MBS at the same year was $11 billion.
In 2007, the issuance of MBS had reached up to $2936.7 billion, while issuance of the agency
and GSEs security only had a volume of $380.9 billion317. So the direct involvement of the
federal government in MBS market is limited, especially in the flourishing period. In this
sense, the role of federal government in the MBS markets has been weakened.
More complicate is that the current housing finance system is composed by three
sub-markets: the primary mortgage lending market, the secondary mortgage market and the
market for MBS. These markets share different characteristics with respect to the credit risk
control and will respond differently to the government intervention.
Regarding to the primary mortgage market, the lender will advance the loan and hold it in
its portfolio until maturity under the traditional bilateral credit relationship between lenders
and borrowers. For the safety of the loan, the lender would carefully evaluate the riskiness of
the borrower and avoid potential losses as much as possible, otherwise the lender would bear
the losses. This credit control behavior in the microeconomic sense has a positive impact on
the financial stability in the macroeconomic sense. As the mortgage market develops in depth,
the creation and development of secondary mortgage market creates the opportunities for the
primary lenders to sell their mortgages in portfolio. The federal agencies, GSEs, private
317 See Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Annual Flows and Outstandings, 1984-2010. Available at:
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/data.htm.
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investment banks function as secondary mortgage market intermediaries. Their business
covers the purchase and sale of loans and loan participations, packaging loans into pools for
securitization, issuing MBS and selling them into the financial markets. The secondary
mortgage market not only creates a market for primary mortgages, but it also changes the
underlying relationships in the primary market318. Because the existence of the excess spread
between the price at which the mortgage loans were transferred and the funding costs, the
primary lenders are able to make money from fess for securitizing mortgages. In this new
situation, the primary lender (originator) can earn more income through generating more
mortgage loans, and logically the focus of the primary lenders shifted from serious evaluation
of the riskiness of the homebuyer to providing more mortgage loans for securitization in the
secondary mortgage market driven by a greedy desire for fee and servicing income. In order
to generate sufficient new mortgage loans, the primary lenders loosen its underwriting
standards and risk tolerance, and extend their lending to the non-conforming and sub-prime
loans in the past three decades. At the same time, the primary lenders require less or no
documentation, lower loan-to-value ratio and lower credit score. Many homebuyers who
would not qualify the traditional under the traditional conventional are eligible for the new
loans. As long as there was a market for the loans that they have originated, the primary
lenders will continue to supply these kind of mortgage loans. The desire to maximize the
profit of the primary lenders has greatly undermined the quality of securitized mortgage
loans.
With respect to the investors in the MBS market, the problems of them before the
sub-prime crisis is their excessive trust to the safety of MBS and the other financial products.
In fact, they have no firsthand knowledge regarding to the quality of the underlying assets and
the rules applicable to the underlying transactions. Their investing decisions just rely on the
uniformity of standardized mortgage documents, and the fact that the underlying assets have
been approved by the primary lenders and accepted by the purchasers on the secondary
mortgage market, including the federal agencies, GSEs, and the sophisticated companies. The
intervention of the federal government makes the investors believe that asset quality is good
318 Robin Paul Malloy, Flawed Economic Assumptions: Critical Perspectives: Mortgage Market Reform and the
Fallacy of Self-Correcting Markets,30 Pace L. Rev. 79, Fall, 2009, P97.
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enough to secure the future repayment of the MBS. They always assume that the MBS market
is independent from the underlying real estate transaction, and so they pay mor attention to
the security market, while they have little interest to look at the fundamentals of the
underlying primary mortgage market. To a certain extent, the financial crisis was, in many
respects, a product of too much such trust319.
There are two important reasons for the loosening underwriting standard in the primary
market, which could be observed from the sides of the federal government and the secondary
mortgage market itself. The first is the volitional policy of the federal government to raise the
homeownership rates making credit more accessible to low income families and all racial
categories. The GSEs are required to meet "affordable housing goals" set annually by the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and approved by Congress, and thus
they are encouraged to fund more risky loans in the primary market. This meant a systemic
increase in their exposure to sub-prime and Alt-A loans over the past decades. Secondly, from
the market side, the primary lenders are no longer responsible for the riskiness of the
underlying assets as a result of the originate-to-diversify model. The originator and MBS
issuers did not fulfill their ex ante fiduciary duty to the MBS investors, whereby the investors
could be protected by the common law judges. Thus, although common law fiduciary duties
can be central in protecting shareholders, and often are in the United States, they're not always
as strong as they can be cracked up to be320. This finding could be similarly applied to the
MBS holders in the U.S secondary mortgage market. The excessive trust of the MBS holder
was disappointed. So the government policy and the originate-to-diversify model together
have rotten the foundation for the self-regulation and self correcting capacity of the housing
and mortgage markets.
Based on the above analysis,The focus should the underlying real estate transaction in the
primary mortgage market, the quality and reliability of which is directly linked to the MBS in
the capital market. The problems occurred in the secondary mortgage market can be attributed
to the weakness in the primary mortgage market. So measures should be taken to improve the
319 Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-Regulation, 57 Buffalo L. Rev.
1361, December, 2009, P1364.
320 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition in
Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. P1435, 1441,1992.
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soundness of housing and mortgage markets. The fundamental reason for the mortgage
market meltdown is the originate-to-diversify model of securitization and the legislations
facilitating it. So the right remedy to cure the financial crisis and to avoid the potential future
crisis is to reform the legislation governing securitization restricting the side effects of
originate-to-diversify or substituting it with the originate-to-hold model, and lay down a
robust foundation for the market self-regulation321 and self-correcting, rather than to enhance
the government intervention in the name of public regulation322.
4.3.3 Efficient legislation and market self-regulation for mortgage
securitization: The promotion of statutory mortgage securitization
In this part, we will discuss the possibility of statutory covered bond system as a alternative
for the U.S structured mortgage securitization so as to eliminate or mitigate the incentive
problems in the originate-to-diversify model. To European investors, issuers and investment
bankers, covered bonds may seem like old news, such as Germany and Denmark323, but in the
North American capital markets, they are still of novelty. As we have shown in Chapter 2, the
first covered bond was issued in Prussia in the late 18th Century. In stark contrast, the first
covered bonds were not issued by a North-American issuer until late 2006 and early 2007,
when two US banks, first Washington Mutual and then Bank of America, implemented their
inaugural covered bond programmes. At the same time, the U.S legislators have began to
consider the possibility of introducing a legal framework for covered bond in the U.S. For
321 However, some scholars still maintain that the common-law world was, for a variety of reasons, more
hospitable than the civil-law world to private self-regulatory institutions. See John C. Coffee, The Rise of
Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1,
P9, 2001.
322 In fact, even the advocates of the government intervention and public regulation have not initiated good
suggestions for institutional change so as to cure the current financial crisis and to avoid the future crisis. For
example, Prof.Malloy is a firm advocate for the federal regulation, however, his suggestions for confronting the
crisis are the following: curbing housing market speculation, reducing the incentive to Over-borrow and
Over-lend,addressing an inverse Prisoner's Dilemma problem in the underlying real estate transaction. He
perceived the very reason of the crisis, namely the worsening situation in the primary mortgage market because of
the declining quality of the newly originated mortgage loans. However, the measures he initiated can not be
applied in the long term, and can not be considered to be able to introduce radical institutional change in the
mortgage market.
323 The Danish mortgage system was hailed by the International Monetary Fund in late 2006 as "highly rated" and
one of the "most sophisticated" mortgage systems in the world. See IMF, The Danish Mortgage Market - A
Comparative Analysis 3,2007, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr07123.pdf.
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example, on March 18, 2010, a bill titled by "United States Covered Bonds Act of 2010" had
been introduced to the US House of Representatives by Representative Scott Garrett of New
Jersey(the"Garrett Bill"324). The motive that encourages the U.S legislators to make reference
to the EU covered bond is its advantages in credit risk control and financial stability. For
example, in the over two hundred years since the inception of the mortgage bond market,
"there has never been an incidence of default on a Danish mortgage bond.325"
4.3.3.1 The covered bond and credit risk control
The advantage of the funding framework of covered bonds is that it combine the scale
advantages of capital market funding with on-balance sheet credit risk management by the
lender326. Under the OtH covered bond, the flexibility in risk allocation is kept while only the
credit risk is retained by the issuer-originator. Credit risk retention by the issuer/lender is an
integral component of this funding model, and thus the issuer-originators have stronger
incentives for maintaining high high quality of collateral, capacity, and credit assessment. so
long as the issuer is a going concern.
With respect to the risk allocation or diversification, the originate-to-hod (OtH) model
and originate-to-diversify (OtD) share different characteristics. Under OtD, nearly all risks are
shifted from the originator to the GSEs, insurance companies and investors, including the
credit risk. In the Agency or GSEs-backed securities, the Agency or the GSEs bear the credit
risk in exchange for the guarantee fee, while the interest rate risk in shifted to the MBS
investors. In the private-label MBS, the credit risk and interest rate risk are also shifted from
the originator to the MBS investors and other risk bearers. The issuer-originator bears no risk
any more under the OtD model. The efficient distribution of risk, to the investors who are
willing and able to absorb them, is an important attribute in favor of the OtD model.
Under the statutory framework of covered bond, various provisions are adopted so as to
encourage the issuer-originator to conservatively control the credit risk of the underlying
324 The text of this bill is available at: http://www.opencongress.org/bill/112-h940/show.
325 Jocelyn H. W. C. Chong, Danish Mortgage Regulations - Structure, Evolution, and Crisis Management, 9 Wash.
U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 371, P372, 2010.
326 Jay Surti, Can Covered Bonds Resuscitate Residential Mortgage Finance in the United States? IMF Working
Paper, P5, December 2010.
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mortgage loans. These measures are of importance for the health and financial stability of the
secondary mortgage market, but unfortunately they can not be found in the U.S. Mortgage
securitization theories and practices. In the following part, we discuss this advantage of
covered bond with reference to the German Pfandbriefe Act 2005.
In the first place, the issuer-originator of covered bond are usually eligible financial
institutions authorized by the supervisory authority which exercises oversight of licensed
institutions' management of covered bond programs and retains the right to withdraw the
license for failure to do so. Under article 2 (1) of the German Pfanbrief Act, a credit
institution which wishes to engage in Pfandbrief business shall require the written license of
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (supervisory authority) in accordance with§32
of the German Banking Act. At the same time, these credit institutions shall also comply the
requirements of the supervisory authority, covering capital, license suitable procedures and
instruments to manage, monitor and control risks for the cover pools and the issuing business
based thereon, and sustained business plan, and so on.
Secondly, the most important character of the covered bond is its originate-to-hold model,
under which the issuer-originator shall keep the pooled assets in its portfolio and retain the
credit risk of these assets. As a result, the originator has more stronger incentives to scrutinize
the borrowers' quality. At the same time, the bondholders have full recourse to the issuers for
the repayment of the bond debt. Moreover, the coverage principle is strictly followed so as to
assure that the aggregate volume of pfandbrief outstanding must be covered by the pooled
mortgage loans or public sector obligations. Under article 4 (1), the cover of the Pfandbriefe
outstanding must be ensured at all times according to the net present value, which shall
include interest and principal obligations; the net present value of the recorded cover assets
must exceed by 2 percent the net present value of the liabilities to be covered (excess cover).
The credit institution has the ongoing obligation to maintain sufficient assets in the cover pool
to satisfy the claims of covered bondholders throughout the tenor of the bonds, and it is
possible that the credit institution may therefore be required to add further assets to the cover
pool to compensate for matured or defaulted assets.
Thirdly, some other complementary measures are employed to strengthen the originators'
incentives to ensure the quality of the mortgage loans. For example, with respect to the
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valuation of the property, most of the EU covered bond statutes utilize the mortgage lending
value, rather the market value, as a valuation basis. The MLV reflects solely the long-term,
sustainable features of a property, meaning that short-term speculative aspects of the property
price are disregarded. It is a sustainable value which includes neither temporary price peaks at
the property market nor expected future increases in the value of the property327.
Consequently, the speculative activities are restricted and the influence of the housing bubble
is excluded.
Under these rules, the originators are imposed more duties and incentives to ensure the
quality of the underlying mortgage loans and thus the moral hazard is mitigated.
While provision of a stronger incentive to issuers-originators for prudent underwriting is a
primary benefit of the covered bonds model, it also has to bear some efficiency losses. For
example, the loan-to-value ration in Germany is usually under 80%, even to 60%, and this has
limited the flow of the market value of the real estate and thus engendered a efficiency loss
for the mortgagors. One should weigh the increase in funding cost entailed by covered bonds
against the salutary incentive impact of greater credit risk retention328 so as to realize an
equilibrium between funding efficiency and financial stability.
4.3.3.2 The efficient legislation and market self-regulation under the legal
framework of covered bond
As we have demonstrated above, the legal framework of covered bond has imposed many
restrictions to the originator so as to provide more incentives to control the credit risk from
the underlying mortgage loans. Basically, the role of mortgage in this financing mechanism is
preserved, and the secondary markets in the EU member states develop very well without the
burst of financial crisis for more than 2 centuries as we has pointed out in 4.3.3.1. How does
this legal framework to realize the balance between public regulation and market
self-regulation? Or is the market self-regulation still possible with the existence of so many
regulations from the law? If it is possible, how can this market self-regulation become
327 Dr.rer.pol.Stefan Kofner, The german pfandbrief system facing the financial crisis, P14, July 2009.
328 Jay Surti, Can Covered Bonds Resuscitate Residential Mortgage Finance in the United States? IMF Working
Paper, P8, December 2010.
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possible? Moreover, how does the equilibrium between investor protection (also the financial
stability) and funding efficiency has been achieved?
Firstly, with respect to the relationship between the public regulation and market
self-regulation, the legal framework of covered bond has established the criteria for the
market entrance of credit institutions, the coverage principle, the valuation of the property, the
status of the cover pool and the rights of the bond holders to it, and the statutory bankruptcy
isolation of the cover pool from the originators' creditors, and so on. These provisions are
necessary and vital for the inception and development of the secondary market for covered
bond in EU, and thus they are endogenous factors for the secondary market. It signifies that
the EU covered bond market would neither exist nor develop without these factors. As a
formal and human-made market, the secondary market shall establish some rules for its
participants to follow so as to maintain the market order and stability. In this sense, these rules
are inherently consistent with the market's need for healthy and continuous development. The
legislator has found these rules inherent in the market and put them together into a special
legislation in order to normalize the transactions in this market. Those transactions which are
not eligible to the standards will be prohibited to undertake in the market for the soundness of
the market. This constitutes the rationality of these rules. So the public regulation and market
self-regulation are harmonized and share no conflicts with each other. Except these rules, the
government imposes no other duties to perform, such as the promotion of homeownership.
Thus the secondary mortgage market does not suffer the unreasonable intervention from the
government.
Secondly, the covered bond is realized through the statutory cover pool and statutory
bankruptcy isolation329. The biggest advantage of this statutory approach is the legal certainty
of bond holders' rights to the cover pool and the issuer-originator. The statutory cover pool is
specifically separated or "ring-fenced" from the other estates of the originator and is utilized
to repay the bond holder. Through the analysis in chapter 3, we found that the U.S. mortgage
329 See article § 30 (1) provides the statutory bankruptcy separation: The assets entered in the cover registers
including the assets as defined in par. 3 as well as the minimum reserve maintained with the Deutsche Bundesbank,
inasmuch as it refers to Pfandbriefe, constitute assets which are separate from the Pfandbrief bank’s general assets
and which are not part of the insolvency estate in the event that insolvency proceedings are opened in respect of
the Pfandbrief bank’s assets (insolvency-free assets). The claims of the Pfandbrief creditors are not affected by the
opening of insolvency proceedings in respect of the Pfandbrief bank’s assets; the Pfandbrief creditors’ right
pursuant to par. 6 sent. 4 remain intact.
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securitization legislation has experienced a long evolutionary history until now which still
owns some legal uncertainty regarding to the rights of the MBS investors, especially in the
event of the originators' insolvency. The recent development demonstrates that the U.S.
Securitization are prone to adopt the EU statutory bankruptcy isolation approach. For example,
the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008330 expressly provides that any mortgages
or mortgage pools held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac in trust for the benefit of other persons
are not available to satisfy claims of creditors of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac, but will
continue to be held for the benefit of those third parties331. And this demonstrates that the
current federal law acknowledges the significant difference between (1) the GSEs' guaranteed
mortgage-backed securities and the loans underlying those securities and (2) the GSEs' direct
debt and the mortgage loan and mortgage-backed securities that the GSEs held in their
portfolios332. The rationality of this statutory bankruptcy lies in the fact that the covered bond
is based the credit of the underlying asset, not the credit of the originator, and the repayment
of the bonds are mainly dependent on the quality and value of these cover pools. The bond
holders shall be granted priority with respect to these underlying assets, that is to say, in the
event of the insolvency of the credit institution, the assets in the cover pool will be used to
repay the covered bondholders before they are made available for the benefit of the credit
institution's unsecured creditors.
Thirdly, the pool recording eliminates the secret lien problems under the U.S mortgage
securitization practices. As a result of the OtH model of covered bond, there is no need to
transfer the mortgage loans from the originator a subsidiary SPV, and consequently the
mortgage itself should not be transferred. This helps save the recording cost for the transfer of
mortgage and mortgage loans. So there no exists a market intermediatory institution such as
MERS, which has created serious problems of secret lien and thus imposed threat to the
potential market participants, in the EU covered bond market. For example, under article 5 (1)
of the German Pfandbrief Act, "the cover assets used to cover the Pfandbriefe as well as the
330 Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654 (amending scattered
sections of 5, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
331 See § 1145, 122 Stat. at 2746 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 4617(b)(19)(B)(i)) ("Any mortgage, pool of mortgages,
or interest in a pool of mortgages held in trust, custodial, or agency capacity by a regulated entity for the benefit of
any person other than the regulated entity shall not be available to satisfy the claims of creditors generally ... .").
332 Thomas E. Plank, Regulation and reform of the mortgage market and the nature of mortgage loans: Lessons
from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 779, Spring, 2009,P802.
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claims under derivative transactions shall be recorded by the Pfandbrief bank individually in
the register (cover register) maintained for the respective Pfandbrief type." The cover register
must contain precise details regarding the scope of the part to serve as cover and its rank in
relation to the part not serving as cover; in case of doubt, the part to serve as cover shall have
priority333. Moreover, a transcript about the changes of cover pool register should shall be
submitted to the supervisory authority. The purpose of the registration and checking
procedures (cover audits, cover pool monitors) is to formally secure that the cover assets are
in existence and of value. This is essential for satisfying the Pfandbrief creditors' claims in the
event of an issuer insolvency334. Through eliminating the secret lien, the bond holders are
better protected by the law.
Conclusion
Mortgage securitization has radically changed the role of mortgage in credit risk control,
and the incentive problems caused by mortgage securitization has greatly weakened the role
of mortgage for the credit risk control. However, the mortgage law in common law system did
not give appropriate responses so as to mitigate these side effects caused by mortgage
securitization. The consequence is the deteriorating underwriting standard of the primary
mortgage lender and the worsening quality of mortgage loans. The unreasonable federal
government intervention in the secondary mortgage market made the situation worse. During
the evolutionary development in the past 80 years since the Great Depression, the U.S.
mortgage industry did not develop a set of rules to control the credit risk of the mortgage
loans. In stark contrast, the EU covered bond legal framework put all the rules necessary for
the credit risk control into a special legislation, such as the Pfandbrief Act in Germany, which
eliminates the legal uncertainty of covered bond and has always been applied to ensure the
quality of the underlying mortgage loans. This statutory approach of mortgage securitization
has realized the equilibrium between funding efficiency and financial stability, and thus
should be considered as a possible policy alternative to cure the financial crisis and keep the
333 See German Pfandbrief Act, Art. 5 (1a).
334 Dr.rer.pol.Stefan Kofner, The german pfandbrief system facing the financial crisis, P13, July 2009.
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future financial stability.
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Ⅴ Developing mortgage securitization in china
The rapid economic development and the consequent urbanization in China have engendered
the great demand for affordable housing, especially in the past decades. Now the housing has
became the hottest topic in China society, accompanied by the social security system,
education and so on. However, because of the increasing housing price, it is out of the
affordability of most of the low-and medium income families, whose income are mainly from
their salary, especially those in the bigger cities. At the same time, the inequity among the
home purchasers caused by the identity, working units335 worsens the situation, as we have
read in the story at the beginning of this dissertation. So how to provide affordable housing
for the new city immigrants will be a great challenge for the China government, both central
and local.
After the long discussion about the MBS in U.S and Europe, we now turn to the topic on
how to develop mortgage securitization in China as a possible alternative to provide more
financial assistance to the lown-and medium income family and to help them realize the
homeownership dream in China. This chapter will be organized as following: 5.1 will firstly
review the development of the housing market and the existing problems since 1988; 5.2 will
discuss how China shall develop its secondary mortgage market, the U.S approach, the EU
approach or one approach combining the advantages of the U.S and EU approach, and at the
same time the current legal framework for securitization will also be studies taking into
account of the economical and legal environment of China; 5.3 will analyze how to construct
the future legal framework for mortgage securitization, so as to maintain the financial stability
and to avoid the same crisis as occurred in U.S in the future.
335 Here, the working units mean the employer for which the people work, for example a state-owned enterprise, a
government department, public university or other private companies. Usually the public entities are granted many
privileges in the housing distribution and supply in the aspect of land supply, credit, tax and so on. The employees
working in these public entities thus have more opportunities to get affordable house than those in the private
sectors. This constitutes a great discrimination to the private sectors and their employees.
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5.1 The real estate market and the housing finance system
of china
The real estate market is a relatively new emerging sector with a history of about 20 years.
About 20 years ago, it was impossible to hear the public discussion about housing purchase
and the rising home price in China. However, the housing purchase has attracted most of the
attention from the governments and society. Why this transition has happened?
5.1.1 The commercialization of housing since 1978
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the housing supply and
distribution was greatly influenced by the planed economy under which the housing was built
and distributed by the order of the central government. At the beginning of PRC, the
government imposed the confiscation of land in the urban areas, and dominated the supply of
land for the housing construction. The construction of the housings were supported by the
government's financial income and the state-owned enterprises' accumulation, while the
private investments in this sector is discouraged by the existing political environment at that
moment. The houses were not considered as a commodity tradable on the marketplace, rather
a welfare in kind to its citizens. So they were distributed to the citizens in kind without no
payment for the building costs or they were leased to the families with a very low rent which
were not sufficient to cover the maintenance costs. The slow economic development as a
result of the wrong economic and political policies made it impossible to invest enough in
housing construction. During the period from 1950 to 1978, the China government only
invested about 374 China Yuan for housing construction336. So the housing supply was always
in shortage before the reform and opening up since 1978. It is believed that the housing
situation at 1978 became worse than that of 1950337.
In order to mitigate the shortage of housing supply, the former China leader, Dengxiaoping,
336 See China Statistical Yearbook, 1985.
337 Zhang Qun, The reform of housing system in the past 30 years: A review from the point of view of legal history,
Studies in law and business, Vol.1, 2009, P70.
171
made an important speech in 1980. In this speech, Deng admitted that the housing is also a
commodity, and China should develop the construction industry, encourage the private to
construct or purchase private housing, raise the rent of public housing, and give housing
subsidiary to workers. These ideas were followed by the subsequent housing system reform in
the 1980's and 1990's. Later the laws were employed to protect the private property over
housing, and the《General principles on civil law》was promulgated so as to provide more
incentives for the development of private housing. In 1988, the Constitution Law was
amended under which the government began to grant land-use rights to private owners and
the land-use rights was permitted to flow freely in the market for the first time. These laws
together created the legal framework for the development of private housing industry and help
mitigate the shortage of housing supply by stimulate the investment in housing construction.
During the period of 1979 and 1990, about 280 billions China yuan were invested for housing
construction through the diversified source of funding from governments, enterprises and
individual families. Meanwhile, within a few years after the 1988 amendment of constitution
law, the real estate development industry thrived. However, most of the housing is still
distributed in kind and the governments beard great financial burden.
The radical reform of the housing system is the 1998's decision of the State Council of
China, under which the housing was acknowledged as a commodity by the government's
document. It required to stop distributing housing in kind and to monetize the distribution of
housing. It is designed that the residential housing industry will be a new powerful engine for
the economic development. It particularly required to develop the housing finance system.
Since then, most of the housing are supplied by the real estate market, no longer by the
government and state-owned enterprises in kind. In order to assure the housing purchase by
the low-and medium income families, the China government also started the construction of
affordable housing, which were provided at a lower price relative to those commercial
housing
338. However, the construction of affordable housing was seriously stagnated because
of the incentive problems of the local governments, and thus there existed a great
338 The distinction of the economic housing and commercial housing lies mainly in the fact that the former enjoys
government favorable policies in the aspects of land supply, credit support and tax break, while the later is
operated totally in a market way, without any government subsidiary or favorable policies. Logically the price of
the later is higher than that of the former.
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disequilibrium between the shortage of supply and robust demand. The development of
residential housing in the past decade has produced the following problems: quality problem;
the corruption in the distribution of the economic housing339, and the rising home price.
Among these problems, the rapidly rising home price has been paid the most social
attention. For example, the average housing price in Beijing is less than 10,000 RBM per
square meter before 2005, while the current average price has been above 25,000 RMB per
square meter340. According to the Statistic Gazzette of China in 2010, the increasing rate of
the newly-built housing reached up to 17.3% in March, 2010. So the housing price has been
out of the affordability for most of the families, especially the young generations who just
start their career, and the real estate market becomes overheated. So how to curb the rising
home price and make it affordable for the majority of families is a great challenge for the
central government and local governments. The central government has taken many measures
to control the real estate market and curb the skyrocketing housing prices. However, it seems
that the government's efforts did not work because the home price in 2009 and 2010
continued to rise, even though the financial crisis had influenced the economy body of China.
Why this happened?
5.1.2 The puzzle for the rising home price
Since 2000, the domestic economy of China has been facing many challenges, one of which is
the rising home price. There are several possible reasons for the skyrocketing housing prices.
Firstly,the “land finance” of the governments, especially those local governments, is one
339 In this aspect, the distribution of the economic housing is decided by the governments or the state-owned
enterprises, and the limited number of economic housings are usually allocated to the government officers and
state-owned enterprises' employees which have a higher family income. The families needy of affordable housing
are usually not qualified to purchase the economic housing. At the same time, the economic housing is provided by
the law and government regulations that it should be less than 70 square meters. However the economic housing is
usually build more than 90 square meters so as to satisfy these higher income families with privileges.
340 It seems impossible to find a correct statistics about the housing prices in china, especially those in the bigger
cities, such as Beijing, shanghai. The governments’ statistics is not credible because the statistics released by
different departments are in conflict with each other; there are also some specialized real estate database offered by
independent research institutions, it is also doubtful that the housing prices offered by them are not very correct
because their data are also in conflict with the data published by the governments. For example, the average
housing price in the past 2010, released by the Beijing Real Estate Transaction Monitoring
(http://www.bjfdc.gov.cn/public/Index.asp ) , is 14847 RMB per square meter, and the average housing price
during January and July of 2011 is 13623 RMB per square, with a 8.2% reduction. However, the average price
released by a specialized real estate research institution is more than 17, 000 RMB per square meter.
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important propellent for the rising home price. According to the 12th “Five-year developing
plan”, the urbanization rate will arise from 47.5% to 51.5%. And there will be more new
migrants in the cities and this means a continuing robust demand for housing in the future
years. The supply of land is the prerequisite for the supply of housing and thus the sale of
land-use rights becomes an important source of funding for the local governments in parellel
with the normal financial income, and the governments’ income is increasingly dependent on
the transfer of land-use rights. In 2010, the income from the sale of state-owned land- use
right has increased about 106.2%, reaching about RMB 2.94 trillion, amounting to 32.7% of
the government’s total income341. The secretary of the ministry of treasury, Xie Xuren,
analyzed the three possible reasons for the high increase of the sale of state-owned land-use
right: the strong demand of land because of the rapid urbanization and industrialization; an
increasing percentage of lands are transferred by auction—— in 2010 about 60% of the lands
are sold by auction, and the consequent income is 2.6 trillion, amounting to 80% of the total
land income342; the rising price of the land. It is notable that about 2/3 of the land-sale income
is from the eastern part of china, covering 8 or 9 provinces and metropolitan cities. As
illustrated by the following table, we will find that the local finance became increasingly
dependent on the land transfer income343. In the following two graphics, we will observe the
importance of the income from the transfer of land-use rights. We can find that the income
from the transfer of land-use rights becomes increasingly important for the Chinese central
government and local government.
Graphic 3 The amount of land transfer income, financial income of central government and
local governments
341 See the government’s total income in 2010 is 8.972trillion China Yuan, of which 7.739 trillion is from the tax,
and 2.94 from the sale of the land-use right. http://blog.qq.com/qzone/549001870/1299510410.htm?pgv_ref=aio, .
In the government working report, Wen Jiabao said the government income is 8.31 trillion China Yuan.
342 See the interview with the secretary of the ministry of treasury of china, available at:
http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20110307/15439484980.shtml, visiting date: 2011-3-8.
343 Here it is necessary to give a precise definition of land transfer income. Land transfer income is not the fee for
the transfer of land-use rights. The land transfer fees is not calculated into the local governments’financial income
and they are administered and used in separate account. So this comparison does not mean that the the land
transfer income is included in the local governments' budget.
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Source: China statistic yearbook of territorial resources; Statistic gazette of territorial
resources; Local governmental fund income, 2010, Ministry of Treasury;
Graphic 4 The percentage of land transfer income relative to the financial income of central
government and local governments
Source: China statistic yearbook of territorial resources; Statistic gazette of territorial
resources; Local governmental fund income, 2010, Ministry of Treasury;
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Secondly, the speculative activities in the real estate market. As a result of the rising home
price, it is profitable to invest in real estate speculation. Many people, even those who do not
own the financial ability, sought to invest in residential housing. At the same time, the
commercial banks are also willing to extend credit to those investors because of the rising
home price. Even if the borrower can not repay the loan, the rising market value of the
mortgaged house can offset the potential loss of loan. Another important reason for the
overheated real estate market is the deteriorating macroeconomic environment which caused
the bankruptcy of manufacturing enterprises, especially those of small and medium
enterprises in east China. Because of the lack of investment opportunities, these private
capitals, together with foreign capitals344 poured into the real estate market. And this further
raises the home price.
Thirdly, the recent financial policies adopted by the central government against the
financial crisis. In order to confront with the shock from the financial crisis, the Chinese
government adopted “proactive fiscal policy and a "moderately easy monetary policy" to
enhance the liquidity in the market. In 2008, a short period after the U.S administration’s 700
billions of dollars plan to save the financial market, the China government proclaimed its
economic recovery plan of RMB 4 trillions investment for the construction of railway,
highway and other infrastructures, of which 1.18 trillion RMB were invested by the central
government345. At the same time, 9.59 trillion RMB new loans were made in 2009 in response
to the financial crisis. We can get some insights from the increase of the M2 as demonstrated
below.
Graphic 5 The M1, M2 and GDP of China
344 The foreign speculators expect that the exchange rate of china Yuan will rise relative to the main currencies of
the world. Thus many “hot money” enter into china.
345 China government working report, see http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2011-03-05/112022058004.shtml visiting
date:2011-3-8.
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Source: The People’s Bank of China, National Bureau of Statistics of China (Billions of
RMB)
As demonstrated by this graphic, the M2 has surpassed the GDP since 1995, and most of
the increasing rates in these years are above 15% per year. So many currencies poured into the
domestic market, the consequence is inflation of the economy body. That is why in the past 4
years, China has been struggling with the rising price of everything, from the consuming
products to production materials. The CPI of 2011 just published is about 5.4%. Of these new
funds, a certain percentage of them were invested into the real estate market in the form of
mortgage loan, and undoubtedly raised the home price.
At the same time, the central government of china has realized the severity of the excess
liquidity in the economic system. Entering into 2011, the central government takes many
measures to resolve the inflation and draw back the money from the market, by raising the
rate of deposit reserve, issuing note to the commercial banks, controlling the amount of loans,
etc. For example, the rate of deposit reserve has raised up to 20% in March 18, 2011.
According to Fan Gang, 30% of the currencies has been locked and can not flow into the
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market in March 20, 2011346. Except the tightening monetary policy, the government also
enact strict polices in credit, land supply and so on. The most rigorous measure is to restrict
the purchase of second house of the high-income families with administrative measures so as
curb the speculative activities in the real estate market. These efforts of the government is to
keep the home price at an acceptable level.
5.1.3 The affordable housing in china
In fact, the housing policy has experienced a transition since 2010. Except the government's
efforts to curb the skyrocket home price, the government also began to construct affordable
housing for the low- and medium income families.
Under this context, the central government and local governments began to intervene into
the real estate market. First, they want to control the housing price through various measures,
such as land-supply, credit-supply, tax and so on. However, these measures proved to fail for
the housing price continued to rise. Since 2010, the governments began to intervene into the
housing markets in a more direct way, building low-cost houses for the citizens, especially the
low-and medium-income family.
In order to increase the supply of housing, the central government of china decided to build
36 millions apartments for the low and medium-income families in the 12th five-year program
and the affording housing shall at least account for 20% in the total housing supply in this
five-year period. This percentage is a bounding indicator for the central and local
governments. According to this ambitious housing building plan, the government has begun
to construct 5.9 million units of new apartments in the past 2010 and 3.7 million units have
been finish. In 2011, the number is increased up to 10 millions units347. According to the
statements of the Ministry of Treasury, these 10 million new apartments need about 1.3 billion
RMB, and the central government provides 16.88 million RMB while the local governments
346 See http://finance.qq.com/a/20110320/000461.htm?pgv_ref=aio, visiting date 2011-3-20.
347 It is notable that the expression of the target for affordable housing construction has been changed. At first, it
was designed that 10 million apartments will be finished in 2011, while it later changed to start the construction of
10 million apartments. The change of the wording demonstrated the government's unwillingness to bear excessive
burden for the affordable housing construction.
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provide 21 million RMB. And the residual should be financed by the involved enterprises,
individuals and social capital348. In contrast, according to Prof. Daokui Li349, only the 10
millions affordable housings built in 2011 would cost at least 1400 billion RMB which
constitutes a great burden to the budget of central government and various local governments.
Now the funds for the construction of new affordable apartments are mainly from the issuance
of treasury bonds. It is, however, not a sustainable source of funding because the incomes of
government in the future would possibly decrease or stagnate with slowdown of economic
development. Furthermore, the rising debt level of the government would have to potential to
cause a debt crisis like what has happened in Europe. And this has triggered the anxiety of the
government decision-makers and scholars.
Here we do not care about the good will of the China government, we just discuss its
economic feasibility and economic conveniences. The greatest challenge for this ambitious
house-building plan is how the government can get sufficient funds to finance the
construction and how can they pay these debts in the future. For the reason of lack of fund,
the ambitious plan has not been very well implemented, especially in the poor cities. It is
expected that 700 million RMB at most has been invested to fund the housing building in
2011350.
According to my observation of the U.S and the German housing financing system, the
governments shared a very conservative attitude for their involvment in the real estate market,
especially the supply of affordable housing . They usually tried not to be directly responsible
for the construction of apartments for the families in great volume, and they always left it to
the market through special programs and mechanisms. Even if the U.S federal government
has created some agency programs and the GSEs to support the family to purchase house,
they also try to be involved at a lowest cost, namely indirect and implicit guarantee through
the agency and GSEs. The majority of the funds for the housing supply are provided by the
secondary mortgage market through the issuance of MBS.
Although the government has adopted many measure to control the rise of the home price
in the past years, we have observed that the home price is still kept at a very high level out of
348 http://www.soufun.com/news/2011-08-07/5598791.htm, visting date: 2011-09-02.
349 Prof. Li is also the member of the monetary policy committee of the China People’s Bank.
350 http://sh.house.sina.com.cn/news/2011-11-06/0855134511.shtml, visiting date 2011-11-6
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the affordability of most families, especially in the bigger cities, such as Beijing and Shanghai.
However, the high price of the housing in china has a multiple factors, such as the unfair
land-use right transfer system, the urban-rural gaps, and the deteriorating environment for the
small- and medium enterprises. According to my observation, the most important reason is
that China does not own a well developed housing finance system, through which the low-and
medium- income families can get financial support. Meanwhile, there are in fact some
residual capital that are seeking good investment opportunities and diversify their investment
risks. However, the strengthening control of the state-owned economy has squeezed the space
of private enterprises and capitals which are facing a deteriorating macroeconomic
environment. These capitals have no good investment conduits, and they have to pour into the
real estate market, the stock market and so on. The price level in these market no doubt surges.
This is a great dilemma for both the government and the private capital, namely the families
needy of new houses can not get credit from the commercial banks because of the
government's tightening policy, while the private capital can not find good investing
opportunity. This structure paradox can be eliminated through the development of mortgage
securitization which will function as a conduit for the capital flow from the capital holders
anxious of investing opportunities to the families needy of credit support for the home
purchase.
So china should study how to use the secondary mortgage market to fund its affordable
housing construction, rather than directly fund housing through their financial incomes or
government bonds. The mortgage securitization will be good policy choice for the
decision-makers.
5.2 The mortgage securitization in china
In fact, the securitization practices have been initiated as early as 2005. Some regulations
have been enacted so as to lay a legal foundation and institutionalize it in the law. However,
the development of securitization in China is not smooth, and at certain moment fell into
stagnation. In this part, we will retrospect the development of securitization in the past 7 years,
review the primary legal framework of securitization, and discuss the potential institutional
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problems that have blocked the development of securitization.
5.2.1 The development of securitization in China
Securitization is comparatively a new financial transaction introduced recently into China. Its
introduction and development adopted the "pilot experiment" approach which has always
been employed to introduce new institutions or technologies since reform and opening up.
Different from the market-oriented securitization in U.S.and Europe, the introduction and
development are usually promoted by the government, especially the China People's Bank.
This has been well explained by the securitization practices in the past 7 years as we will
demonstrate in the following.
The securitization in China primarily focus on the securitization of financial assets from the
state-owned commercial banks, including mortgage loans, consumer loans and so on. Some
account receivables from the state-owned enterprises could also be securitized. Specifically
speaking, there are two approaches of conducting a securitization transaction under the
existing legal framework in China, namely (1) Credit assets securitizations using trusts as
special purpose vehicles (SPVs) (special purpose trusts (SPTs)), which are regulated by the
People's Bank of China (PBOC) and the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC);
(2)Corporate asset securitization using customer asset management plans as SPV, which are
regulated by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).
Regarding to the corporate asset securitization, the decision-makers has began to study it
and started the first pilot program in 2005. In August 2005, China Unicom initiated the first
corporate assets securitization transaction, issuing CNY9.36 billion ABS, under the collective
asset management plan (CAMP) model. The CAMP model was employed in the subsequent
eight securitization transactions on the market. These securitization transactions covered
various sectors, such as telecommunication, infrastructure, transport and financial leases351.
As the end of 2009, the securitization of corporate assets had issued RMB 26.6 billion ABS,
351 It is notable that these infrastructure are usually operated by the state-owned enterprises, which are usually
enjoy the central government's implicit guaranty, get a high credit rating and are thus more acceptable by the
undeveloped secondary market in China.
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and three ABS has been successfully liquidated as designed, and the security holders have
been repaid the principle and interests.
With particular reference to the credit assets securitization, it covers the securitization of
residential mortgage loans, commercial mortgage loans, car loans, consumer loans and so on.
For the purpose of this dissertation, we concentrate on the securitization of residential
mortgage loans. The first residential mortgage-backed security is the " 05 JianYuan 1" issued
in 2005 by the China Construction Bank, with an outstanding amount of RMB 3 billion,
which is the biggest residential mortgage originator and has conducted most of the residential
mortgage securitization transactions. In 2007, it issued another RMBS " 07 JianYuan 1", with
an outstanding amount of RMB 4.16 billion352. Until now, these are only these two RMBS
transactions353.
Since the subprime crisis burst in 2007, the mortgage securitization has fell into stagnation
as a result of the decision-makers anxiety of financial risk. In the past four years, there was no
new issuance of MBS. However, the discussion regarding to the further development of
mortgage securitization has never been stopped, and there are some advocates promoting the
faster development of mortgage securitization, especially some decision-makers in the central
banks of China and banking regulatory authorities. For example, the vice president of China
people’s bank, Shiyu Liu, stated that the development of securitization should be fastened,
and should not be limited to pilot experiments in selected areas and gradual enlargement. In
this opinion, the securitization of credit assets can improve the capital adequacy ratio,
transform the indirect loan into direct financing in the capital market, and thus re-adjust the
ratio between the direct financing and indirect financing354. Meanwhile, the Chinese banking
system is eager to get new source of funding, resolve the mismatch between long-term assets
and short-term liability and realize an equilibrium in their balance.
352 See the introduction of MBS business by the China Construction Bank, available at:
http://www.ccb.com/cn/corporate/investment/securities.html, visiting date: 2009.10.03.
353 See the statistic about the issuance of MBS and ABS, available at: http://bond.jrj.com.cn/data/zczqh.shtml,
visiting date: 2011.05.06.
354 See http://finance.qq.com/a/20110429/001125.htm
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5.2.2 The legal framework for mortgage securitization in China
Since the introduction of Mortgage Securitization in 2005, the decision-makers have enacted
several regulations and other documents to encourage it development and enlargement. These
regulations and documents cover the the main questions referring to securitization, including:
the regulatory authority, transfer of receivables, security issuance, accounting rules, capital
adequacy, tax, and so on, and thus constitute a comprehensive legal regime within which the
securitizations are carried out. Generally speaking, the China securitization theory and
practices are greatly influenced by its U.S. Counterpart, because it adopts the "true sale"
principle, the special purpose trust, the accounting rules and so on.
Firstly, the PRC Trust Law, enacted in 2001, is the fundamental legislation governing credit
asset securitizations. Under the current legal regime, trust is the unique legal entity form
which is employed to receive and manage the transferred mortgage loans. The special purpose
vehicle is constructed under the provisions of "Trust law", namely the special purpose trust
(SPT). Under article 15 and 16, the assets transferred to the trust are considered to be
independent from both the trustors' and trustee's own properties. The trust could be terminated
under certain conditions.
Secondly, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) and the China Banking Regulatory
Commission (CBRC) enacted the "Administrative Measures for Pilot Credit Asset
Securitization Projects" enacted on 20 April 2005. Mortgage loan is categorized as one of the
most important credit assets and mortgage securitization thus falls into the jurisdiction of this
regulation. This is the first comprehensive regulation governing the credit asset securitization,
including the independent status of the trust estate, special purpose trust, the issuance and
trading of the credit asset-backed securities. The CBRC and the PBOC are the joint regulator
of credit asset securitization, and are responsible for different aspects of the securitization
process:The CBRC is concerned with monitoring financial institutions; while the PBOC
regulates the issuance and trading on the inter-bank bond market because the securities will be
traded at the inter-bank bond market. In order to realize the "true sale" and "risk shift", the
trust is provided as the legal form to receive the transferred assets. Meanwhile, under article 6
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of this regulation, the trust estate is independent from that of the originator, trustor, servicer,
and the other intermediatory agencies involved in the securitization transactions. The trustor
bears responsibility to repay the security to the extent of the amount of the trust estate. This
"True Sale" principle is confirmed by a later "Notice on normalization of the transfer of credit
assets of financial institutions" issued on 3 December, 2010, which requires the financial
institutions to realize the radical transfer of the credit assets and the risk. At the same time, it
also imposes the obligation of due investigation to he transferee, including the credit history
of the borrowers, the situation of business operation, the legality of the credit assets and so on.
The imposition of this duty aims to assure the quality of the transferred assets.
Thirdly, the People's Bank Of China enacted one important regulation, "Management rules
on recording about the pledge on account receivables" in 2007 after the enactment of the
"Real Property Law". Under this regulation, the credit reference center of the PBOC is
responsible for the public filing of the security interests over account receivables. The loans
advanced by the commercial banks are categorized as one type of "account receivable" under
article 4 of this regulation. Logically, the mortgage loans fall into the jurisdiction of this
regulation. Once recorded in this public filing system, the creditors will be granted priority
over the subsequent creditors with respect to the account receivables. However, this
regulation has potential conflicts with the provisions regarding to the conveyance of
obligations in the contract law, under which the transfer of contractual obligation only needs
the notification to the debtor. This is because that it is very hard to distinguish the conveyance
of account receivables and the pledge over account receivables as a result of their intangibility.
There exists the possibility of fraudulent transfer of account receivables, for example, one
creditor first conveys its credit to B with a certain price, then he is also able to get credit from
the banks using this account receivable as collateral through filing a public recording. In this
situation, the rules on the conveyance of account receivables are undermined by the account
receivable pledge. So the true sale in China does not exist or is unsafe for the MBS investors.
Fourth,with particular reference to the transfer of the mortgage loans, the former Ministry
of Construction issued a "Notice on the change of recording of mortgage transfer in
residential mortgage securitization" on 16 May, 2005, which provides in detail the change of
recording of mortgage transfer. Because the Chinese contract law and mortgage law strictly
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stick to accessoriness principle, the transfer of underlying loan is automatically followed by
the transfer of mortgage or other forms of security interests. Under article 50 of the "Guaranty
law"(1995) and article 192 of the Real Property Law of PRC(2007), the mortgage can not be
transferred without the transfer of the underlying obligation or be transferred alone to secure
the other obligation. When the underlying obligation is transferred, the mortgage securing the
obligation should also be transferred. For this purpose, the 2005 Notice provides that the real
estate registry can make a batch recording of mortgages transfer for the transfer of a group of
mortgage loans to the Special Purpose Trust in the mortgage securitization. Particularly, this
Notice specify the period within which the batch recording shall be completed, usually within
5 days for less than 200 individual mortgages, and within 15 days for the transfer of more
than 200 individual mortgages. This batch recording is similar to the recording of mortgage
pool in the German Pfandbriefe act.
These laws and regulations mentioned above, together with the other documents issued
from 2005 to 2011, create the legal regime for the development of mortgage securitization.
However, there still exist some problems in this legal regime. Firstly, there is lack of one
comprehensive legislation that can institutionalize the mortgage securitization, and thus the
legal foundation for mortgage securitization is shaky or uncertain. Although the "Trust Law"
is a legislation governing the creation and legal status of the special purpose trust, it does not
take into consideration of the characteristics of securitization because it was enacted in 2001
when the securitization had not been introduced into China. Consequently, the "True sale" and
the "Bankruptcy isolation" sought by these regulations have not been acknowledged by the
legislations. As we have analyzed above, the Chinese scholars have not yet studied the
distinction between "true sale" and "sale intended as security" in detail, and the conflict
between "sale" and "lien" has not very well resolved. The potential threaten from the pledge
over account receivables is fatal for the safety of the MBS investors. At the same time, the
relationship between mortgage securitization and bankruptcy law has not yet well studied.
Secondly, the true sale and risk diffusion are particular emphasized by the regulations and
government documents. However, according to what we have found in the EU and U.S.
Practices, it is impossible to realize it. Meanwhile the true sale and risk diffusion are apt to
cause moral hazards, because the commercial banks transferring the receivables and the
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relating risks have no longer any incentive to control the credit risk of these receivables, even
if the regulations impose the obligation to investigate the credit quality of the transactions.
Thirdly, the MBS is limited to the inter-bank bond market by the 2005 regulation as we have
mentioned above. However, the experience in EU and U.S. Tells us that the most important
advantage of mortgage securitization is to link the credit market and the capital market so as
to find a alternative source of funding for the banks. The limitation on the scope of market has
blocked this linkage between these two markets in China. When most of the banks are eager
to improve it capital adequacy ratio, the MBS will be hard to issue in the inter-bank bond
market.
For these reasons, it is necessary and inevitable to reconstruct the existing legal framework
for mortgage securitization for the purpose of both encouraging its further development and
keeping financial stability. The soundness of the primary mortgage market should be focus of
the future legislative regime.
5.2.3 The approach of securitization of china
In China, it is very difficult to transplant the legal regime of the U.S governing the mortgage
securitization, although its Bankrupt law and the provisions on security interests over personal
property have been greatly influenced by the U.S Bankruptcy Code and UCC-9. Traditionally,
China is a civil law country, the law system of which was introduced from the continental
Europe, especially from Germany. Its civil law legislation is greatly influenced by the German
civil code. This merit of Chinese legal system makes it more suitable to introduce and accept
a legal regime from EU, rather than from the U.S..
With respect to the development of mortgage securitization in China, I hold that it is more
appropriate to introduce the EU covered bond legal framework. The reasons are as following.
Firstly, the U.S mortgage securitization becomes possible because the U.S. owns a
developed capital market with the involvement of the intermediatory third parties, such as the
mortgage brokers, rating agencies, insurance companies, appraisers, law firms and accounting
agencies. However, these sectors in China are less developed to the extent that they can not
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offer the services necessary for the operation of the MBS. There lack the professionals and
experts in these fields. For example, the origination and development of rating agencies is
only a recent phenomena355. And the rating agencies in china were operated irregularly, lack
of regulation and transparency, and thus have got poor international recognition.
Secondly, the mortgage market usually suffered government intervention, both from the
central government and the local ones. It seems that it is not possible to undertake mortgage
based financial innovations only depending on the market power without the government
intervention. The history of China reform demonstrates that the development of the normal
and modern market usually is driven by the government efforts guided by the top-down
reform approach, not by the market itself. So the evolutionary approach of U.S. mortgage
securitization is impossible to undertake in China. In contrast, the EU covered bond system
owns history of more than 2 centuries with an accumulation of experience dealing with
various market risks, including the credit risk, and it combines the government intervention
and market self-regulation in a inherent way realizing the equilibrium between the funding
efficiency and financial stability. This approach can be transplanted into China with the
lowest costs and risks.
Thirdly, as we have shown in Chapter 3, the U.S. legislation governing mortgage
securitization also owns some fatal drawbacks, including the secret lien problem, and the
legal uncertainty arising from the lien-sale characterization and the bankruptcy isolation.
These problems, combining the originate-to-diversify mortgage securitization, will together
destruct the legal foundation for the healthy development of the mortgage market, and thus
impose negative effects to the financial stability.
For these reasons, it is more convenient to adopt the EU covered bond rather the U.S.
mortgage securitization.
355 Dagong Global Credit Rating Co. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "Dagong") is a specialized credit rating and
risk analysis research institution founded in 1994 upon the joint approval of People‘s Bank of China and the
former State Economic & Trade Commission, People’s Republic of China. But it only started it internalization
process since July 2010 through releasing its first sovereign credit risks report for 50 countries throughout the
world. See http://www.dagongcredit.com/dagongweb/english/aboutus/index.php, visiting date: 2011-3-14.
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Ⅵ. Conclusion
6.1 The mortgage has been transformed from a stagnant lien into a tradable commodity in the
capital market because of the large-scale mortgage securitization in Europe and U.S. The
development of this trend facilitates the financing of banks, families and help to resolve the
housing problems and promote homeownership.
6.2 The institutional cause of current crisis can be traced back to the anti-crisis legislations
which created the amortization of mortgage loans. The amortization caused the mismatch
between the assets and liabilities of financial institutions. Combining with the inflation in the
1970’s, the financial institutions suffered great loss from the interest risk because of the
non-stable macroeconomic environment. Through various forms of financial innovations
developed since then, including securitization, the financial institutions utilized them as
instruments to avoid the loss as a result of the interest risk. Amortization and the inevitable
interest rate risk together constituted the two most important premises for the current crisis.
However, the more important reason of the current financial crisis lies in the fact that the later
legislators did not give a correct respondence to the changing economic environment and the
changing market environment caused by the development of mortgage securitization.
6.3 The common law system is not efficient as maintained by the scholars, such as LLSV.
That is because the flexible and efficient common law has been replaced by rigid and
inefficient legislations which are promoted by the interested industry participants. The
common law system was no longer able to give a timely response to the market changes.
Moreover, these legislations promoted by the advocates of securitization have engendered a
"race-to-the-bottom" competition and thus have rotten the legal foundation for the market
self-regulation.
6.4 Mortgage law plays an important role both in the traditional secured lending and the
mortgage based financial innovations, such as mortgage-backed securities. However, its
monitoring role in mortgage securitization has been greatly weakened under the
originate-to-diversify model of mortgage securitization. Various "distances" caused by the
OtD model produced serious incentive problems, and no participants in the secondary
mortgage market are responsible for the quality of the underlying assets for securitization.
6.5 For the healthy and sustainable development of the secondary mortgage market and
mortgage securitization, the public regulation is necessary but not sufficient. It is necessary to
re-construct the legal regime governing the mortgage securitization, including mortgage law,
secured transaction law, bankruptcy law, so as to reduce the risk in each step of financial
transaction in the microeconomic level. The institution changes in these laws should give the
market participants correct incentives to control the credit risk of the securitized assets so as
to reduce the systemic risk in the whole secondary mortgage market. In this sense, the EU
covered bond system is encouraged to introduce the interested countries suffering from the
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financial crisis. For the emerging countries, such as China, it is also a good policy choice so
as to realize the equilibrium between funding efficiency and financial stability.
6.5 Developing a secondary mortgage market in china is a good and necessary policy
alternative for improving the housing condition and promoting homeownership for the low-
and medium income families, especially for the new graduates and city migrants from the
countryside. The statutory mortgage securitization based on the EU covered bond should be
promoted in the future, rather than the U.S. OtD mortgage securitization.
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